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The United States Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida'
makes it important to determine when, if ever, Congress can compel state
courts to hear private lawsuits against their own state. The Seminole Tribe
Court held that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to authorize private
lawsuits brought against unconsenting states in the lower federal courts.2 The
Supreme Court explained that the Eleventh Amendment bars such suits and
Congress' cannot use its Article I powers to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment.' Yet the Court has reaffirmed Congress's power under Article
I to impose substantive obligations on the states, such as an obligation to pay
its employees a minimum wage." After Seminole Tribe, if Congress wants
these Article I obligations to be enforced through private lawsuits, it must rely
on state courts. The unresolved question, now before the Court, is whether
the states have sovereign immunity in their own courts from private actions
based on Article I statutes.5
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; J.D., Duke University. I
thank Evan H. Caminker, Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, James E. Pfander, and
Carlos Vdzquez for their comments on drafts of this Article. The views expressed in it are
mine alone.
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2 Id. at 72-73.
3 See id. at 73-76 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.")).
' See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (finding it unnecessary to
"revisit" Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and other decisions
that upheld federal statutes enacted under Article I "subject[ing] state governments to generally
applicable laws").
5 See Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998) (No.
98-436); see also infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (describing conflict among courts
on this issue). Whether Congress can require state courts to hear private, federal lawsuits
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This Article concludes that, under Supreme Court precedent, the answer
is yes; states do have such immunity. This conclusion rests primarily on the
against their own state is one aspect of the broader, unsettled question of the extent to which
Congress can comsel state courts to enforce federal law. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 165 (2d ed. 1990) ("[There
exists confusion about whether the Constitution provides the states with a right to protect their
courts from being overburdened by congressionally-imposed obligations to adjudicate federal
cases."); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45, at 271 (4th ed. 1983)
("The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether Congress can require state courts to
entertain federal claims when there is no analogous state-created right enforcible [sic] in the
state courts."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1212 (1988) ("The lurking constitutional question.. . is whether Congress can require
the state courts to take jurisdiction of federal statutory causes of action when they would not
entertain comparable state law cases."); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1977) [hereinafter
Field, Part One] (stating there is "little agreement" about the question "Can Congress,
legislating under article I, remove a state's immunity from suit in state court, without the state's
consent?"); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction ofan Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather Than a ProhibitionAgainst
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (1983) [hereinafter Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation] (Court has not resolved whether "a state could be required to defend a private
suit in its own state courts even though the eleventh amendment protects it against such a suit
in federal court."); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts and the Text ofArticle I1, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 242 n. 113 (1997) (describing "state
courts' obligations to entertain causes of action created by federal law" as "a very subtle
problem"); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential
Evisceration ofEx Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 503-04 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson,
Potential Evisceration] (stating "the question of whether state courts must entertain certain suits
against states that are barred from federal court by the Eleventh Amendment is not entirely
clear"); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision andState Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 57-58 (stating "[njo [Supreme Court] decision, however, holds unambiguously that the
states may not invoke sovereign immunity to resist enforcement of federal law in their own
courts"); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party
Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 595 n. 170 (1994) [hereinafter Pfander, Rethinking] (noting that
"[sicholars today disagree as to whether the state courts owe a positive duty to entertain federal
claims against the state"); Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication ofFederal Causes
ofAction in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311, 312 (1976) (describing as "confused" the "issue
of a state court's 'obligation' to hear federal causes of action when it does not wish to do so");
Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a
Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 203 (describing as "open question.., whether [a
state court] must provide a forum for enforcement of [a] federal claim even when it does not
entertain similar suits arising under local law"); Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created
Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1960) ("Historically, the extent to which states are
obliged to enforce federal rights of action has been unclear.").
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"anticommandeering principle" of the Tenth Amendment,6 which the Court
applied in New York v. United States7 and Printz v. United States.! The
anticommandeering principle prohibits Congress from using its Article I
powers to commandeer the machinery of state government to achieve federal
ends.9 The thesis of this Article is that, although New York and Printz
concerned congressional commandeering of state legislatures and executive
officials, the anticommandeering principle bars the commandeering of a
state's judiciary as well.
The Court in New York and Printz observed that the Supremacy Clause
sometimes obligates state courts to enforce federal law.1" In support of that
observation, the Court cited a line of cases the best-known of which is Testa
v. Katt." Commentators dispute the meaning of Testa and its progeny. 2 As
this author understands the Testa cases, they construe the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution (1) to invalidate state laws that permit or require state
courts to discriminate against federal claims; and (2) to require state courts to
hear federal claims if the courts have power to do so under the state law that
remains intact after such discriminatory state laws are disregarded. The Testa
cases do not construe the Clause as otherwise expanding the jurisdiction of
state courts. Thus, the Clause does not compel a state court to hear a private,
federal claim if the court lacks power to do so under neutral state law.
Under this reading of Testa, the Supremacy Clause does not invalidate
nondiscriminatory state laws that give the state immunity from private actions
in their own courts. Thus, the Clause would not invalidate a state law that
barred all private actions against the state. The Clause could come into play,
however, if a state waived immunity in its own courts from certain private
claims. In that situation, the Clause would require a state court to hear any
federal claim that arose from the same facts as did claims as to which the state
had waived its immunity. Suppose, for example, a state authorized a former
employee to sue it in state court on the ground that his or her discharge
6 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
505 U.S. 144 (1992). See also id. at 202 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (describing majority opinion as articulating an '"anticommandeering' principle").
8 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
" See id. at 2380; New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
'0 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370-72; New York, 505 U.S. at 178-79.
330 U.S. 386 (1947), cited in Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381; New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
12 See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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constituted a breach of contract under state law. In such a suit, the
Supremacy Clause would require a state court to hear a claim that the
discharge also violated federal law. The Clause would not, however, require
the state court to hear federal claims against the state that did not arise out of
the discharge.
New York and Printz establish that Congress cannot use Article I to
require the state courts to hear claims that the Supremacy Clause does not
require them to hear. The Court in those cases determined that congressional
commandeering of state government causes three harms to the system of dual
sovereignty established by the Constitution. Congressional commandeering
(1) diverts state resources from matters of local concern; (2) interferes with
the power of state citizens to set an agenda for state legislative action; and (3)
blurs the lines of political accountability between state and federal officials.
All three harms could occur if Congress could compel state courts to hear
federal claims that the courts lacked power to hear under neutral state law.
The harms would be particularly acute if Congress could compel state courts
to hear private claims against their own state without its consent.
Whereas this Article traces the states' immunity in their own courts to the
Tenth Amendment, Professor Carlos Vizquez has traced it to the Eleventh
Amendment. 3 This Article explains that a connection exists between the
states' Tenth Amendment immunity in their own courts and their Eleventh
Amendment immunity in federal court. 4 The connection is that both the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, as construed by the Supreme Court, protect
the system of dual sovereignty. That common underpinning probably explains
why the Court has looked to the states' immunity in their own courts to
determine their immunity in federal court, and vice versa. Nonetheless, the
states' immunity in the two forums is not wholly congruent. For example, a
state can extend its state-court immunity to its cities and counties. In contrast,
cities and counties lack Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court.
1" Carlos Manuel Vizquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683
(1997).
"' By "Eleventh Amendment immunity," I mean the constitutional immunity that states
enjoy in private actions brought in a lower federal court. Beginning in Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890), the Court construed that immunity to extend beyond that described in the
Eleventh Amendment. The Court has justified that extension on the ground that the states'
sovereign immunity reflects one of the "postulates" of the Constitution, see Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934), of which the Eleventh Amendment is "but
an exemplification," In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
[Vol. 37
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The states' immunity in their own courts is limited by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause requires states
to provide adequate procedures when they deprive someone of life, liberty,
or property. Those procedures may well have to include remedies in state
court against state officers who cause wrongful deprivations. Furthermore,
to enforce the Due Process Clause, Congress may well have power in certain
circumstances to compel state courts to hear actions directly against their own
state.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II describes why the Seminole
Tribe decision has made it important to understand Congress's power to
compel state courts to hear private, federal claims against their own state. It
includes a discussion of the division among the courts on this issue. Part III
argues that Congress lacks the power to exert such compulsion under Article
I because of the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. Part
IV explores the connection between the states' Tenth Amendment immunity
in their own courts and their Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court.
Part V discusses the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
states' immunity in their own courts. Part VI concludes by discussing the
implications of accepting the thesis that states have an immunity rooted in the
Tenth Amendment from private lawsuits in their own courts alleging rights
under Article I statutes. 5
IS Other commentators have addressed whether the Constitution requires, or Congress can
force, state courts to hear private, federal claims against their own state. See Daniel J. Cloherty,
Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment: Recognizing the Assumption ofState Court
Availability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1287, 1313-15 (1994); Field,
Part One, supra note 5, at 546-49; William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1261, 1286 n.129 (1989)
[hereinafter Fletcher, A Reply to Critics]; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLum. L. REv. 1889, 1937 & n.256 (1983);
Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1145, 1151 (1984); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 61 (1989); Redish & Muench, supra note 5, at 340-
46; Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts:
Implications for the Theory ofJudicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REv. 71 (1998); Vzquez, supra
note 13; Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against
States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REv. 189 (1981); see also
Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise,
1995 Wis. L. REv. 39, 41-46 (summarizing author's view that history shows state courts
traditionally have been understood to be unable, or at least not compelled, to hear certain federal
claims); Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins ofConstitutionally Compelled Remedies,
107 YALE L.J. 77, 111-25 (1997) (discussing 19th-century Supreme Court decisions suggesting
1998-99]
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II. CURRENT LAW ON THE IMMUNITY OF STATES IN THEIR OWN COURTS
Under current law, Congress can use Article I to impose substantive
obligations on the states but not to authorize private enforcement of those
obligations in federal court. Congress may well respond to this situation by
providing for private enforcement actions against the states in their own
courts. It is unsettled whether Congress can force the state courts to entertain
such actions without the state's consent. That issue has divided the lower
courts and is now before the United States Supreme Court. 6
In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress cannot use Article I to
open the doors of the federal courts to people who want to sue an
unconsenting state.' There, the Court struck down a federal law authorizing
Native American tribes to sue states in federal court to compel them to
negotiate about gambling on tribal reservations. 8 The federal law was based
on the Commerce Clause. 9 The Court held that Congress cannot use the
state courts were sometimes obligated to hear actions against their officers for constitutional
violations). Of these commentators, only Professor V6zquez has argued, as I do, that states have
a constitutional immunity from federal claims in their own courts. He traces that immunity to
the Eleventh Amendment; however, whereas I trace it to the Tenth Amendment. See infra notes
256-365 and accompanying text (discussing this point of disagreement and its significance).
Although other commentators have referred to the possibility that the Tenth Amendment
supports state-court immunity from federal claims, I believe this is the first detailed analysis of
the issue. Cf RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 477 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER 4th ed.] (questioning
whether New York "establish[es] Congress's power to impose jurisdiction on otherwise
competent state courts... where necessary and proper to implement federal policy"); REDISH,
supra note 5, at 166-67 ("Any search for a constitutional state enclave [from an obligation by
its courts to enforce federal law] logically begins with the tenth amendment...."); id. at 168-69
(concluding that Tenth Amendment does not create such an enclave); Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1111-12 (proposing that inquiry into general issue of state
sovereign immunity "may be based on the tenth amendment"); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 99 n.394
(1988) [hereinafter Jackson, State Sovereign Immunity] ("forcing state courts to adjudicate
[certain federal] claims poses federalism problems"); Meltzer, supra note 5, at 59-60 ("the
anticommandeering principle might be seized upon to raise doubts about Congress's
constitutional power to require the states' courts to enforce federal law against the states").
16 See Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998) (No.
98-436).
'7 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-73 (1996).
" See id. at 45-47 (describing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(1994)).
,' See id. at 47 (stating that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act "was passed by Congress
[Vol. 37
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from private actions brought in federal court.2° At the same time, the Court
reaffirmed Congress's power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The Court reasoned that, unlike the
Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment postdated the Eleventh
Amendment and "operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and
federal power achieved by Article III [of the Constitution] and the Eleventh
Amendment., 22 As the dissent in Seminole Tribe observed, this reasoning
appears to preclude Congress from using any of its Article I powers to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.'
Although Congress can no longer use Article I to authorize private suits
under the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3"); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(Commerce Clause) ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ....
20 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56-75.
21 See id. at 65-66; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
22 Id.
23 See id. at 77-78 & n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 73 ("Article I cannot be
used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."); Close v.
New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1997) (joining "the long list of courts that have concluded,
after Seminole, Congress cannot abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
pursuant to any Article I power"); see also Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Congress lacked power under War Powers to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity), vacated in relevant part as superseded by statute, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999).
But see Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 n.9 (I st Cir. 1996) (holding that,
notwithstanding Seminole Tribe, Congress had power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment using
its War Powers). Although Seminole Tribe appears to bar Congress's use of Article I to
authorize private, federal-court actions against unconsenting states, the Court's decision does
not appear to bar Congress's use of Article I to encourage the states to consent to such actions.
For example, Congress presumably can still use its Spending Power to obtain such consent, by
conditioning grants of federal money to the states on their consenting to suits associated with
the use of that money. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I (Spending Clause); Kit Kinports,
Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MiNN. L. REv. 793, 822-27 (1998) (arguing this use
of Spending Clause survives Seminole Tribe); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign
Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REv. 102, 102 (1996) (describing Seminole Tribe as
holding that "Congress lacks authority under itsArticle I, Section 8regulatorypowers to subject
unconsenting states to suits initiated in federal court by private persons") (emphasis added). It
is also possible that, even after Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar private,
federal court suits brought directly under provisions in Article I that specifically forbid certain
activities by the states, such as the coining of money. See James E. Pfander, History and State
Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1269,
1330 (1998) [hereinafter Pfander, History] (discussing historical support for this view).
1998-99]
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against the states in federal court, Congress can still use Article I to impose
substantive obligations on the states. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,24 the Court upheld the application of the federal minimum-
wage and overtime law to state and local governments against a Tenth
Amendment challenge.2 The Court treated the federal law, the Fair Labor
Standards Act26 (FLSA), as an exercise of the Commerce Clause.2" In more
recent decisions, the Court has said Garcia sustained Congress's power under
Article I to subject states to "generally applicable" laws, which also regulate
private conduct.28 With that characterization in mind, the Court has declined
to "revisit" Garcia and other decisions upholding Congress's power under
Article I to subject states to generally applicable laws.29
24 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
25 See id. at 555-57.
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
217 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 532, 537, 547-48 (discussing Congress's Commerce Clause
power).
29 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (distinguishing "a federal law
of general applicability" from one the object of which is "to direct the functioning of the state
executive"); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (declining to "revisit"
Garcia and other cases upholding Congress's power under Article I to enact "generally
applicable laws" subjecting a state "to the same legislation applicable to private parties"); id.
at 177 (distinguishing case before it from cases addressing "whether the Tenth Amendment
limits the ability of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws"); id. at
178 (even if"a particularly strong federal interest enables Congress to bring state governments
within the orbit of generally applicable federal regulation ..... [nlo matter how powerful the
federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require
the States to regulate"); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) (holding federal
statute did not violate Tenth Amendment because it was a "generally applicable federal
regulation[ ]") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
759 (1982) (distinguishing issue of "extent to which state sovereignty shields the States from
generally applicable federal regulations" from issue of permissibility of federal government's
"attempt[] to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals").
29 See New York, 505 U.S. at 160 (declining to "revisit" Garcia and other cases upholding
Congress's power under Article I to enact "generally applicable laws" subjecting a state "to the
same legislation applicable to private parties"). Seminole Tribe was not the first Supreme Court
decision to open a gap between Congress's imposition of substantive obligations on the states
and Congress's authorization of private actions to enforce those obligations against the states.
In Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), the Court held that, although Congress intended in the FLSA to
regulate the wages of state employees like the plaintiffs, Congress had not made sufficiently
clear an intention to authorize private suits against the states by those employees for violations
of the FLSA. See id. at 283-88; see also Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 5,
at 1112 ("It is one thing for the federal government to regulate state conduct by creating certain
[Vol. 37
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The fallout of Seminole Tribe may well lead Congress to use state courts
for private enforcement of the "generally applicable" federal requirements
that, under Garcia, Congress can still impose on the states under Article I.30
In the wake of Seminole Tribe, the lower federal courts have held that states
are immune from private actions under the FLSA in those courts.3 The lower
federal courts have also relied on Seminole Tribe to strike down provisions
authorizing private, federal-court actions against the states under the
Copyright Act and the Bankruptcy Code.3" These decisions cast doubt on the
validity of private enforcement of other federal statutes in federal court, such
federal obligations .... It may be another for it to create private federal causes of action and
particular remedies to enforce these obligations .. "). Unlike Seminole Tribe, which was a
case about congressional power to authorize such suits, Employees concerned congressional
intent to authorize such suits. Nonetheless, the Court's insistence, in Employees, on a clear
statement of congressional intent arguably foreshadowed the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe.
Cf Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment & Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203, 1241 (1978)
[hereinafter Field, Other Doctrines] ("unarticulated doubts concerning congressional power
contribute to holdings grounded upon an absence of congressional intent").
30 See, e.g., Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, 112 Stat.
3315 (amending the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994,
38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-04, 4311-18, 4321-26, 4331-33 (1994 & Supp. 1996), to permit private
actions to enforce Article I statute to be brought exclusively in state court); see also Velasquez
v. Frapwell, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing this amendment). See generally John T.
Cross, Intellectual Property and the Eleventh Amendment After Seminole Tribe, 47 DEPAUL L.
REv. 519, 520 (1998) ("Although Congress may still invoke Article I to impose substantive
liability on the states, Seminole Tribe forces it to turn to state courts for the actual adjudication
of most lawsuits brought against state defendants."); Meltzer, supra note 5, at 57-62 (discussing
"possibility" after Seminole Tribe that Congress can "rely upon the state courts to require state
governments to provide retrospective relief authorized by federal law"); Monaghan, supra note
23, at 126 (observing that, in light of Seminole Tribe, "the federal government may come to rely
upon state courts" to enforce some federal rights).
3' See Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (11 th Cir. 1998) (holding state could not be
sued in private, federal-court action under FLSA and citing decisions of seven other circuits so
holding).
32 See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 287-91 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
Congress could not abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from private suit for
copyright infringement); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140,
1146-47 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding Congress could not abrogate Eleventh Amendment under the
Bankruptcy Code). Cf College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1347-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999) (No. 98-
531) (holding federal statute authorizing patent infringement suits in federal court against states




as certain environmental laws enacted under Article I that apply to state and
private entities alike.33 If these decisions are correct and if Congress wants
these Article I statutes to be enforced against the states through private
actions,34 it will have to provide for the actions to be brought in state courts. 35
Congress's power to do that is unsettled. The Court often said in
nineteenth and early twentieth century decisions that states are immune from
lawsuits in their own courts.36 In more recent decisions, however, the Court
has hinted that unconsenting states might be privately sued on federal claims
33 See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ETAL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW& POLICY: NATURE, LAW
& SOCIETY 373 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing "Seminole's holding in its environmental law
context"); Dennis A. Whitaker, Interdisciplinary Aspects of Seminole Tribe v. Florida:
Environmental Law, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1441 (1997).
14 While private suits are an important means of enforcing statutory obligations, they are
not the only means. For example, the United States can bring a federal-court action against a
state to enforce its substantive obligations. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare
v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (although federal statute
could not be enforced against states by private lawsuits in federal court, statute could be
enforced by enforcement actions against states brought by United States). Such actions are not
barred from federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi,
380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643-45 (1892). This
Article is agnostic on the question whether the United States could bring an action against an
unconsenting state in the state's own courts to enforce an Article I statute.
3' This Article argues the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from using its Article I
powers to authorize private actions against a state in its own courts, if those courts lack power
under neutral state law to hear the action. This Article does not explore Congress's power to
compel the courts of State A to hear such actions against the courts of State B. The Court has
suggested, however, that the Tenth Amendment also limits that exercise of Congress's Article
I powers, See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), discussed infra note 247.
36 See, e.g., Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32,34 (1918) ("The right of individuals to sue a State,
in either a federal or a state court, cannot be derived from the Constitution or laws of the United
States."); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446,451 (1883) ("It may be
accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a state nor the United States may be
sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent .... ); Beers v. Arkansas,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857) (upholding dismissal of private suit against state in its own
court alleging constitutional violation, stating that "[i]t is an established principle of
jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in
any other, without its consent and permission"). In addition to the foregoing cases, in which
the Court has specifically said states cannot be sued in their own courts, the Court has described
the states' immunity in terms that do not limit that immunity to federal court. See, e.g., In re
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("a State may not be sued without its consent"); Briscoe
v. President of Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 321 (1837) ("No
sovereign state is liable to be sued, without her consent."). Cf Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,
16 (1890) ("The suability of a State, without its consent, was a thing unknown to the law.").
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in their own courts." The Court has never squarely addressed Congress's
power to force a state court to hear private claims against its own state without
the state's consent.38
In the absence of guidance from the Court, the highest state courts have
disagreed whether state courts must hear private actions against their own
state to enforce Article I statutes despite the state's sovereign immunity under
state law. Most recently, the Maine Supreme Court, in Alden v. Maine,39 held
that Maine is immune from private suits under the FLSA brought in its own
courts.40 That holding squarely conflicts with a recent decision by the
Arkansas Supreme Court holding that courts in that state must hear private
FLSA actions despite the state's sovereign immunity.4' The holding in Alden
also conflicts with suggestions by several federal courts of appeals that state
courts must entertain private FLSA actions.42 These conflicting views in post-
Seminole Tribe decisions reflect a division that pre-dates Seminole Tribe.4"
" See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991) (stating that
when Congress clearly expresses its intention that a federal statute be enforceable against a State
in state court, "the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in every State, fully enforceable
in state court"); see also Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994) (asserting, in dicta, that
state court's denial of private claim for recovery of state taxes collected in violation of federal
law was itself a violation of Fourteenth Amendment, "the sovereign immunity that States
traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding").
" See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 5, at 57-58 (stating that "[n]o [Supreme Court] decision.
.. holds unambiguously that the states may not invoke sovereign immunity to resist enforcement
of federal law in their own courts"); see also supra note 5. Cf Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356
(1990) (holding state court was obligated to hear federal claim against public school district
when it entertained similar state-law claims and when school district was not shown to share
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity), discussed infra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
" 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 443 (1998) (No. 98-436).
40 Id. at 175.
4' See Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998), petition for cert.
filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3024 (U.S. June 24, 1998) (No. 98-4); see also ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20
("The State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any of her courts.").
42 See, e.g., Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 817 (10th Cir. 1997); Wilson-Jones v.
Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1996), modified, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1997).
4' Compare Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422, 424-32 (Mass.
1991) (holding Eleventh Amendment barred private action against state in its own court alleging
claims Under federal Jones Act, general admiralty law, and state law, except to extent that state
waived its immunity in state tort claims act); Maloney v. New York, 144 N.E.2d 364, 365-67
(N.Y. 1957) (holding sovereign immunity barred private action against state in its own court
under federal Jones Act); Mossman v. Donahey, 346 N.E.2d 305,307-15 (Ohio 1976) (holding
Eleventh Amendment barred private action against state in its own court to enforce FLSA); and
Gross v. Washington State Ferries, 367 P.2d 600, 602-05 (Wash. 1961) (holding sovereign
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Alden
to resolve the issue." This Article proposes the resolution that the author
believes is most faithful to the Court's precedent.45
immunity barred private action against state toll bridge authority in state court alleging claims
under federal Jones Act and general maritime law), with Clover Bottom Hosp. & Sch. v.
Townsend, 513 S.W.2d 505,507 (Tenn. 1974) (holding sovereign immunity did not bar private
action against state in its own court under FLSA). See also Ribitzki v. School Bd. of Highlands
County, 710 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding Eleventh Amendment did not bar
private action under FLSA against school board); Weppler v. School Bd. of Dade County, 311
So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding contra); Bunch v. Robinson, 712 A.2d 585, 588-
96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (same); Lyons v. Texas A & M Univ., 545 S.W.2d 56, 58-59
(Tex. App. 1976) (holding sovereign immunity barred private action against state university in
state court under federal Jones Act, general maritime law, and state tort claims act). Cf Board
of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enters. Co., 255 So. 2d 869 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (holding
sovereign immunity barred admiralty tort suit in state court against state agency), revd, 273 So.
2d 19 (La. 1973) (holding state boards and agencies were not entitled to sovereign immunity
and casting doubt on validity of immunity doctrine).
" Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998) (No. 98-436). The questions presented by the
petition for certiorari in Alden are:
1. May a state court refuse to entertain a federal statutory private party cause of
action against a State or a state agency-such as the present state employee action
against the State of Maine under the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.-on the basis of state sovereign immunity?
2. If a state court may properly refuse to entertain such a federal statutory private
party action on the basis of state sovereign immunity in certain circumstances but not
in others, may a state court do so in the circumstance in which that court entertains
analogous state statutory actions?
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), cert. granted,
119 S. Ct. 443 (1998) (No. 98-436). The Court could decide the case without resolving either
of these issues. The action in Alden was brought in the Superior Court of Maine under a
provision in the FLSA that authorizes private actions to be brought "in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994). One could argue that Section
216(b) does not authorize this action, because the Superior Court of Maine was not "competent"
to hear an action barred by the state law of sovereign immunity. See Brief of the National
Conference of State Legislatures et al., as Amici Curiae In Support of Respondent at 6 n.6,
Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998) (No. 98-436).
"' In the interest of full disclosure, the author notes that he has filed a brief amicus curiae
in support of respondent (the State of Maine) in Alden, on behalf of various state and local
government organizations and officials.
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III. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ANTICOMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE TO
PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST STATES IN THEIR OWN COURTS
This Part concludes that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from using
Article I to compel state courts to hear private actions that the Supremacy
Clause would not require the courts to hear. It further concludes that the
Supremacy Clause does not compel a state court to hear a private action
against its own state if the state court lacks power to hear that action under
neutral state law-i.e., state law that does not discriminate against federal
claims, including a state's law of sovereign immunity.
The first conclusion follows from Supreme Court decisions holding that
the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from "commandeering" state
government.46 So far, the Court has applied the anticommandeering rule to
strike down only federal laws that commandeered state legislative and
executive officials. This Part argues that the rule also bars congressional
commandeering of state courts.
The second conclusion follows from a line of cases the most famous of
which is Testa v. Katt. Commentators have long disputed the meaning of the
Testa cases. This Article concludes that those cases establish a
nondiscrimination principle that does not disturb neutral state laws that give
a state total or partial immunity from private actions in its own courts.
This Part begins by describing the Court's decisions on the
anticommandeering principle. It then discusses the Testa cases. It ends by
integrating the two lines of cases.
A. The Anticommandeering Cases
1. New York v. United States
In New York v. United States,47 the Court held that a provision in the
federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985"8
46 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)
(using the term "commandeefr]," apparently for the first time in a Supreme Court decision, in
dicta, stating that Congress cannot "commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program"), quoted in New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992); see also Prirntz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2381 (1997) (explaining that federal statutory provisions were upheld in prior decision
"precisely because they did not commandeer state government") (emphasis added).
47 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
48 42 U.S.C. § 2021(e)(d)(2)(c) (1994).
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exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and thereby violated
the Tenth Amendment.49 The provision required each state to take title to all
low-level radioactive waste generated in the state unless it met a deadline for
adopting a program to dispose of the waste. 5' The Court construed this "take
title" provision as requiring state legislatures to enact waste-disposal laws or
to implement an administrative solution (or both)." In invalidating the
provision, the Court declared Congress cannot "commandeer[] the legislative
processes of the State[ ] by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program." 2  The Court made clear that this
"anticommandeering principle" was absolute;53 it barred Congress from using
Article I to compel state legislatures to enforce federal law, no matter how
strong the federal interest was in their doing so.54
49 See New York, 505 U.S. at 184 (provision was "irreconcilable with the powers delegated
to Congress by the Constitution and hence with the Tenth Amendment's reservation to the
States of those powers not delegated to the Federal Government").
'0 See id. at 153-54, 174-76 (describing "take title" provision of Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985).
", See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380 (describing New York); New York, 505 U.S. at 174-76.
52 New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
51 See id. at 202 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing majority's
opinion as adopting an "'anticommandeering' principle").
54 See id. at 178. The Court left unclear whether the anticommandeering principle restricts
only Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, some or all of Congress's powers under
Article I, or all of Congress's powers under the Constitution. This Article follows the widely
held assumption that the principle restricts most of the powers in Article I. See, e.g., Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to
Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1006 n. 13 (1995) [hereinafter Caminker,
Subordinacy]. That assumption accords with some, but not all, of the language of the opinion.
Some language in the opinion suggested that the Court was addressing Congress's power under
all of, but only, Article I. See New York, 505 U.S. at 155 (describing case law on "ascertaining
the constitutional line between federal and state power" as framing the issue in two different
ways: as "whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress
in Article I of the Constitution" or as "whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment") (emphasis added); id. at 157 (Tenth
Amendment required the Court in that case to determine "whether an incident of state
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article Ipower") (emphasis added); id. at 207 n.3
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority for reading history "so
selectively as to restrict the proper scope of Congress's powers under Article 1") (emphasis
added). Other language in the opinion suggested that the anticommandeering rule limited all
of Congress's power under the Constitution. See id. at 176 ("[T]he Constitution does not
empower Congress to subject state governments to this type of instruction," namely, "a simple
command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress."); id. at 188 (The
Constitution does not "authorize Congress simply to direct the States to provide for the disposal
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The Court in New York distinguished federal statutes that commandeer
state legislatures from federal statutes that are enforceable in state courts."5
The Court acknowledged, "Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in
a sense, direct state judges to enforce them."56 But "this sort of federal
'direction' of state judges," the Court explained, "is mandated by the text of
the Supremacy Clause."57 The Court was referring to the second part of the
Supremacy Clause, which commands statejudges to follow federal law. 58 The
of the radioactive waste generated within their borders."). Moreover, it is quite possible that
some of Congress's Article I powers, such as the War Powers, are not subject to the
anticommandeering principle. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39-40, Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478 & 95-1503) (remark by Rehnquist, C.J.,
suggesting Congress's War Powers might be treated differently from other Article I powers for
purposes of Tenth Amendment); see also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854
n. 18 (1976) (striking down Commerce Clause statute on Tenth Amendment grounds, but noting
Court was not addressing "the scope of Congress's authority under its war power"), overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). Indeed, several
Article I provisions could be read expressly to permit limited commandeering of state officials.
Examples of such provisions include the provision empowering Congress to regulate the time,
place, and manner of congressional elections, see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1, and the provision
authorizing Congress and the President to train and call up the State militia, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 16; art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371-72 (indicating that Congress can
enact law implementing obligation of States' executive authorities under Extradition Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 463 n.3 (4th Cir. 1998)
(distinguishing federal statute before it, which court held violated anticommandeering rule, from
federal "motor voter" law, which had been upheld against Tenth Amendment challenge in, e.g.,
Association of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 1995)); see
also Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT.
REv. 199,213 n.41 [hereinafter Caminker, Limits ofFormalism] (noting that the Militia Clauses,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15 & 16, and Time, Place, and Manner Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 4, cl. 1, may authorize federal commandeering of state officers); Caminker, Subordinacy,
supra at 1032-34 (arguing existence of constitutional provisions specifically authorizing
commandeering should not be read to preclude commandeering under other provisions);
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957, 1992 & nn. 186-
89 (1993) (citing, in addition to provisions already mentioned, the Fugitive Slave Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3). For simplicity's sake, this Article describes New York and the
Court's later decision in Printz v. United States as holding that Congress cannot use its "Article
I" powers to commandeer the states. This description is not meant to imply that commandeering
is prohibited when specifically permitted by Article I.
" New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
16 Id. at 178-79.
57 id.
58 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause) ("This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made pursuant thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
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Court observed,"No comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress
to command state legislatures to legislate." 9
2. Printz v. United States
In Printz v. United States,' the Court struck down provisions of the
federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 6' (Brady Act) that required
state and local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers. 62 The Court concluded that the provisions
violated the "rule" articulated in New York that '[t]he Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program.' 63  The Court described this rule as rooted in the "essential
postulate," which was made "express" in the Tenth Amendment, that the
Constitution establishes a "system of dual sovereignty."' As in New York, the
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
59 New York, 505 U.S. at 179. Before New York, the Court had upheld in FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), a federal law that required state utility commissions to
implement regulations promulgated by FERC. The Court construed the federal law to permit
state commissions to implement the FERC regulations by adjudicating disputes of the same sort
that they were already authorized to resolve under state law. See id. at 760. Based on that
interpretation, the Court in FERC found Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), to be "instructive
and controlling." See id. The FERC Court described Testa as holding that a state court had to
entertain a federal claim that was "analogous" to state-law claims of which the state court had
jurisdiction under state law. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 386. See also infra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text. The Court in FERC said: "So it is here. The Mississippi Commission has
jurisdiction to entertain claims analogous to those granted [by the federal law], and it can satisfy
[the federal law's] requirements simply by opening its doors to claimants." FERC, 456 U.S. at
760. Thus, FERC extends Testa to encompass state officials who carry out judicial functions.
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381 n.14. For simplicity's sake, however, this Article will generally
refer to Testa as imposing an obligation on state "courts" or state "judges." The Court's
extension of Testa's obligation to officials other than state judges may not be supported by the
portion of the Supremacy Clause that specifically refers to state judges. See Caminker,
Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1040. The extension may well be justified, however, by the
Supremacy Clause as a whole and by the Supreme Court's role in enforcing that Clause. See infra
note 363.
6 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
61 18 U.S.C. § 925A (1994).
62 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368-69 (describing Brady Act).
63 Id. at 2383 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
' Id. at 2384 (Brady Act provisions requiring background checks were "fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty"); id. at 2376-77 (identifying
among "essential postulates" that "the Constitution established a system of dual sovereignty,"
which was "rendered express" by Tenth Amendment (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Court said the anticommandeering rule was an absolute bar to Congress's use
of Article I powers.65
As in New York, the Court in Printz distinguished the enforcement of
federal law by state courts from its enforcement by the other branches of state
government."6 The Court explained that state courts are "viewed
distinctively" in regard to their obligation to enforce federal laws, as shown
by the specific mention of state judges in the Supremacy Clause.
6
B. The Testa Line of Cases
The Court observed in New York and Printz that state courts sometimes
have a duty under the Supremacy Clause to enforce federal laws enacted under
Article 1.68 In making that observation, the Court cited a line of cases the most
famous of which is Testa v. Katt.69 In this author's view, the Testa cases
establish that the Supremacy Clause, of its own force, (1) invalidates state
laws that require or permit state courts to discriminate against federal claims;
and (2) requires state courts to hear federal claims that they have power to
hear under the state law that remains intact when any discriminatory state laws
are disregarded. Apart from invalidating such discriminatory state laws, the
Supremacy Clause does not enlarge the jurisdiction of state courts. Thus, the
Supremacy Clause, standing alone, would not compel a state court to hear a
private federal claim against its own state if state law barred the state courts
from hearing any private claim against the state. The Clause would, however,
compel a state court to hear a federal claim against a state if state law waived
the state's immunity in its courts from a state-law claim arising on the same
facts as did the federal claim.70
65 See id. at 2383.
66 See id. at 2381 n.14.
61 See id. at 2371; see also supra note 58 (reproducing Supremacy Clause).
68 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at2381;New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
69 330 U.S. 386(1947), cited in Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381; New York, 505 U.S. at 178; see,
e.g., Collins, supra note 15, at 45 (describing Testa as "the modem starting point for discussions
of state court jurisdictional duties"); see also HART & WECHSLER 4th ed., supra note 15, at 469-
79 (treating Testa as main case on obligation of state courts to enforce federal law).
'0 This obligation applies, of course, only to federal claims that Congress has not confided
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. See generally Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,
459-60 (1990) (holding that Congress can defeat presumption of state courts' concurrent
jurisdiction by making clear its intention to confer exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts).
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1. The Testa Principle
Testa concerned a federal price-control statute authorizing someone who
had bought goods for a price exceeding the federal ceiling to sue the seller for
treble damages in "any court of competent jurisdiction."'" The Rhode Island
state courts dismissed a private action under the federal statute, because of a
state policy against enforcing the "penal" laws of a "foreign" jurisdiction.72
The Court held that the state courts could not decline jurisdiction on this
ground 73 and that those courts had an obligation under the Supremacy Clause
to hear the federal claim.74 In announcing that obligation, the Court
emphasized that "this same type of claim arising under Rhode Island law
would be enforced by that State's courts." '75 The Court determined that those
courts accordingly had "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under
established local law to adjudicate" actions underthe federal statute.76 "Under
these circumstances," the Court concluded, "the State courts are not free to
refuse enforcement of [the plaintiffs federal] claim. 77
Commentators disagree on the meaning of Testa.78 Some believe it
established a nondiscrimination principle. The principle is commonly
described as one that forbids state courts from refusing to hear federal claims
that are "analogous" to state-law claims that the courts would have power to
hear under state law.79 Other commentators read Testa more broadly to hold
7' Testa, 330 U.S. at 387-88 & n.1 (quoting federal statute).
72 See id. at 388.
73 See id at 389-94.
"4 See id. at 389. But cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1128, 1162 (1986) (questioning whether Testa rests on Supremacy Clause, in
course of arguing that Court's "inadequate state ground" doctrine rests on federal common law,
rather than Supremacy Clause).
75 Testa, 330 U.S. at 394.
76 Id.
77 Id.
71 See Jackson, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 15, at 99 n.394 (describing possible
readings of Testa); see also Collins, supra note 15, at 166-70 (discussing ambiguity of Testa);
Gordon & Gross, supra note 15, at 1159-60 (same); REDISH, supra note 5, at 166 (same).
79 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 45, at 271 ("The Supreme Court has not yet
considered whether Congress can require state courts to entertain federal claims when there is
no analogous state-created right enforcible [sic] in the state courts."); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 643 n.50 (1993) (describing Testa
as holding "state courts may not refuse to hear federal claims if they are open to analogous state
claims"); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation ofPowers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV.
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state courts must "entertain all federal causes of action."' As explained next,
this Article favors the narrow reading of Testa; however, the Article disagrees
that, under this reading, state courts must entertain any federal claim that is
somehow "analogous" to state-law claims within their jurisdiction.
Each side in the Testa debate has some support in Supreme Court
precedent. In FERC v. Mississippi,"' the Court said that the state courts in
Testa heard state-law claims "analogous" to the federal claim that they were
obligated to hear. 2 That statement supports the narrow reading of Testa, but
682, 692 n.62 (1976) (similar description of Testa); Note, supra note 5, at 1552 n.6
(understanding Testa to premise state court's obligation to enforce federal law upon "whether
a state enforces an analogous right"); see also Massey, supra note 15, at 145 ("[Tlhe holding
in Testa commands states to provide a state forum for federal claims to the extent the state
courts would entertain parallel state claims under established jurisdictional rules of local law.").
" Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1038. See id. at 1024 (under Testa, "state
courts generally must enforce federal law by entertaining federal claims"); Cloherty, supra note
15, at 1313 (under Testa, "[s]tate courts are obligated to hear claims of federal statutory rights
when Congress requires them to do so"); Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. REv. 1, 35 (1967);
Gordon & Gross, supra note 15, at 1171-77; Jackson, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 15,
at 38 nn. 157-58, 74 n.304, 99 & n.394; Redish & Muench, supra note 5, at 350-59; Wolcher,
supra note 23, at 241-44 (arguing Testa should be read to require state court to entertain federal
claims, even if "state law denies jurisdiction to state courts over any and all causes of action for
damages against the state"); see also Meltzer, supra note 5, at 58 ("the better argument favors
upholding the state courts' obligation" to enforce federal law regardless of state sovereign
immunity). Cf Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1095-98 ("Testa strongly
suggests that the federal government may require state courts to entertain federal causes of
action in perhaps all but extraordinary circumstances. Yet difficulties arise in applying Testa
to suits brought against states by private citizens and in finding in the case the principle that the
state courts must hear federal causes of action that are barred in federal court."); Sandalow,
supra note 5, at 205-06 (finding that Testa provides "[s]ome support" for view that state courts
must adjudicate federal claim "even in the absence of discrimination," yet also finding it
"difficult to perceive the federal interest that justifies so substantial an intrusion upon the power
of the states to determine the purposes to be served by agencies of state government").
456 U.S. 742 (1982).
82 See id. at 760 (stating that, in Testa, "[t]he courts of Rhode Island refused to entertain
[federal] claims, although they heard analogous state causes of action" and reasoning that
Mississippi state agency had obligation to adjudicate federal claims "analogous" to claims that
it was empowered to hear under state law); see also id. at 784 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (describing Testa as holding that "state trial courts may not refuse to hear
a federal claim if 'th[e] same type of claim arising under [state] law would be enforced by that
State's courts") (quoting Testa, 330 U.S. at 394) (internal bracketed text added by Justice
O'Connor). Cf Powell, supra note 79, at 643 n.50 (describing Justice O'Connor's "handling"
of Testa in her partial dissent in FERC as "remarkably grudging").
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it does not foreclose the broad reading. On the other hand, the Court hinted
at a broad reading of Testa, without conclusively adopting it, in Hilton v.
South Carolina Public Railways Commission.83 The Hilton Court cited one
of Testa's progeny, Howlett v. Rose, 84 for the proposition that, when a federal
statute creates a private cause of action against a state, "the Supremacy Clause
makes that statute... fully enforceable in state court." 5 This statement was
dicta insofar as it suggested that states lack immunity from such causes of
action. The issue before the Court in Hilton was "a pure question of statutory
construction:"" namely, whether Congress intended the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA) to create a cause of action in state court against a state-
owned railroad."7 Nonetheless, Hilton's failure to suggest that states had
immunity in their own courts from these FELA actions implies that no such
immunity exists, an implication at odds with the thesis of this Article.
Moreover, Justice Marshall expressly rejected the existence of such immunity,
based on a broad reading of Testa, in his concurring opinion in Employees of
the Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health
& Welfare."8 Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that the Eleventh
Amendment barred private suits under the FLSA against the States in federal
court; he also believed, however, that the state courts had an obligation under
Testa to entertain those suits.s9
83 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
84 496 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1990) (discussing Testa).
85 Hilton, 502 U.S. at 207 (citing Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367-68).
86 Id. at 205. In its briefs to the Court, the state in Hilton emphasized that it was not
claiming sovereign immunity from the FELA claim asserted against it. See Brief on the Merits
by Respondent at 21, Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991) (No.
90-848) ("The State of South Carolina has not asserted sovereign immunity as an affirmative
defense to a federal cause of action under which it would be liable but for the defense."); see
also id. at 2 ("The South Carolina Public Railways Commission assumes, but does not concede,
that Congress has the Constitutional authority to subject it to the FELA."). I therefore do not
share Professor VAzquez's view of Hilton as holding that Congress has the power to impose
damage liability on a state despite the state's invocation of sovereign immunity. See Vdzquez,
supra note 13, at 1788-89.
87 See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 205.
88 411 U.S. 279, 289 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
89 See id. at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result) ("While constitutional limitations
upon federal judicial power bar a federal court action by these employees to enforce their rights,
the courts of the State nevertheless have an independent constitutional obligation to entertain
employee actions to enforce those rights.") (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)); see also
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 n.2 (1985) (citing Justice Marshall's
concurrence to rebut dissent's criticism that majority's decision-which held states immune
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Justice Marshall's reading "clearly oversteps Testa's bounds."'  In Testa
and the line of cases of which it is a part, the Court struck down state laws
that permitted or required state courts to discriminate against federal claims."'
The Court made clear in Testa that such state laws violate the Supremacy
Clause.92 In the cases involving such laws, the Court held -that the Clause
obligated the state courts to hear the federal claims. The Court premised that
obligation, however, on the state courts' having power to do so under the state
law that remained intact when the discriminatory state law was disregarded. 93
The Court never suggested that, apart from invalidating discriminatory state
laws, the Supremacy Clause expanded the state courts' jurisdiction.
Moreover, such a suggestion would conflict with the "valid excuse"
doctrine. That doctrine holds that state courts can decline to hear a federal
action if they have a valid excuse for doing so.' An excuse is "valid" if it
under Eleventh Amendment from federal-court actions under a federal statute-made private
relief wholly unavailable and adding, in dicta, "It denigrates the judges who serve on the state
courts to suggest that they will not enforce the supreme law of the land.").
o Tribe, supra note 79, at 692 n.62.
9' The earliest case in the Testa line was Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford
Railroad Co. (Second Employers'Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1 (1912). In Mondou, the Court
held that a state court erred in refusing to entertain a private action under a federal statute
because of disagreement with the policy underlying the statute. Id. at 55-59. The Court
concluded that rights arising under a federal statute are enforceable in state courts "when their
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion." Id. at 55. The next case
in the Testa line was McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
There, the Court struck down a state law that allowed state courts to hear state-law, but not
federal-law, causes of action arising in other states. Id. at 231-34. The Court observed that the
state courts had "general jurisdiction of the class of actions to which [the federal cause of action
at issue] belong[ J, in cases between litigants situated like those in the case at bar." Id. at 232.
The Court accordingly determined that the plaintiff in that case was barred from state court
"because he is suing to enforce a federal act." Id. at 234. The Court declared, "A state may not
discriminate against rights arising under federal laws." Id. Following McKnett and Testa, the
Court held in Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), that a state court violated the Supremacy
Clause by refusing to hear a claim against a local school board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.
at 375-83. The Court based that holding, in part, on the fact that the state courts would have
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit had it been based on state, rather than
federal, law. See id. at 377-80.
92 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1946).
93 See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378 (discussing state law that gave the courts jurisdiction over
the federal claim); Testa, 330 U.S. at 394 & n.13 (same); Mondou, 223 U.S. at 55 (concluding
that rights under federal statute at issue were enforceable in state courts "when theirjurisdiction,
as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion").
' See, e.g., Howlett, 496 U.S. at 357, 369.
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relates to judicial administration and neither discriminates against nor is
inconsistent with federal law.95 Thus, in the absence of a valid federal statute,
a state may neutrally control the volume and types of cases that its courts can
hear.96 For example, a state can have a doctrine of forum non conveniens
under which its courts decline to hear certain federal claims (as well as state-
law claims). 97 A state can also put territorial restrictions on its courts that
prevents them from hearing federal (as well as state-law) causes of action that
arise outside their territory.98
2. Applying the Testa Principle to State-Court Actions Against States
that Have Wholly Preserved Their State-Court Immunity
Under the reading of Testa proposed above, the Supremacy Clause does
not compel a state court to hear a federal claim that it lacks power to hear
under a neutral state law of judicial administration. So read, Testa strongly
implies that the Clause would not compel state courts to hear any federal
claims against a state if state law barred all state-court actions against the
state.99 Such a law would not discriminate against federal claims."
Moreover, the law would relate tojudicial administration; it would concern the
state courts' competence over parties and subject matter.''
91 See id. at 372.
" See, e.g., Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377,387-88
(1929).
" See Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1950); cf Douglas,
279 U.S. at 387-88 (upholding state statute that permitted courts to dismiss both federal and
state-law claims in cases in which neither plaintiff nor defendant was state resident; remarking,
however, that result might be different if federal statute required state courts to hear federal
claims notwithstanding discretionary state-law doctrines to the contrary).
9' See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 123 (1945).
9 Tribe, supra note 79, at 692 n.62; see also Massey, supra note 15, at 145 (observing
that, under Testa, "a state could theoretically deny a forum for a private federal claim against
the state on the ground that, pursuant to its sovereign immunity from suit in its courts, it does
not permit parallel private state claims," but arguing that General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S.
211 (1908), restricts states' ability to do this); Wolcher, supra note 15, at 241 (recognizing
that, notwithstanding Testa, a "difficult question arises [as to state court's obligation to hear
federal claim] where state law denies jurisdiction to state courts over any and all causes of
action for damages against the state"); infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
'" See Tribe, supra note 79, at 692 n.62. ("How can a state be charged with discriminating
against a federal claim when it allows no suits in state courts against the sovereign?").
1o1 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 381 (1990) (suggesting that rules are jurisdictional
when they concern court's "power over the person and competence over the subject matter");
see also McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934) (describing rules
subject to "valid excuse" doctrine as ones that "determine the limits of the jurisdiction of [state]
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This subsection examines precedent that supports Testa's implication that
the Supremacy Clause does not, of its own force, compel a state court to hear
an action against a state that has wholly preserved immunity in its own courts.
The precedent both postdates and predates Testa.
a. Post-Testa Decision Supporting State-Court Immunity
The relevant post-Testa case is Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v.
Musgrove, 2 decided two years after Testa. In a one-paragraph, per curiam
opinion, the Court dismissed an appeal from a decision by the Georgia
Supreme Court because that court's judgment was "based upon a non-federal
ground adequate to support it."' 3 The Georgia Supreme Court had dismissed
an action brought in state court against the Georgia Commissioner of Revenue
challenging the constitutionality of a state tax law.l" The dismissal was based
on the Georgia court's determination that the action was "in substance and
effect an action against the State and was not maintainable, the State not
having consented to be thus sued."'"5 The United States Supreme Court's
conclusion that this was an adequate, non-federal basis for dismissal indicates
that nothing in federal law, including in the Constitution, required the state
court to hear the private action against its own state alleging a violation of the
Constitution."0
In a recent dissent, Justice Souter argued "the posture of the [Musgrove]
case suggests that the Court may have viewed the lower court's decision as
based on a valid state law regarding the timing and not the existence of state
remedies.""0 7 Justice Souter further argued that, in light of the Court's prior
decision in General Oil Co. v. Crain,08 state courts indeed have a
constitutional duty to remedy unconstitutional state conduct.'" Justice Souter
courts [and] the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them").
102 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (per curiam).
103 Id.
"o4 See Musgrove v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 49 S.E.2d 26, 36 (Ga. 1948), appeal
dismissed, 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (per curiam).
'0' Id. at 37.
"o See Fallon, supra note 5, at 1210 n.316 (stating Musgrove "clearly implied that the state
court was under no constitutional obligation to entertain the suit").
107 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2057-58 n.14 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Fallon, supra note 5, at 1211 n.317).
os 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
' See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2058 n.14 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing
Crain); see also Gibbons, supra note 15, at 1937 n.256 (arguing for a similar reading of Crain).
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was joined in this dissent by three other Justices,' and his view of Musgrove
is shared by some commentators."' Other commentators, in contrast, have
suggested Musgrove implicitly limited or overruled Crain."2 The two
decisions, however, are compatible.
Musgrove was a state-court suit that, according to the Georgia Supreme
Court, would have been barred by the Eleventh Amendment if brought in
federal court."' In holding that the suit was "in substance and effect" against
the state, the Georgia court cited United States Supreme Court cases in which
state officers were sued in federal court." 4 Those cases held that the Eleventh
Amendment bars an officer suit in federal court if the suit seeks specific
performance of a contract between the plaintiff and the state, because such
suits are really suits against the state."5 The Georgia Supreme Court
.. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2047 (indicating Justice Souter's dissent was
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
"'. See Fallon, supra note 5, at 1211 n.317; see also Wolcher, supra note 15, at 244 n.234
(reading Musgrove as merely reflecting absence ofconstitutiohal right to injunction against state
taxes).
112 See PAUL BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 935 (2d ed. 1973) (suggesting that Crain may have been overruled sub silentio by
Musgrove); 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4024,
at 363 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that "the broader implications" of Crain "might have been
abandoned" in Musgrove); id. § 423 1, at 566 n.26 (stating that "[tjhe doctrine of the Crain case
may have been repudiated by" Musgrove); cf. Woolhandler, supra note 15, at 150 n.382 ("The
result in Musgrove may reflect a greater respect for state judge-made law than the result in
Crain."). But cf Fallon, supra note 5, at 1210 n.315 (observing that third edition of HART &
WECHSLER did not repeat suggestion in second edition that Musgrove may have silently
overruled Crain). The suggestion likewise does not appear in the fourth edition. Cf HART &
WECHSLER 4th ed., supra note 15, at 856 n.9 (questioning whether, in light of Musgrove,
Crain's "suggestion"-i.e., that state courts have obligation to entertain constitutional
claims-holds true only if plaintiff establishes that no federal court remedy exists).
" See Musgrove v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 49 S.E.2d 26, 36 (Ga. 1948).
114 See id. at 37 (citing, among other cases, Exparte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890)).
15 See Ayers, 123 U.S. at 504 (holding that federal-court officer suit based on state contract
"the object of which is... its specific performance ... is in substance a suit against the State
itself' and hence barred by Eleventh Amendment); Hans, 134 U.S. at 20 ("the state cannot be
compelled by suit to perform its contracts"); id. at 10 (citing Ayers); Temple, 134 U.S. at 30
(finding it "perfectly clear" that officer suit seeking injunctive relief from state laws that
allegedly violated Contract Clause "was virtually a suit against the state" and so "within the
principle" of, among other cases, Ayers), all cited in Musgrove, 49 S.E.2d at 37. See also
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273,285 (1906) (finding that state was bound
by decision in prior litigation in which its officers participated and in which state was "directly
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determined that those cases governed the case before it, because that case, too,
involved an attempt by a plaintiff to enforce a contract with the state." 6 The
Georgia court recognized that United States Supreme Court decisions, such
as Exparte Young," 7 had established "the general rule that a suit to restrain
a State official from executing an unconstitutional statute in violation of the
plaintiffs rights and to his irreparable damage is not a suit against the
State."' The Georgia court apparently determined the action before it did not
fall within the Ex parte Young rule not only because of the specific-
performance remedy sought but also because there was no imminent threat
that the allegedly unconstitutional state statute was going to be executed
against the plaintiff; the Georgia Revenue Commissioner had "done nothing
more than threaten to make assessments" under the statute." 9 In light of the
reasoning underlying the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Musgrove, the
United States Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal from that decision
implies that state courts do not have to entertain actions against their own state
that do not fall within the Exparte Young model. That implication arises from
a case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of the U.S. Constitution. It
interested" because of alleged limitations on its taxing power arising from "contract" between
it and plaintiff). See generally Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate
Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43
VILL. L. REv. 155, 168-74 (1998) (discussing Supreme Court cases holding that officer suits for
specific performance of government contracts were barred by sovereign immunity).
H16 See Musgrove, 49 S.E.2d at 37. The railroad in Musgrove claimed that its state charter
constituted a contract that exempted certain railroad property from ad valorem taxes. See id. at
36. The railroad further claimed that later state laws attempting to eliminate the tax exemption
violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10,
cl. I (Contract Clause) ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts .... ").
117 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
"1 Musgrove, 49 S.E.2d at 36. Ex parte Young generally permits federal-court actions
against state officials for prospective relief from violations of federal law. See, e.g., Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68(1985); but cf Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117S. Ct. 2028,2040-
43 (1997) (holding action that effectively sought quiet title judgment against state did not fall
within Ex parte Young doctrine). The Court in Young held that such actions are not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment because they are not suits against the state. See Young, 209 U.S. at
167. The Court explained that, when a state official administers an unconstitutional state law,
he or she is "stripped" of official authority, and therefore cannot claim the state's immunity as
protection. See id. at 159-60. Commentators have pointed out, as the Court in Young itself did,
that its holding was supported by the Court's precedent. See id. at 150-56; see also, e.g.,
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1041 & n.24; Meltzer, supra note 5, at
6.
119 Musgrove, 49 S.E.2d at 38.
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would seem to follow afortiori that state courts also need not entertain a
private claim based on the state's violation of a federal statute if the suit falls
outside the Ex parte Young model. 2 °
So understood, Musgrove fully accords with General Oil Co. v. Crain, the
case cited by Justice Souter."' In Crain, the Court found a federal question
presented by, and accordingly exercised appellate jurisdiction over, a
Tennessee Supreme Court decision.' In that decision, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, like the Georgia Supreme Court in Musgrove, dismissed on
sovereign immunity grounds an action against a state officer challenging a
state tax law as unconstitutional.' Unlike the state-court action in Musgrove,
however, the state-court action in Crain would not have been barred by the
Eleventh Amendment had it been brought in federal court.'24 For one thing,
the plaintiff in Crain was not seeking to enforce a contract with the state.
25
For another, unlike the officer-defendant in Musgrove, the officer-defendant
120 See Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 191 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("For the
Supremacy Clause does not give greater supremacy to [a federal statute] over the free scope of
the States to determine what shall be litigated in their courts and under what conditions, than
it gives with reference to rights directly secured by the Constitution...."). Cf Employees of
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 292
n.8 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("It seems to me a strange hierarchy that would provide
a greater opportunity to enforce congressionally created rights than constitutionally guaranteed
rights in federal court."); Field, Other Doctrines, supra note 29, at 1257-58 (explaining why it
"would be plausible" to recognize power of federal courts to enforce federal statutes against
states in private actions but no similar power to enforce constitutional provisions if Eleventh
Amendment "were to limit the [federal] judiciary while imposing no limitations upon
Congress," but finding "[n]othing in the eleventh amendment [to] support[] the view that it was
intended only to affect the powers of the [federal] judiciary and not those of Congress"); but cf
John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes ofAction Against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1422, 1430 (1975) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment limits only federal courts' power
to imply cause of action against States, not Congress's power to create such causes of action);
Tribe, supra note 79, at 693 (arguing that Eleventh Amendment gave states sovereign immunity
rights against federal courts, not against Congress).
12 See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122 See General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 228 (1908).
123 See id. at 220-28 (citing General Oil Co. v. Crain, 95 S.W. 824 (Tenn. 1906)).
124 See id. at 226-28.
12' The plaintiff in Musgrove claimed state tax laws violated the Contract Clause by
impairing a state charter granting the plaintiff a tax exemption. See Musgrove v. Georgia R.R.
& Banking Co., 49 S.E.2d 26, 36 (1948). In contrast, the plaintiff in Crain alleged that state
tax laws violated the Commerce Clause by taxing property in interstate commerce. See Crain,
209 U.S. at 214.
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in Crain had done more than merely "threaten" to make assessments under the
allegedly unconstitutional state tax law; he had actually made them."6 Crain
thus fell outside the case law holding sovereign immunity barred officer suits
seeking to compel specific performance of a state contract, and it fell within
the principle, affirmed in Ex parte Young, that a state officer could be
enjoined from "taking or injuring the plaintiff's property" in violation of
federal law, notwithstanding sovereign immunity. 2 '
In sum, Musgrove did not fall within Exparte Young (in the state supreme
court's view), but Crain did.12 The Court's disposition of Musgrove and
Crain indicates when the Constitution does not, and when it may, require a
state court to hear a private suit alleging the state violated federal law. Under
Musgrove, the state court need not hear the suit if it would be barred from
federal court by the Eleventh Amendment.'29 Under Crain, the state court
may have to hear the suit if it would fall within Exparte Young and, therefore,
could be asserted in federal court, despite the Eleventh Amendment. 3 '
126 See Crain, 209 U.S. at 213-14. Cf Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1908)
(indicating state officer had attempted to enforce allegedly unconstitutional state law in violation
of federal court order).
127 Crain, 209 U.S. at 226.
128 Today, it seems odd that the question whether an officer suit was "really" a suit against
the sovereign could depend on whether the plaintiff's claim was based on a contract with the
government and whether an officer had merely threatened to interfere with the plaintiffs
property or had actually done so (or was about to do so). At the time of Crain and Young,
however, the distinction was important. It reflected the notion that courts could entertain officer
suits, despite sovereign immunity, only if those suits established the actual commission, or
imminent occurrence, of a wrong for which a private person would be liable at common law.
See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2035 (1997); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890); Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 497, 501-02 (1887) (distinguishing
impermissible officer suits seeking specific performance of state contracts from permissible
officer suits for personal wrongs committed by officer); see also Seamon, supra note 115, at
163-70. Cf Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 306 (1952) (holding, in
later federal-court proceeding involving same controversy as Musgrove, Eleventh Amendment
did not bar suit, because it fell within Exparte Young doctrine).
129 See Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (per curiam).
130 See Crain, 209 U.S. at 226-28. Crain's suggestion that state courts have a constitutional
duty to entertain constitutional claims asserted in Exparte Young-type actions is supported by
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885), in which the Court rejected an immunity claim
asserted by a state in an action brought in state court against a state officer seeking prospective
relief for a violation of the Constitution-a classic Exparte Young-type action. See id. at 293-
301. Indeed, the Court in Ex parte Young relied on Poindexter, even though Poindexter
involved an action brought in state court. See Young, 209 U.S. at 151. Professor Wolcher relies
on Crain and Poindexter to argue the Constitution requires state courts to entertain actions
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Musgrove strongly suggests the existence of a state-court immunity that, Crain
indicates, has limits. Crain does not, however, conflict with the later decision
in Musgrove any more than Ex parte Young conflicts with later decisions
holding the Eleventh Amendment bars some private actions against state
officers in federal court challenging the constitutionality of a state tax.'
b. Pre-Testa Decisions Supporting State-Court Immunity
Two cases decided before Testa strongly suggest states are immune from
federal claims in their own courts. The Court in Testa did not cite either case,
much less suggest it intended to narrow or overrule them. These two pre-
Testa cases, therefore, support reading Testa to establish only a
nondiscrimination principle that would allow state courts to refuse to hear
federal claims if the state has preserved its state-court immunity from all
claims.
One of the cases, Palmer v. Ohio,32 resembled Musgrove. In Palmer, the
Court dismissed, for lack of a federal question, a writ of error from a state
supreme court decision. 3 3 The state supreme court had upheld the dismissal,
on sovereign immunity grounds, of a state-court action brought directly
against the state by landowners.'34 The landowners claimed that the state's
flooding of their land violated the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and that the state court's denial of relief violated the Due Process
against the state itself, even though he recognizes they both concerned claims against state
officers. See Wolcher, supra note 15, at 267-68. As discussed in the text, the cases indicate,
instead, that the Constitution requires state courts to entertain at least some actions that, under
Exparte Young, would not be considered to be suits against the state and, therefore, would not
be barred by the Eleventh Amendment if brought in federal court. The Court in Crain did not
clearly identify what part of the Constitution obliges states to entertain Ex parte Young-type
actions. As discussed below, although the Crain Court appeared to rely on the Supremacy
Clause, the result in that case may be justified, instead, under the Due Process Clause. If so, the
state courts' obligation to hear Exparte Young-type suits does not completely correspond to the
power of federal courts to hear such suits. See infra notes 380-91 and accompanying text.
31 See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462-66 (1945) (holding
Eleventh Amendment barred action against state officers and other defendants for order
requiring them to refund from state treasury taxes collected under allegedly unconstitutional
state statute); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 48-53 (1944) (holding same). Read
together, Musgrove and Crain also suggest the scope of the states' immunity in their own courts
generally corresponds to their immunity in federal court, a correspondence that is explored in
Part IV of this Article. See infra notes 291-301 and accompanying text.
132 248 U.S. 32 (1918).
131 See id. at 34.
134 See id. at 33.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'35 The United States Supreme Court's
denial of review, which was based on its determination that the state-court
decision involved only a question of local state law, implies, as does
Musgrove, that the Constitution does not require a state court to hear a federal
claim against the state.' 36
The same implication arises from Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College.'37 Hopkins involved a suit against a public college by a nearby
landowner who asserted that the college's erection of a dike had caused his
land to flood. 3 He contended this conduct violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by taking his property without due process.3 9 The Court rejected
the college's argument that the landowner's claim for money damages was
really a suit against the state, relying on Eleventh Amendment case law to do
so. 40  In contrast, the Court sustained the college's objection to the
landowner's claim for an injunction requiring the removal of the dike, finding
that form of relief would entail a suit against the state:
The title to the land and everything annexed to the soil is in the state ....
The state, therefore, may be a necessary party to any proceeding which seeks
to affect the land itself, or to remove any structure thereon which has become
a part of the land. If so, and unless it consents to be sued, the court cannot
decree the removal of the embankment which forms a part of the state's
property.
14'
Thus, the Court gave partial effect to the state's assertion of immunity in its
"I See id. at 33-34. The main difference between Palmer and Musgrove was that the suit in
Palmer was directly against the state, rather than a state officer, and, therefore, it did not even
arguably fit within the Ex parte Young doctrine.
136 Id. at 34. Professor Wolcher disputes this implication by observing that, in the short
opinion dismissing the writ, the Palmer Court summarily rejected the plaintiffs Just
Compensation claim. See Wolcher, supra note 15, at 262-63. The Court's passing remark on
the merits does not account for the jurisdictional disposition of the case-a dismissal on the
ground that the judgment rested on an inadequate state question. See Palmer, 248 U.S. at 34.
Moreover, Professor Wolcher's reliance on the Palmer Court's view of the merits forces him
to make the untenable argument that state-court immunity bars a suit if the plaintiffs
constitutional claim lacks merit, but does not bar a suit if the plaintiffs constitutional claim has
merit. See Wolcher, supra note 15, at 268. This argument conflates two quite distinct issues:
the issue of immunity from a claim and the issue of the merits of the claim.
13' 221 U.S. 636 (1911).
131 See id. at 637.
139 See id. at 641.
140 See id. at 642-48.
141 Id. at 648-49.
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own courts from a constitutional claim. 4 2 This aspect of the opinion is
difficult to explain other than as a holding that the states enjoy immunity in
their own courts and that, because the immunity limits recovery for an alleged
constitutional violation, the immunity itself is constitutional in nature.'43
3. Applying the Testa Principle to States that Have Partially Waived
Their State-Court Immunity
Testa's nondiscrimination principle is harder to apply when a state has
waived immunity in its courts from some private claims, as most states have
done.'" This author believes the Supremacy Clause only obligates a state
court to apply federal law to a dispute that the court has power to hear under
state law. The Clause, therefore, does not require a state court to hear a
federal claim if the court lacks power to decide a state-law claim arising from
the same facts.
This conclusion is based on the Court's precedent in an analogous setting.
The precedent concerns actions in federal court to which the state has
consented. The precedent establishes that a state cannot restrict its consent so
as to prevent a federal court from applying relevant federal law. Such a
.4 As the quote from Hopkins reproduced in the text illustrates, the Court frequently used
"necessary" or "indispensable" party terminology to mean relief was barred by sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 28 (1933) ("[W]hen it appears that a state
is an indispensable party to enable a federal court to grant relief sought by private parties, and
the state has not consented to be sued, the court will refuse to take jurisdiction"); see also
Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI.
L. REV. 435, 436, 438-39 (1962); see also Clark Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1479, 1482, 1493-99 (1962) (discussing dismissal of suits against federal officers
for failure or inability to join indispensable party).
"41 Professor Wolcher suggests the Hopkins Court refused injunctive relief because the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only requires an award of damages. See
Wolcher, supra note 15, at 263 & n.335. This is not, however, the reason the Court gave in
Hopkins for denying injunctive relief. The Court denied that relief because it could only be
awarded in a suit against the state, and the state was immune from such a suit in its own courts
without its consent. See Hopkins, 221 U.S. at 649. Professor Wolcher's explanation of
Hopkins, like his explanation of Palmer, see supra note 136, does not account for the actual
basis of the Court's decision.
'" See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 n.28 (1980) (stating that all but
a "handful of States" have waived their immunity from tort suits for nondiscretionary
governmental functions); John Evans Taylor, Note, Express Waivers of Eleventh Amendment




restriction would require the federal court to violate the Supremacy Clause.
The precedent also establishes, however, that a state's consent cannot be
enlarged beyond that necessary for a federal court to comply with the
Supremacy Clause.
The leading case is Gardner v. New Jersey. 4 ' In Gardner, the state filed
a claim against the bankruptcy estate in a federal reorganization proceeding. "
The state argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal court from
considering objections to the state's claim.'47 The Supreme Court rejected
that argument. 4 The Court held, "When the State becomes the actor and files
a claim .. . it waives any immunity which it otherwise might have had
respecting the adjudication of the claim."' 49 The Court has made clear,
however, that a sovereign's waiver does not extend beyond matters
"respecting the adjudication of the [sovereign's] claim."'50 The defendant to
the claim "may, without statutory authority, recoup on a counterclaim an
amount equal to the principal claim."'' The defendant can assert such a
counterclaim, however, only to reduce or eliminate affirmative recovery by
the sovereign.'52 Furthermore, the defendant's counterclaim must arise from
4' 329 U.S. 565 (1946); see also Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct.
2047, 2056 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Gardner with approval).
146 Gardner, 329 U.S. at 570.
141 See id at 571.
141 See id. at 572-74.
41 Id. at 574 (citing Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 274 (1906); Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883)). Accord Gunter, 200 U.S. at 284 ("[Wlhere a State voluntarily
becomes a party to a cause, and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound
thereby, and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibition of the
[Eleventh] Amendment."); Clark, 108 U.S. at 447 ("The immunity from suit belonging to a
state, which is respected and protected by the constitution within the limits of the judicial power
of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure; so that in a suit,
otherwise well brought, in which a state had sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party
defendant, its appearance in a court of the United States would be a voluntary submission to its
jurisdiction."). Cf Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933) (agreeing with lower court that
state's intervention in federal-court action "was too limited in character to constitute a waiver
of the immunity given by the [Eleventh] amendment").
SO Gardner, 329 U.S. at 574.
... United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 511 (1940) (citing
Bull v. United States, 285 U.S. 247, 261 (1935)); see also 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
13.50, at 13-69 (3d ed. 1988).
152 See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 947-48 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994) (holding defendant could assert against state any compulsory
counterclaims to reduce or eliminate state's recovery on its claims); Livera v. First Nat'l State
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the same facts as the sovereign's claim.'53
The recoupment doctrine honors a sovereign's immunity while ensuring
federal courts honor the Supremacy Clause. A state may waive its immunity
by submitting a claim to a federal court.'54 The state cannot, however, limit
that waiver so as to prevent the federal court from following federal law
applicable to the claim. Such a limitation would require the federal court to
Bank, 879 F.2d 1186, 1195 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Penn, 632 F. Supp. 691, 693 (D.V.I. 1986)); United States v. 2116 Boxes of Boned
Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots,
Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 825 (1984) (Lower court holding that defendant could not assert
counterclaim against United States in seizure proceeding under recoupment theory, because
"recoupment is merely 'the right of the defendant to have the plaintiff's monetary claim reduced
by reason of some claim the defendant has against the plaintiff arising out of the very [matter]
giving rise to the plaintiff's claim."') (quoting National Bank of Louisville v. Master Auto Serv.
Corp., 693 F.3d 308, 310 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1982)) (bracketed text supplied by the court). Cf State
of Georgia Dep't of Taxation v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313 (11 th Cir. 1998), petition
for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1998) (No. 98-906) (holding that, by filing claim
in bankruptcy proceeding, state waived immunity from compulsory counterclaim for costs and
attorney's fees associated with state's violation of automatic stay).
153 See, e.g., Burke, 146 F.3d at 1318 n.10 (holding that, by filing claim in bankruptcy
proceeding, state waived immunity from counterclaim because it arose out of same transaction
or occurrence as state's claim); Schlossberg v. Maryland Comptroller of Treasury (In re Creative
Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147-50 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998) (holding that, by filing claim in bankruptcy proceeding, state did not
waive its immunity from bankruptcy trustee's claim, because trustee's claim did not arise out
of same transaction or occurrence as did state's claim); Livera, 879 F.2d at 1195-96 (holding
that federal government waived immunity from defendant's counterclaim because counterclaim
arose out of same loan agreement as government sought to recover on); In re Monongahela Rye
Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864, 868-70 (3d Cir. 1944) (state did not waive its immunity in
bankruptcy proceeding from bankruptcy trustee's unrelated counterclaim); Commonwealth v.
Matlack, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 303 (1804).
"' A state's voluntary submission of an affirmative claim to a federal court differs greatly
from conduct that the Court has held insufficient to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.
See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2056-57 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (seeing "no place for"
doctrine of "[c]onstructive consent" in determining whether state had waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity). Gardner, therefore, does not support the doctrine of "constructive
waiver" associated with Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department,
377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964), overruled in part by Welch v. Texas Department of Highways &
Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468 (1987); other precedent of the Court has cast serious doubt
on, if not invalidated, that doctrine, see Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 285-87
(5th Cir. 1998). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.6, at 406-10
(2d ed. 1994) (discussing constructive waiver).
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violate the Supremacy Clause by disregarding federal law. No such violation
occurs, however, when a federal court declines to hear counterclaims against
the state that do not arise from the same facts as does the state's claim. The
court's refusal to hear such counterclaims respects sovereign immunity to the
extent permitted by the Supremacy Clause.
The same reasoning applies when a state waives its immunity, not by
filing a claim in federal court, but by consenting to claims against it in its own
courts. The state cannot limit its consent so as to prevent its courts from
applying relevant federal law in resolving the claims. 5 The state can,
however, refuse to consent to claims that do not arise from the same facts as
do the claims to which it has consented. The state's withholding of such
consent does not require the state courts to violate the Supremacy Clause.
Suppose, for example, that a state authorized a discharged employee to
sue it on the ground that her discharge violated an employment contract. The
state could not prevent the employee from arguing that her discharge also
violated a valid federal statute. That restriction would require the state court
to disregard federal law governing the dispute over the discharge. Such
disregard by the state court would violate the Supremacy Clause. No similar
violation would occur if the state consented to suits for wrongful discharge but
not to suits for unrelated claims arising during the term of employment. The
Supremacy Clause is offended only when the state allows its courts to hear a
state-law claim but prohibits them from hearing a federal claim arising from
the same facts. It is only in that situation that the state's restriction on its
consent to suit would require the state courts to violate the Supremacy Clause.
'4. Applying the Testa Principle to Federal Claims Against Non-State
Defendants
Although this Article focuses on private, federal claims against the states,
it has proposed a reading of Testa that has implications for private, federal
claims against non-state defendants. This subsection briefly examines those
implications. As a doctrinal matter, the implications accord with precedent
outside the Testa line of cases. As a practical matter, the implications are
fairly minor.
155 See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 5, at 165 ("[T]here has never existed doubt that state courts
are obligated to consider and apply relevant principles of federal law which become applicable
in the course of the adjudication of a state cause of action.") (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816)).
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Testa's nondiscrimination principle governs the obligation of state courts
to hear private, federal actions against any defendant. Under that principle,
the Supremacy Clause requires a state court to hear a private, federal claim if
the court has power under state law to hear a state-law claim arising from the
same facts. The requirement applies whether or not the defendant is a state.
By the same token, the Supremacy Clause does not require a state court to
hear a private, federal claim against any type of defendant if the court lacks
power to hear a state-law claim arising from the same facts. Thus, states can,
consistently with the Supremacy Clause, prevent their courts from hearing
private, federal claims against any defendants, as long as the states do not
discriminate against federal claims.
This conclusion is consistent with precedent. The Court has long
recognized the states' authority "to establish the structure and jurisdiction of
their own courts."'56 The Court has also recognized that the exercise of that
authority "is commonly, if not always, a question for the State itself," rather
than a question of federal law.'57 Accordingly, the Court said in Howlett v.
Rose, "The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat
federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a
requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which
the federal claim is presented."'58 That statement reflects the "general rule"
that "federal law takes the state courts as it finds them."'159
As a practical matter, though, states have not shut their courthouse doors
to federal claims and cannot do so. Every state has courts of general
jurisdiction. 60 Many states supplement those courts with courts of specialized
jurisdiction.' 6' State courts of some kind are open to nearly every type of
state-law claim against a private defendant. And the Supremacy Clause
requires a state court to hear any federal claim that arises from the same facts
as does a state-law claim that the court would have power to decide. The
result is that state courts will remain open to virtually all federal claims
156 Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1805 (1997).
117 Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
's Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990).
'5 Id. (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)).
"6 See Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 1743, 1774 (1992).
61 See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV.
1755, 1763 (1997) (noting that, "in almost every state some functional specialization has
occurred for areas like family law, wills and probate, and small claims").
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against private defendants (except claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts). 62 The debate about Testa thus has significance primarily
for federal claims against the states, local governments, and officials of those
entities.
5. Implications of the Testa Principle for Congress's Power to Compel
State Courts to Hear Federal Claims
The Testa cases address the state courts' obligation to enforce federal law
under the Supremacy Clause standing alone. Those cases do not directly
address Congress's power to enlarge that obligation. One of the Testa cases,
however,--Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R.
Co. '63-strongly suggests that Congress lacks such power, at least under the
original Constitution. That suggestion accords with dicta in earlier precedent
concerning Congress's power to confer jurisdiction on state courts."6 The
suggestion is in some tension, however, with early federal statutes that
appeared to require state courts to enforce federal law. On balance, the
Court's precedent before New York and Printz implies, without deciding, that
Congress cannot compel a state court to hear a federal claim that the
Supremacy Clause would not require it to hear.
In Mondou, the Court held that a state court erred in refusing to hear a
private action based on an Article I statute because it disagreed with the policy
underlying the statute. 6 ' The Court concluded that rights arising under
federal law are enforceable in state courts "when their jurisdiction, as
prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion."" Thus, the state
62 See Weinberg, supra note 160, at 1777; but cf. infra notes 346-52 and accompanying text
(discussing state-court immunity of cities and counties).
163 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
'" See Collins, supra note 15, at 163 (cases leading up to Testa "suggested that
constitutional problems would surround any insistence that the state courts hear cases other than
those they ordinarily heard"); Note, supra note 5, at 1555 (stating that Testa and other FELA
decisions by Supreme Court "implied that constitutional difficulties might arise if Congress
attempted to compel states to enforce federally created rights when no analogous state-created
right existed"). Dicta in a pre-Testa case had gone further, suggesting that Congress can never
compel state courts to enforce federal law over the state's objection (even if the federal law were
analogous to state laws enforced by them). See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 520
(1883) (relevant passage quoted infra note 175). Testa plainly limits that dicta by forbidding
States from authorizing their courts to discriminate against federal claims. See Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
65 See Mondou, 223 U.S. at 55-58.
'6 Id. at 59.
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courts' duty to enforce federal rights depends on "[t]he existence of the
jurisdiction." 167 The Court in Mondou emphasized that the case did not
involve "any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of
state courts." 168 The federal statute at issue, "instead of granting jurisdiction
to the state courts, presuppose[d] that they already possessed it." 169
In emphasizing that the federal statute before it did not seek to force
jurisdiction on the state courts, the Mondou Court may well have reflected
doubt about Congress's power to do so. In earlier cases, the Court had made
clear that, even when state courts adjudicate federal actions, they are
exercising jurisdiction derived from state law. 370 More to the point, the Court
had said, in dicta, that Congress cannot confer jurisdiction on state courts. 171
367 Id. at 58.
168 Id. at 56.
169 Id. See also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945) (citing this passage). Cf
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 219 (1916) ("proceedings in
state courts [under the federal statute at issue] deriv[e] their authority from state law"); id. at 222
(Mondou "in no sense implied that the duty which was declared to exist on the part of the state
court depended upon the conception that, for the purpose of enforcing that [federal] right, the
state court was to be treated as a Federal court, deriving its authority not from the state creating
it, but from the United States.").
370 See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (holding that state courts could
entertain actions authorized by federal law even though "a State court derives its existence and
functions from the State laws"); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304,
337 (1816) (stating that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Article III cases "only.
: * in those cases where, previous to the constitution, state tribunals possessed jurisdiction
independent of national authority"). Cf Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97 (1807)
(Marshall, C.J.) (state courts "emanate from a different authority, and are creatures of a distinct
government").
" See, e.g., Claflin, 93 U.S. at 141 (denying "that Congress could confer jurisdiction upon
the State courts"); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 27-28 (1820) (Washington, J.)
("For I hold it to be perfectly clear, that Congress cannot confer jurisdiction upon any Courts,
but such as exist under the constitution and laws of the United States, although the State Courts
may exercisejurisdiction on cases authorized by the laws of the State, and not prohibited by the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Courts."); id. at 67 (Story, J., dissenting) ("There is no
pretence to say, that Congress can compel a State Court Martial to convene and sit in judgment
on [a federal criminal] offence."); see also Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 517
(1910) ("It is undoubtedly true that the right to create courts for the states does not exist in
Congress."). Cf Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821 (1824)
(asserting that state tribunals "may be closed to any claim asserted under a law of the United
States"); Stearns v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1188, 1192 (C.C.D. Vt. 1835) (No. 13,341)
(Thompson, J.) ("Congress cannot compel a state court to entertain jurisdiction in any case..
.."); Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No.
9662) (Story, J.) ("It is clear, that congress has no right to require, that the state courts shall
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Those statements seem to reflect the then-"undoubted truth" that "there is
nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of
laws or judicature it sees fit.""' 2
Despite the Court's early suggestions that Congress could not confer
jurisdiction on the state courts, the Court in Testa described several early
federal statutes as "conferr[ing] jurisdiction upon the state courts.""' 3 The
Court may have meant only that the statutes gave state courts enforcement
authority that could have been given exclusively to federal courts."4 In any
event, the early federal statutes did not unambiguously compel state courts to
enforce federal law if they lacked power to do so under state law. Neither the
Court nor such an eminent historian as Charles Warren understood them to do
so. "5 Moreover, to the extent that these early statutes could be read to reflect
an assertion of broader congressional power, their constitutionality was
consistently disputed." 6 The history of these statutes thus serves to highlight
entertaim [bankruptcy] suits...
17 Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879). See also Newton v. Commissioners, 100
U.S. 548, 559 (1879).
113 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-90 (1945); see also Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2370-71 (1997) (describing early federal statutes that state courts were apparently required
to enforce); Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REv. 545,
577-84 (1925) (same).
"4 See Claflin, 93 U.S. at 139-40.
' See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370 n.1; see also Holmgren, 217 U.S. at 517 (state courts can
enforce federal law "[u]nless prohibited by state legislation"); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S.
513, 520 (1883) ("And though the jurisdiction thus conferred [by early federal statutes] could
not be enforced against the consent of the states, yet, when its exercise was not incompatible
with state duties, and the states made no objection to it, the decisions rendered by the state
tribunals were upheld."); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 108-09 (1860); Collins,
supra note 15, at 135-64; Warren, supra note 173, at 546 (reviewing early federal statutes but
concluding that "Congress has no power to force jurisdiction upon a State Court"); id. at 594
(Congress "has only power to authorize" a state-court trial for a federal crime, "and the State
may or may not assent.").
176 See Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1035 ("The questions of whether and
when state courts must entertain federal causes of action have been fiercely controverted
episodically since the early nineteenth century."); Collins, supra note 15, at 135-64 (detailing
history of this controversy); id. at 167 (summarizing that "the historical record of cooperation"
by states in enforcing early federal statutes is "scanty," and that "state court objections to the
assumption of unwanted jurisdiction were made early on"); Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1094 n.237 (noting that it was not "established" in 19th century
that state courts had obligation to entertain federal causes of action); Charles Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 70-71 (1924)
(describing how "State-Rightists" who originally advocated federal statutes that were
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the longstanding uncertainty about congressional power to compel state courts
to hear federal claims.
In light of this history,. it is quite doubtful that the Testa Court meant to
imply that Congress could compel state courts to hear federal claims that the
Supremacy Clause did not require them to hear. The unanimous decision in
Testa did not signal that it broke new ground. 77 The Court's analysis in Testa
consisted mostly of describing its prior holdings.'78 In particular, the Testa
Court found the argument against state-court jurisdiction in that case
"strikingly similar" to the one it had rejected in Mondou.'7 9 Thus, as the
Court later said, "[T]he sense of the Testa opinion was that it merely reflected
longstanding constitutional decision and policy represented by such cases as
Claflin ... and Mondou."' °
enforceable in state courts later argued that Congress lacked power to provide for enforcement
of federal laws in state courts); id. at 71 n.50 (citing case law and commentary debating
constitutional issue).
... In keeping with the pre-Testa case law discussed supra in notes 170-72 and the
accompanying text, the Solicitor General admitted in Testa that "there is no obligation upon the
states to provide a forum for the enforcement of [a] federally created right where there is
otherwise no state court of appropriate jurisdiction." Brief for the Petitioners at 15, Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (No. 431) (citation omitted). The Solicitor General, however,
contended that the state court's dismissal of a federal cause of action in that case conflicted with
"repeated-" holdings by the U.S. Supreme Court "that state courts cannot discriminate against
federal rights and refuse to entertain causes of action based on federal statutes where they would
entertain a similar action brought under a state statute." Id.
178 See Testa, 330 U.S. at 390-94.
179 Id. at 392.
,S' Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402 (1973) (citations omitted). It may be
significant that the Testa Court relied without comment on scholars who believed Congress
could not force state courts to hear federal claims over the states' objection. See Testa, 330 U.S.
at 390 n.5. In discussing early federal statutes that Congress made enforceable in state court,
the Court cited Charles Warren, Federal CriminalLaws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV.
545 (1925), and James D. Barnett, The Delegation of Federal Jurisdiction to State Courts, in
3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Association of Am. Law Schs. ed. 1938). See
Testa, 330 U.S. at 390 n.5. Both Warren and Barnett believed that Congress could not force a
state court to hear federal causes of action over the state's objection. See Warren, supra, at 546
("While Congress has no power to force jurisdiction upon a State Court, it has the power to
leave jurisdiction to a State Court."); id. at 594 (stating that Congress "has only power to
authorize such a trial [i. e., a trial in state court of a person charged with a federal crime] and the
State may or may not assent"); Barnett, supra, at 1213 ("With the exception of a few cases in
which the supremacy of Federal law is interpreted to render the exercise of jurisdiction both
lawful and compulsory, the courts invariably have held, either without argument, because




As construed in the Testa cases, the Supremacy Clause does two
things. It invalidates state laws that permit or require state courts to
discriminate against federal claims. It also requires state courts to hear federal
claims if, aside from such discriminatory laws, the courts "otherwise" have
power under state law to hear the federal claims.' 8 ' Thus, the Supremacy
Clause does not require a state court to hear a claim against its own state if
state law bars all claims against the state in state court. The Clause does,
however, require a state court to hear a federal claim if the court has power
under state law to hear a state-law claim arising from the same facts. Thus,
if a state waives immunity in its courts from a state-law claim, its courts must
hear federal claims against the state that arise from the same facts.
The Testa cases do not resolve Congress's power to compel state
courts to hear federal claims that the Supremacy Clause would not require
them to hear. The Testa cases imply, however, that Congress lacks such
power under the original Constitution. That implication is consistent with
dicta in other Supreme Court precedent expressly denying Congress such
power.
C. Integration of Anticommandeering Cases and Testa Cases
The Court reaffirmed in New York and Printz that the Supremacy
Clause sometimes obligates state courts to enforce federal law.' As
independent position of the States, that the exercise of jurisdiction in such cases is wholly
optional with the State authorities."). It bears emphasis that the Testa Court did not cite these
sources for the proposition that the Constitution forbids Congress from forcing the adjudication
of federal claims on a non-consenting state. The Court cited them merely for their discussion
of early federal statutes that were enforceable in federal court. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 390 n.5.
It nonetheless seems significant, in light of other evidence that the Court in Testa did not view
its decision as breaking new ground, that the Court cited these commentators without
mentioning, much less disavowing, their position that the state courts were not obligated to
enforce federal law.
"" See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 374 (1990). When state courts are obligated to
entertain a federal claim (or a federal defense), they also must follow federal procedure in resolving
that claim (or defense), if those procedures are intertwined with the federal right being asserted.
See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (holding that state law requiring plaintiff to
give notice of suit to federal officer sued in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was preempted
because it would "interfere[ ] with and frustrate[ ] the substantive right Congress created"); Dice
v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359,363 (1952) (holding that state court was
required to conduct ajury trial in action under FELA).
182 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2371 (1997); New York v. United States,
1998-99]
BRANDEIS LAWJOURNAL
discussed in the last section, that obligation has limits. The question remains
whether Congress can expand those limits by requiring state courts to hear
federal claims that the Supremacy Clause would not require them to hear.'83
The Court's reasoning in New York and Printz dictates a negative answer
when Congress attempts to impose such requirements under Article I.
To understand this conclusion, one must initially recognize what is at
stake. The Supremacy Clause, standing alone, leaves a state with significant
control over the volume and types of cases that its courts can hear. The
Clause does not prevent a state court from declining, on the basis of a neutral
rule ofjudicial administration, to hear a federal action.'" Those neutral rules
include doctrines that limit the volume and type of litigation, including, as
discussed above, the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 8 At stake, then, is
Congress's power to compel state courts to hear federal claims that would be
barred from those courts under neutral state laws of judicial administration,
including the state law of sovereign immunity.
This Section argues that such congressional compulsion would harm
the system of dual sovereignty in the same ways that led the Court, in New
York and Printz, to strike down federal statutes that commandeered state
legislatures and executive officials. Subsection one identifies the harms that
the Court found congressional commandeering of the legislative and executive
branches of state government caused. Subsection two demonstrates that those
same harms would result from congressional commandeering of state courts.
Subsection three establishes that the injury to dual sovereignty would be
particularly grave if Congress compelled state courts to hear private actions
against their own state without the state's consent.
1. The Concerns Underlying the Anticommandeering Principle
The Court has identified three harms that occur when Congress uses
Article I to commandeer a state's legislative or executive branch. One
concerns resource allocation. A second concerns the power of a state's
505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992).
' The Supremacy Clause itself, of course, does not give Congress such power. The
Supremacy Clause is not a grant of congressional power at all. It merely makes a federal statute
the supreme law of the land if the statute falls within a grant of congressional power provided
for elsewhere in the Constitution and is otherwise constitutional.
184 See, e.g., Howlett, 496 U.S. at 374; see also supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text
(discussing "valid excuse" doctrine).
"gs See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372.
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residents to set a legislative agenda. The third concerns the lines of
accountability between the federal and state government. The harms are best
described by tracing their identification in the Supreme Court's decisions
chronologically.'86
Although New York was the first case in which a majority of the Court
applied the anticommandeering principle, the concerns underlying the
principle were first articulated in FERC v. Mississippi"7 in a partial dissent by
Justice O'Connor, the author of the majority opinion in New York.' Justice
"86 The Court based the anticommandeering rule not only on the harms that commandeering
causes the system of dual sovereignty but also on history that indicates Congress-lacked the
power to commandeer the legislative and executive branches of state government. See Printz,
117 S. Ct. at 2370-83; New York, 505 U.S. at 155-69, 175-77. Commentators debate the
accuracy of the Court's understanding of history. See Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note 54,
at 1042-50 (arguing that history of Constitution and early congressional practice "strongly support"
congressional commandeering of state executives but is "ambiguous" with respect to congressional
commandeering of state legislatures); Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on
the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal
Power, 41 KAN. L. REV. 493, 517 (1993) (arguing that history of Constitution does not support any
anticommandeering principle); Powell, supra note 79, at 661-64 (arguing that history of
Constitution does not support "autonomy of process" principle on which New York is based);
Prakash, supra note 54, at 1959-60, 1990-2032 (arguing that history of Constitution supports
congressional commandeering of state executive officials, but not congressional commandeering
of state legislatures). Cf Martin H. Redish, Doing It with Mirrors: New York v. United States and
Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 593, 603-04 (1994) (criticizing New York's reliance on constitutional history regardless of
accuracy of Court's understanding of history). In any event, there is no clear historical support for
congressional commandeering of state courts. As discussed above, there were some early federal
statutes that could be construed to compel state courts to enforce federal law. In light of their
ambiguity and persistent doubts about their constitutionality, these early federal statutes provide
little historical support for congressional power to commandeer state courts. The relevant
history is examined in great detail in Collins, supra note 15, at 135-64. See also Prakash, supra
note 54, at 1967-71 & 2007-30 (examining history of congressional commandeering of state
courts). Cf Powell, supra note 79, at 652-81 (examining history of congressional
commandeering in general).
187 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
... See id. at 775-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id.
at 781 n.8 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Although the
congressional goal is a noble one, appellants have not shown that Congress needed to
commandeer state utility commissions to achieve its aims.") (emphasis added). At issue in
FERC were several provisions of the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA). See id. at 745 (citing Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Titles I-III,
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.)).
The challenged provisions consisted of: (I) what the Court called "the consideration
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O'Connor argued that a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty is the power
to decide the subjects to which state government should devote its attention:
the power to "set an agenda."' 9 The federal statute at issue in FERC intruded
on that power, in her view, by requiring state utility commissions to consider
the adoption of federal rate-making standards. Justice O'Connor explained
that the federal statute was more intrusive than a federal statute that simply
preempted state utility regulation: "[A]fter Congress pre-empts a field, the
States may simply devote their resources elsewhere.... [The Act], however,
provisions," requiring state utility commissions to consider the adoption of federally prescribed
rate-making standards designed primarily to encourage energy conservation; (2) "procedural
provisions," requiring the state commissions to follow certain procedures when considering the
federal rate-making standards; and (3) Section 210 of PURPA, requiring the state commissions
to implement regulations adopted by FERC to encourage the development of certain energy
resources. See id. at 746-51, 770. The Court held that these provisions fell within Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause and did not violate the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 753-
70. Justice O'Connorjoined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the
part of the majority's decision that rejected a Tenth Amendment challenge to the consideration
provisions and the procedural provisions. See id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). These provisions were invalid, in the Justice's view, because they
"conscript[ed] state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic army." Id. (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In a separate partial dissent, Justice Powell argued
that the procedural provisions violated the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 771-75 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Justices unanimously agreed that all of the
provisions fell within the Commerce Clause and that Section 210 of PURPA did not violate the
Tenth Amendment. See id. at 775 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding
that, in contrast to procedural provisions, precedents of the Court support the constitutionality
of the substantive provisions of this Act); id. at 775 n. I (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (expressing agreement with the majority's rejection of the Commerce Clause
challenges and Tenth Amendment challenge to Section 210 of PURPA).
189 See id. at 778-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (identifying
statute's "Tenth Amendment defecto" as arising from its "structuring the regulatory agenda of
a state agency"); id. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The power
to make decisions and set policy.. . embraces more than the ultimate authority to enact laws;
it also includes the power to decide which proposals are most worthy of consideration, the order
in which they should be taken up, and the precise form in which they should be debated."); id.
at 780-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating Act intrudes on state
sovereignty by "set[ting] the agendas of agencies exercising delegated legislative power"); id.
at 785 n. 14 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing prior Court
decision holding that state trial courts could not refuse to hear a federal claim if a similar state
law claim would be heard in that state's courts on the ground that "[sitate legislative bodies
possess at least one attribute of state sovereignty, the power to set an agenda, that trial courts
lack").
19' See supra note 188.
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drains the inventive energy of state governmental bodies."'' Justice
O'Connor also identified "a second reason" why federal preemption was less
intrusive than a federal command requiring state quasi-legislative bodies to
consider federal regulatory proposals:
Local citizens hold their utility commissions accountable for the choices they
make. Citizens, moreover, understand that legislative authority usually
includes the power to decide which ideas to debate, as well as which policies
to adopt. Congressional compulsion of state agencies, unlike pre-emption,
blurs the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their
representatives are no longer responsive to local needs. 92
Thus, the problems with federal commandeering, according to Justice
O'Connor, are that it diverts state resources from matters of local concern;
interferes with the ability of state residents to set a legislative agenda; and
makes it difficult for people to tell who to blame for the policies that the states
are commandeered to implement.'93
Justice O'Connor largely repeated these concerns for the majority in
New York. The Court found that two adverse consequences flowed from
federal statutes that compel states to regulate according to federal dictates.
First, those statutes prevent states from "devot[ing] [their] attention and
resources" to problems that their citizens want addressed. 94 Second, they
diminish the accountability of government to the electorate. When state
officials are forced to implement federal policy, people who do not like the
policy cannot tell which group of elected government officials-state or
federal-to blame for the policy.'95
The Court in New York found that these concerns distinguished
federal commandeering from other "methods, short of outright coercion, by
191 FERC, 456 U.S. at 787 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93 Justice O'Connor's concern for the public perception of governmental action in the
commandeering context resembles a similar concern that she has expressed in cases presenting
challenges based on the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater
Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 635-36 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that relevant inquiry is whether "reasonable observer"
would perceive challenged government action as endorsing religion).
,9' New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
'9' Id. at 169 ("[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised




which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent
with federal interests."' 196 First, Congress may encourage states to regulate by
offering federal funds conditioned on their doing so.19 7 Second, Congress may
threaten the states with preemptive federal regulation of a subject unless the
states regulate it in a manner acceptable to Congress.'98 Third, Congress can
skip the threat and enact federal laws that immediately preempt state
regulation of the subject covered by the federal laws.'99 The first two types
of congressional action leave states with a choice of whether or not to regulate
according to federal dictates: "The States thereby retain the ability to set their
legislative agendas."2" The third type of congressional action allows states
to devote their attention and resources to matters of local concern. In all three
situations, the states remain accountable to the electorate for their choices and
actions.2°'
.The Court again pointed to the resource-allocation and accountability
concerns in Printz. There, the Court did so by rejecting the government's
argument that the Brady Act provisions should be upheld because they, unlike
the "take title" provision struck down in New York, required only "discrete,
ministerial tasks. 2 °2  The Court found that, even accepting that
characterization, the Brady Act provisions implicated the concerns underlying
196 Id. at 166.
' See id. at 167 ("under Congress's spending power, 'Congress may attach conditions on
the receipt of federal funds' [if the conditions] bear some relationship to the purpose of the
federal spending") (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)); see also id. at
158 (discussing Congress's power under Spending Clause).
'9' See id. at 167 ("where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress's power to offer States the choice of regulating
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal
regulation").
9 See id. at 188 ("The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state
regulation contrary to federal interests."); see also id. at 159 (discussing Supremacy Clause).
201 Id. at 185. See also id. at 167-69, 173-74.
20' See id. at 168 ("If state residents would prefer their government to devote its attention
and resources to problems other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose to
have the Federal Government rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated
regulatory program.... Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling
it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials
remain accountable to the people."); see also id. at 185 (when Congress encourages state
regulation by offering federal money or threatening preemption, "[t]he States thereby retain the
ability to set their legislative agendas; state government officials remain accountable to the local
electorate").
202 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997).
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the anticommandeering principle.2"3  Specifically, "[b]y forcing state
governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing [a background-
check system], Members of Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems
without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher
federal taxes." 2" Even if Congress reimbursed the states for the expense of
implementing the Brady Act, the states were "still put in the position of taking
the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects."2 5 Thus, the Brady
Act's background-check provisions forcibly diverted state resources to matters
of federal concern and blurred lines of accountability.2"
2. The Harms to Dual Sovereignty Caused by Congressional
Commandeering of State Courts
In Printz, the Court examined the concerns underlying the
anticommandeering principle to determine whether Congress had power under
Article I to commandeer state executive officials. If the Court takes the same
approach in assessing Congress's power under Article I to commandeer state
courts, it should conclude Congress has no such power. Recall that
congressional commandeering of state courts would consist in compelling
state courts to hear federal claims that would be barred under neutral state
laws related to judicial administration.2"7 Such compulsion could cause the
same harms caused by congressional commandeering of the other branches of
state government.
First, congressional commandeering of state courts would divert state
time and resources from matters of local concern.208 Simply put, the more
time and money that Congress required state courts to devote to hearing




206 In addition to the concerns discussed in the text, the Court in Printz briefly mentioned
the concern that federal commandeering of state executive officials undermined the authority
of the President to execute federal law. See id. at 2378. The brevity of the Court's discussion
of this controversial and complicated issue led one commentator to "wonderi] about Printz's
precedential value on this point." Caminker, Limits of Federalism, supra note 54, at 226. The
thesis of this Article does not rely on this aspect of Printz.
207 See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
20 Cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
209 See Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1052 ("The more federal claims a state
court must hear, the fewer state claims it can adjudicate."). Professor Caminker makes this
point to argue the Court was wrong to prohibit federal commandeering of state executive and
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Congressional commandeering of state courts could consume just as much
state energy as could congressional commandeering of the other branches of
state government. In this respect, congressional commandeering of state
courts undermines dual sovereignty in a way that does not occur when
Congress assigns the adjudication of certain matters exclusively to the federal
210courts.
Second, congressional commandeering of state courts would interfere
with the power of a state's citizens to set an agenda for state legislative
action.2 A state legislature often responds to local problems by enacting
laws that must be enforced in state courts. The legislature cannot effectively
respond in that way when the state courts are already clogged with federal
cases. Moreover, in that situation the legislature cannot expedite the
adjudication of urgent cases in the state courts.212
Finally, congressional commandeering of state courts would blur the
lines of accountability between state and federal officials. 213  A state
legislature could react in two ways to the congressional commandeering of its
courts. It could expand its court system, but that would take money. It could
do nothing, but that would cause the quality and speed of state-court
adjudication to deteriorate. Either route would cause state residents to blame
members of the state legislature, rather than members of Congress, for the
increase in costs or the decrease in efficiency.214
legislative officers. See id. In contrast, this Article makes the point to argue that the
commandeering principle extends to judicial officers as well.
210 Cf FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,787 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (federal commandeering of state agency "drains" time and energy that agency
needs to address local matters and, in that respect, is more intrusive than federal preemption of
matter regulated by state agency).
211 Cf New York, 505 U.S. at 185; see also id. at 167-69, 173-74; FERC, 456 U.S. at 779
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212 Cf Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1052 ("[T]hrough the jurisdictional and
procedural rules it imposes, the state legislature does shape the agenda of its courts through a
process of exclusion.... This type of agenda setting is as much an aspect of state sovereignty
as any other sort of agenda setting."); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 185 (referring to state's
power to seta legislative agenda); FERC, 456 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (same).
23 Cf Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
214 It is possible that congressional commandeering of state courts would cause another sort
of accountability problem: People who disliked the federal laws being enforced by state courts
would blame the state judges for the laws, rather than Congress. Compare Jackson, State
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 15, at 99 n.394 ("Requiring state, rather than federal, judges
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One could argue that these harms do not justify the total bar that
would result from applying the anticommandeering rule to congressional
control of state courts." Short of a total bar, though, it would be difficult to
devise a principled way to limit Congress's power to commandeer the state
courts." 6 Without any limit, Congress's control over state courts would be
broad indeed, even if one considers only the Commerce Clause.2" 7 When one
also considers Congress's other Article I powers, one cannot easily imagine
any limit whatsoever on Congress's ability to compel adjudication by state
courts. It seems unlikely, of course, that Congress would attempt such
broadscale compulsion;. 8 yet it seems no more unlikely than the risk of
broadscale congressional commandeering of the other branches of state
government. Particularly without a principled way to limit commandeering,
short of wholly prohibiting it, the categorical rule of New York and Printz has
to take the political heat for ordering substantial state expenditures [in suits asserting monetary
claims against States under federal law] might be thought, in the long run, to undermine the
vitality of state courts as an independent judicial system capable of acting as a check on abuse
of government power.") with Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1070 n.264 (discussing
same possibility; arguing that same risk attends federal commandeering of legislative and
executive officials; and concluding that risk is small, given ability of state judges and other
officials to publicize when their conduct is mandated by federal law).
215 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 (stating its conclusion "categorically, as [the Court]
concluded categorically in New York").
216 But cf Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, Il1 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2182-83 (1998) (summarizing author's suggestions for
judicially enforced limits on congressional commandeering of state legislative and executive
branches).
217 See New York, 505 U.S. at 157-58 (discussing breadth of Commerce Clause).
218 Although the hypothetical exercise of power described in the text is unlikely today, it
would produce a state of affairs that was contemplated when the Constitution was adopted.
Under the "Madisonian Compromise," the Constitution itself did not establish lower federal
courts, but it gave Congress the power to create them. See, e.g., Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371
(discussing the compromise). If Congress had not done so, cases arising under federal law that
did not fall within the United States Supreme Court's original jurisdiction would have to have
been filed in state courts. See generally CHARLES WARREN, THEMAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
325-27 (1928) (describing debate at Convention on creation of inferior federal courts). Because
of the possibility that Congress would not create any lower federal courts, some commentators
have argued that state courts must have a duty to adjudicate federal causes of action; otherwise,
cases might arise under federal law that could not be heard in any court. See, e.g., Gordon &
Gross, supra note 15, at 1154 ("Congress's ability to restrict federal jurisdiction implies a state
court obligation to assume jurisdiction over federal claims."). As Professor Collins has shown,
however, "this is precisely the line of inferential, Supremacy Clause reasoning that does not
seem to have commended itself to the generation which struck [the Madisonian Compromise]
as much as it has occupied our own." Collins, supra note 15, at 143.
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much to commend it, including as it applies to the commandeering of state
courts.2 1 9
By the same token, it makes little sense to conclude that Congress can
commandeer the state courts but not the other branches of state government.
Under New York and Printz, Congress could not use Article I to compel a state
legislature to enact, and the governor to sign, a statute requiring state courts
to hear federal claims. 2 0 Congress should not be able to enact an identical
law itself.22'
3. The Particular Harm Caused by Congressional Commands that
State Courts Hear Actions Against Their Own State Without Its
Consent
Congress could cause particular harm to the system of dual
sovereignty if it could use Article I to compel state courts to hear private
actions against their own states without their consent. Such a use of Article
I turns the state against itself. This form of commandeering poses a
sufficiently grave threat to dual sovereignty that the Court could appropriately
find it beyond Congress's power, without foreclosing Congress's power to
compel state courts to hear Article I claims against other types of defendants.
The situation under discussion is illustrated by Alden v. Maine.222
Alden is an action by current and former probation officers and juvenile
caseworkers against their employer, the State of Maine.223 The plaintiffs seek
overtime compensation plus liquidated damages under the FLSA.224 The
underlying dispute concerned how the plaintiffs should be classified under the
219 Cf Powell, supra note 79, at 684 (stating that "[tihe prudential argument" underlying
New York is "powerful").
220 Cf Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (asserting that "tt]he requirement that a
state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily
include within it a requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which
the federal claim is presented."); Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223
U.S. 1, 57-58 (1912), quoted supra in text accompanying notes 168-69.
221 Cf. Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 517 (1910) ("It is undoubtedly true that
the right to create courts for the states does not exist in Congress.").
222 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 443
(1998) (No. 98-436).
223 See id. at 173 & n. 1.
224 See id. at 173; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994) (authorizing private actions for




FLSA for purposes of entitlement to the time-and-a-half rate of pay generally
prescribed by the FLSA."' The issue now before the Court is whether
plaintiffs can sue the State of Maine in its own courts for Maine's asserted
improper classification of the plaintiffs under the FLSA. 2 6
Alden pits the state'sjudicial branch against its executive branch. The
case requires the state court to decide whether the coequal branch has
complied with the FLSA. If the state court determines the executive has not
done so, it may enter an award payable out of the state treasury. That would
pit the state judiciary against the third branch, the Maine legislature, which,
like most state legislatures, has exclusive control over the treasury."2 7
This form of commandeering intrudes severely on state sovereignty.
Decisions by the people of a state allocating powers among the branches of
their state government "go to the heart of representative government." ' That
is especially true of decisions about control of the state treasury. 29 Concern
for preserving that control explains why Congress cannot use Article I to
empower the federal courts to tap the state treasury. 30 The same concern
225 See Brief for Respondent at 1-5, Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998) (No. 98-
436), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
226 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998) (No.
98-436), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
227 See ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. 3, § 4; see also James M. Hirschhorn, Where the Money Is:
Remedies to Finance Compliance with Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815,
1837 n.120 (1984) (stating that most state constitutions forbid disbursements from the state
treasury except by legislative appropriation); Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (similar provision).
The legislature's traditional exclusive control over appropriations predates the Framing of the
Constitution, when most states required people with monetary claims against them to petition
the legislature and forbade expenditures from the state treasury except pursuant to an
appropriation statute. See Pfander, History, supra note 23, at 1303-04; see also id. at 1328
(prior to adoption of Constitution, "state legislatures had complete control over the payment of
state obligations").
.2 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). See id. at 460 ("Through the structure of its government, a State defines itself as a
sovereign."); see also Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) ("How
power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always,
a question for the state itself.").
229 See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883); President & Dirs. of Bank of
Wash. v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 530, 532 (1857).
230 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-73 (1996), discussed supra notes 17-23
and accompanying text; see also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39
(1994) ("Adoption of the [Eleventh] Amendment responded most immediately to the States'
fear that 'federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their
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suggests that Congress should not be able to use Article I to compel state
courts to tap the state treasury.
Indeed, such a use seems to conflict with New York. The Court there
held that Congress could not compel a state that failed to meet a federal
deadline to take title to low-level radioactive waste.2"' The Court reasoned
that "[s]uch a forced transfer ... would in principle be no different than a
congressionally compelled subsidy from governments to radioactive waste
producers." 2  That reasoning implies that Congress cannot compel the
legislature of a state that has violated federal law to make a payment from the
state treasury to private parties. The result should not change when Congress
seeks to exert the same compulsion through a state's courts. If anything, that
route seems more offensive, since state courts lack control over the state
treasury from which the payment would come.233
The threat to dual sovereignty posed by a congressional command that
a state court hear a private claim against its own unconsenting state is not
limited to claims for retroactive monetary relief. A congressional command
that a state court entertain suits for non-monetary relief, such as injunctive
relief, poses an equally grave threat to state sovereignty.234 A state-court
action directly against the state could give the state court much greater
contempt and injunctive power than it would have in an Exparte Young-type
action.235 In a direct action, a state court could plausibly assert power to
enjoin whole parts of the state government, such as the legislature. That
power is doubtful in a case against a state officer.236 In effect, if Congress
financial ruin."') (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151(1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
23 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
232 Id.
233 See supra note 227 (citing authority indicating that state courts lack control over their
treasuries).
234 Cf Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 ("The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in
order to preven[t] federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury; it also
serves to avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals
at the instance of private parties.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; brackets
supplied by the Court).
23 See Hirschhorn, supra note 227, at 1836-51, 1853-70 (discussing remedial limitations
in Ex parte Young actions).
236 Cf Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (holding that federal district court
abused its discretion when it imposed personal contempt fines on city council members, rather
than imposing fines on the council as a body, because fines on individual legislators would
unduly interfere with local legislative process).
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could compel the state courts to hear federal claims for injunctive relief
directly against their own state, it could use the state courts to commandeer
the other branches of state government.
These considerations suggest one reasonable way to limit the
anticommandeering rule as it applies to state courts: The limit would
distinguish between federal laws that compel state courts to hear private,
federal actions against their own state and federal laws that compel state
courts to hear private, federal actions against other types of defendants. The
former laws undermine dual sovereignty to a much greater degree than do the
latter. Moreover, precedent other than New York and Printz establishes that
states have immunity from private actions in their own courts.237 It would be
consistent with that precedent for the Court to hold that Congress cannot use
Article I to compel state courts to hear private federal actions against their
own state without the state's consent, even though Congress may be able to
use Article I to compel state courts to hear private federal actions against other
sorts of defendants.238
On the other hand, one could argue this limited form of the
anticommandeering rule has things exactly backwards and Congress should
be able to compel state courts to hear claims against their own state even if the
courts cannot be compelled to hear claims against private defendants. The
argument would begin with the proposition that state courts are supposed to
be "the primary guarantors of constitutional rights." '239 The argument would
continue that, in light of that role, it is more important for state courts to hear
private, federal claims against states (and other defendants acting under color
of state law) than to hear private, federal claims against private defendants.
31 See supra notes 99-143 and accompanying text.
238 Some prominent scholars have found historical support for that precedent. Specifically,
Professor William Fletcher found it "clear" that the framers of the Eleventh Amendment "did not
contemplate" that "Congress could require state courts to hear cases barred from federal courts by
the eleventh amendment" Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1095.
Professor James Pfander has come to a similar conclusion with respect to the Framers of the
original Constitution. See Pfander, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 596 ("It seems unlikely... that
the framers would have chosen to compel the state courts to entertain federal claims against their
will and in violation of their own jurisdictional limits."); Pfander, History, supra note 23, at
1362 n.415 ("the framers did not intend to impose suability upon the states in their own
courts"). Other commentators have found history unclear on this issue. See Vizquez, supra
note 13, at 1722-23; Wolcher, supra note 15, at 247.
239 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1401 (1953).
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This is because private defendants generally cannot violate the Constitution
unless they act under color of state law. 40 The argument would emphasize
that the state courts' role in enforcing federal law against the states has
become still more important in the wake of Seminole Tribe because that
decision limits the ability of federal courts to do so. This line of argument
would conclude that, assuming the anticommandeering rule limits the
commandeering of state courts at all, it should not prohibit the
commandeering of state courts for the purpose of hearing federal-or at least
constitutional-claims against the states.24'
The argument is cogent but ultimately unconvincing to this author.
First, it conflicts with the precedent discussed earlier establishing that the
Constitution protects states from private actions in their own courts. 2 42 As
Professor Vdzquez has observed, fidelity to precedent protects the rule of law,
which in turn protects individual rights.2 43 That consideration countervails the
indisputable value of judicial relief for government violations of individual
rights.2" Second, the argument described in the last paragraph depends
heavily on a fortuity of timing. It emphasizes the importance of state courts
in the wake of Seminole Tribe. The same argument could have been made
against the result in Seminole Tribe, if, before deciding that case, the Court
had held that Congress could not use the Commerce Clause to compel state
courts to hear claims against their own state. Such a holding arguably would
have given the federal courts an especially important role in enforcing federal
law against the states. Relatedly, the argument described in the last paragraph
240 See, e.g., JOHNE. NOWAK& RONALDD. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.4, at 343
(5th ed. 1995) ("Almost all of the constitutional protections of individual rights and liberties
restrict only the actions of governmental entities.").
241 See generally Ellen D. Katz, State Courts and the Mandatory Exercise of Jurisdiction
After Seminole Tribe and Printz (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author, making the
argument discussed in the text).
242 See supra notes 99-143 and accompanying text.
243 See Vizquez, supra note 13, at 1805-06.
244 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (holding that sovereign immunity did
not bar action against federal officials in wrongful possession of private land and that to hold
otherwise would ignore that "[alli the officers of the government, from this highest to the
lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803) (stating that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury," and suggesting that the protection generally should be available from the courts); see
also, e.g., Jackson, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 15, at 3-4 (asserting that sovereign
immunity conflicts with the rule of law).
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seems ultimately premised on the view that state courts should be able to
remedy a violation of the Constitution whenever a federal court cannot do
so. 45 So understood, the argument rests on the premise that judicial relief
should be available in some court for every violation of a constitutional
right.246 Perhaps that ideally "should" be true, but, historically, it has never
been so. 47 Moreover, the argument begs the question whether individual
245 See Gordon & Gross, supra note 15, at 1154 (identifying as "essential premise" of that
article "that an adjudicative forum must always be available to vindicate federal rights" and that
state courts are therefore "the ultimate guarantors of federal rights"); Wocher, supra note 15,
at 242 (arguing that, "if a remedy against a state is called for by the Constitution and federal
courts cannot give it because of the eleventh amendment," it must be true that state courts are
obligated to provide the remedy). Cf Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44
VAND. L. REv. 953, 956 (1991) (analyzing Court's decisions on federal jurisdiction from
author's perspective, which "[p]lac[es] the highest value on the enforcement of individual
rights").
246 Professor Wolcher's argument against recognition of state-court immunity for states
appears to rest heavily on the "basic assumption ... that constitutional government requires that
some court, state or federal, always be available to test the legitimacy of a plaintiff's claim that
he is entitled by the Constitution to a given remedy." Wolcher, supra note 15, at 242. That is
likewise an "essential premise" of the Gordon and Gross article. See Gordon & Gross, supra
note 15, at 1154; see also id. at 1174.
247 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1733, 1786 (1991) ("[T]he existence of
constitutional rights without individually effective remedies is a fact of our legal tradition, with
which any theory having descriptive pretensions must come to terms."). Apart from relying on
the normative view that state courts should provide adequate remedies for constitutional
violations, especially when they are not available in federal court (see supra note 246),
Professor Wolcher primarily relies on two Supreme Court decisions-Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410 (1979), and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980)--to argue that states do not enjoy an
immunity in their own courts corresponding to their immunity in federal court. See Wolcher,
supra note 15, at 248-61, 267-68. I respectfully disagree that either case supports his argument.
In Nevada v. Hall, the Court held that the Constitution does not immunize State A from a
lawsuit in the courts of State B. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-27. The Court began its analysis by
distinguishing "two quite separate concepts, one applicable to suits in the sovereign's own
courts and the other to suits in the courts of another sovereign." Id. at 414. The case before the
Court in Nevada v. Hall involved the latter type of immunity, which, the Court held, existed
only as a matter of comity, and not as a matter of constitutional law. See id. at 416. The Court's
analysis of a state's immunity in the courts of another sovereign has no bearing on the question
whether the Constitution affords states immunity in their own courts. See generally Pfander,
Rethinking, supra note 5, at 559, 581-88 (discussing historical differences between the two
types of immunity); see also Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of
Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L.
REv. 867, 886 (1970) (describing as "regrettable" the "equation" in some cases of domestic
sovereign immunity to foreign sovereign immunity). Nevada v. Hall could be read to suggest
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liberty is better served by the availability of judicial relief in the situation
under discussion or by a federalism-based restriction on such relief.248
that Congress can require courts of State B to entertain federal claims against State A. Even that
reading is questionable in light of a footnote in the Court's opinion remarking that, in that case,
State B's exercise ofjurisdiction over State A "pose[d] no substantial threat to our constitutional
system of cooperative federalism." Hall, 440 U.S. at 424 n.24. For reasons similar to those
discussed above, forcing one state's courts to hear federal suits against another state could pose
a severe threat to cooperative federalism. In the terminology of New York, Congress would be
"commandeering" State B to work Congress's will on State A. In Thiboutot, the Court held that
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action enforceable in state court against persons acting
under color of state law for violations of not only the Constitution but also federal statutes. See
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5-8. The Court also held in Thiboutot that state courts that entertained
§ 1983 claims could, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, award attorney's fees, payable out of the state
treasury, to a prevailing plaintiff. See id. at 8-11. The Court accordingly affirmed an award of
attorney's fees to a plaintiff who successfully sued a state's officers in state court for violating
the federal Social Security Act. See id. at 3-4. Professor Wolcher finds it significant that the
Thiboutot Court upheld monetary relief against the state in its own court on the basis of a
violation of an Article I statute. See Wolcher, supra note 15, at 258. In his view, this aspect
of Thiboutot "implies either that no [state-court] immunity doctrine exists, or that it is so clearly
subject to congressional modification as not to warrant discussion." Id. at 259. Even if this is
a plausible reading of Thiboutot, it was drastically undermined by Will v. Michigan Dep 't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), a case that was decided after Professor Wolcher wrote his
article and that held that a state cannot be sued in a state court under § 1983, because Congress
did not intend the statute to apply to states or to officials sued in their official capacity. See
infra notes 313-26 and accompanying text. Moreover, Professor Wolcher's reading of
Thiboutot is questionable without regard to Will, in my opinion. The award of attorney's fees
in Thiboutot was authorized under a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that falls within
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court has recognized
elsewhere. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978). Under Section 5, Congress can
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal-court, despite the constitutional
nature of that immunity. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 571 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996). That
Congress can likewise eliminate the states' state-court immunity under Section 5 does not cast
doubt on the constitutional nature of that immunity or, in particular, on its imperviousness to
attempted breaches by Congress using Article I powers. This conclusion is not affected by the
fact that the fee award under § 1988 upheld in Thiboutot was made to a plaintiff who prevailed
by establishing a violation of a federal statute enacted under Article I (in that case, the Social
Security Act). See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 2-3. The Court held, in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S.
122, 127 n.9,130-32 (1980), that Congress can use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
authorize attorney's fees in a case in which a "substantial constitutional claim" is asserted and
in which the plaintiff prevails on a claim that arises out of the same facts as does the
constitutional claim.
248 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378 (explaining that the system of dual sovereignty "is one of
the Constitution's structural protections of liberty").
[Vol. 37
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
4. Commandeering of State Courts Versus Commandeering of
Other Branches of State Government
This Part of the Article has argued that, under the Commerce Clause,
Congress has no greater power to commandeer state courts than it has to
commandeer the other branches of state government. As construed in Testa,
however, the Supremacy Clause sometimes obligates state courts to enforce
federal law, including statutes that fall within the Commerce Clause. For
example, a state court must hear a minimum-wage claim under the FLSA, if
the court has jurisdiction to do so under neutral state law. Thus, the
Supremacy Clause does enable Congress to enlist state courts in the
enforcement of federal law. The Supremacy Clause does not impose any
similar affirmative enforcement obligation on the other branches of state
government.
The Court in New York and Printz plausibly traced this difference to
the Supremacy Clause.249 As the Court observed, the Supremacy Clause treats
state judges "distinctively."25 It specifically obligates state judges to follow
federal law, without mentioning officials in other branches of state
government."' The history of the Clause shows that state judges were singled
out because they have a special role under the Constitution. The Supremacy
Clause was first proposed, and then quickly adopted by the Framers, right
after they rejected a proposal to permit Congress to strike down state laws that
conflicted with the federal Constitution.252 This chronology reflected a
decision to replace the congressional negative on state laws with a judicial
negative.253 The Framers knew that this judicial negative would be exercised
by state courts; they expected state courts to hear cases arising under federal
249 See id. at 2371; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992).
210 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 178-79 (discussing state
courts' obligation under Supremacy Clause to enforce federal law).
251 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause), reproduced supra note 58.
232 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,792-94 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
... See, e.g., id. at 794-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (linking
Framers' adoption of Supremacy Clause to their rejection of proposed congressional negative
on state laws); Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1036-38 (same); Pfander, Rethinking,
supra note 5, at 590-91 (same); see also EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 443-44 (1964) (relating Supremacy Clause to judicial power to hold statutes
unconstitutional); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Limitations on Congress's Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 46-49 (1981) (same).
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law (including cases challenging state laws on federal grounds).254
One might say, therefore, that the Supremacy Clause "commandeers"
state courts by requiring them to apply federal law to decide cases over which
they have jurisdiction under neutral state law. It is not that Congress has more
power to commandeer state courts than it has to commandeer the other
branches. Rather, it is that the Constitution itself imposes an obligation on
state judges that other state officials do not have.255
254 See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 138-41 (1876) (discussing material
"show[ing] the prevalent opinion which existed, that the State courts were competent to have
jurisdiction in cases arising wholly under the laws of the United States"); Caminker,
Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1037-38 (discussing Framers' recognition that state courts would
decide federal issues); Pfander, History, note 23, at 1300 (same); Redish & Muench, supra note
5, at 311 (same).
255 Professor Caminker believes that, "with respect to arguments concerning formal notions
of sovereignty, New York cannot stand alongside Testa." Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note
54, at 1060. That belief rests on an overly broad reading of Testa and an unduly narrow
reading of the portion of the Supremacy Clause that is directed to state judges, which Professor
Caminker calls the "Judges Clause." Professor Caminker reads Testa to mean state courts must
"entertain all federal causes of action." Id. at 1038; see also id. at 1006, 1007, 1011, 1024,
1059 (referring to state courts' obligation under Testa in similarly broad terms). Based on that
reading, he criticizes the New York decision for tracing the state courts' obligation under Testa
to the Judges Clause. See id. at 1034-42. In his view, the Judges Clause "cannot comfortably
be read as a rigid injunction that state courts of competent jurisdiction must entertain every
federal cause of action." Id. at 1039; see also id. at 1035 ("the [Judges] Clause does not provide
unique authority for judicial commandeering, in which case its presence cannot reasonably
imply the exclusion of a more general commandeering authority").
Testa does not impose such a rigid injunction; it imposes only a duty of
nondiscrimination toward federal claims (as well as federal defenses). See supra notes 90-98
and accompanying text. That duty of nondiscrimination is justified by a refined version of what
Professor Caminker admits is a plausible reading of the Judges Clause. He says the Clause can
plausibly be read, in light of its text and history, "as imposing a 'nullification rule."' Id. at
1036. He explains that, under this rule, "when state judges exercise their state law jurisdiction
to hear a case, and the case poses conflicting claims of federal and state law, the judges are
'bound' to prioritize the former over the latter." Id. Yet Professor Caminker understands this
duty "merely [to] require[ ] state courts to recognize federal defenses to state law causes of
action." Id. (emphasis added). On the contrary, Testa's insight is that the "nullification rule"
embodied in the Supremacy Clause obligates state courts to prioritize federal law over state law,
not only when federal law is asserted as a defense, but also when it is asserted to support a claim
for affirmative relief in a case that a state court has power to decide under neutral state law. See
supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text. In short, when Testa is read, as it should be, to
impose on state courts only a duty of nondiscrimination, but a duty that entails recognition of
federal law whether it is raised to support a claim or a defense within the state court's
jurisdiction under neutral state law, Testa accords with the "nullification" rule prescribed by the
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IV. THE LINK BETWEEN THE STATES' TENTH AMENDMENT, STATE-COURT
IMMUNITY AND THEIR ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, FEDERAL-COURT
IMMUNITY
In a recent, scholarly article, Professor Carlos Vizquez traced the
states' immunity from liability in their own courts to the Eleventh
Amendment. 6 In contrast, this Article traces that immunity primarily to the
anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. Part III attempted to
explain the doctrinal support for that conclusion. This Part examines the
connection between the states' Tenth Amendment immunity in their own
Judges Clause, when that rule is correctly perceived as requiring state courts to recognize both
federal claims and federal defenses. The Court, therefore, properly relied on that Clause in New
York and Printz to explain why the Constitution imposes an affirmative obligation on state
courts that, under the Court's anticommandeering rule, cannot be imposed on other branches
of state government.
256 See Vazquez, supra note 13, at 1702, 1785-90. As Professor Vazquez recognizes, see
id. at 1685 n.6, the Court has frequently said that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to
state courts. See, e.g., Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204-05
(1991) (referring to "the jurisdiction of state courts to entertain a suit free from Eleventh
Amendment constraints"); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989)
("the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts"); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9
n.7 (1980) ("No Eleventh Amendment question is present, of course, where an action is brought
in a state court since the Amendment, by its terms, restrains only '[tihe Judicial power of the
United States."'); see also Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994) (holding state was
required to refund unlawfully collected taxes in state-court action, even though "the sovereign
immunity States enjoy in federal court, under the Eleventh Amendment, does generally bar tax
refund claims from being brought in that forum"); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420 (1979)
(holding Eleventh Amendment does not bar action against State A brought in the state courts
of State B); Meltzer, supra note 5, at 57 (remarking Eleventh Amendment's reference to federal
courts "is one textual limitation that the Supreme Court has observed"). Professor Vazquez
therefore uses the term "Eleventh Amendment immunity" as a shorthand for the federal-court
immunity that states enjoy under the constitutional "postulate," see Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934), of which the Eleventh Amendment is "but an
exemplification," In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). See Vazquez, supra note 13, at
1685 n.6. Professor Vazquez finds support in the Court's precedent for two distinct
interpretations of Eleventh Amendment immunity. One interpretation treats the Amendment
as conferring "only an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts," which he
calls the "forum-allocation" interpretation. See id. at 1691, 1702. The other interpretation treats
the Amendment, more broadly, as also conferring "(effectively) an immunity from liability to
individuals under federal law," an interpretation that he calls the "immunity-from-liability"
interpretation. Id. Professor Vazquez concludes that the Court's Eleventh Amendment
precedent provides stronger support for the immunity-from-liability interpretation than for the
forum-allocation interpretation. See id. at 1785-90.
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courts and their Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. In doing so,
it explains the differences between Professor Vizquez's position and mine.
This Part concludes that a connection exists between the states' Tenth
Amendment immunity in their own courts and their Eleventh Amendment
immunity in federal court, but the immunities are not wholly congruent.
A. Decisions that Determine Eleventh Amendment Immunity by Reference to
State-Court Immunity
Three features of Eleventh Amendment immunity rest on the Court's
perception of the scope of state-court immunity. Those features are the
following: the Eleventh Amendment's ban on federal-court suits brought
against a state by its own citizens; its ban on federal-court suits against a state
that arise under federal law; and the unavailability of Eleventh Amendment
immunity to cities and counties. None of these features is readily discernible
on the face of the Eleventh Amendment. The Court has adopted them to make
the states' immunity in federal court congruent with their traditional immunity
in their own courts.
The Court established the first two features in Hans v. Louisiana.257
In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana sued that state in federal court, arguing that the
state's failure to pay interest on its bonds violated the Contract Clause of the
United States Constitution .2 1 The Court framed the question before it as
"whether a state can be sued in a circuit court of the United States by one of
its own citizens upon a suggestion that the case is one that arises under the
constitution or laws of the United States., 259 The Court answered no.26
That answer rested on the Court's understanding of the extent to
which states could be sued in their own courts when the Constitution was
adopted. The Court believed that "the cognizance of suits and actions
unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the
constitution when establishing the judicial power ofthe United States., 26' The
Court thus found it determinative that "[t]he suability of a state, without its
consent, was a thing unknown to the law" at that time.262 The Court was
27 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
258 See id. at 13; see also supra note 116 (reproducing the Contract Clause).
219 Hans, 134 U.S. at 4.
260 See id. at 16.
261 Id. at 15.
262 Id. at 16. Butcf Gibbons, supra note 15, at 1895-99 (arguing that Hans misread history);
James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment
Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899, 926-62
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referring to the suability of a state in its own courts. The Court made that
clear by saying that the nonsuability of the states "was fully shown" in Justice
Iredell's dissenting opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia."3 In that opinion, Justice
Iredell had first determined that no state statute "authorizing a compulsory suit
for the recovery of money against a State, was in being either when the
Constitution was adopted, or at the time the judicial act [of 1789] was
passed."2" Justice Iredell then turned to the common law suability of a
sovereign in its own courts.265 He concluded that, at common law, the courts
could not award monetary relief against their sovereign without the consent
of the sovereign's legislature.2' Although Justice Iredell focused on monetary
claims against the states, the Court in Hans disregarded this limitation, stating,
for example, that Justice Iredell "conclusively showed" in Chisholm that
"subjecting sovereign states to actions at the suit of individuals.., was never
done before." '267
The Hans Court recognized the text of the Eleventh Amendment did
not bar suits against a state brought by the state's own citizens, but observed
that a departure from the text would avoid two anomalies.26 The better-
known anomaly that the Court sought to avoid was that "a State may be sued
in the federal courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like
cause of action by the citizens of other states, or of a foreign state. 269 The
(1997) (making similar argument).
263 Hans, 134 U.S. at 16 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793)
(Iredell, J.)).
264 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 434-35 (Iredell, J.).
263 See id. at 437-46 (Iredell, J.).
266 See id. (Iredell, J.).
267 Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.
268 See id. at 10-11.
269 Id. at 10. With respect to this anomaly, the Court reasoned:
Suppose that congress, when proposing the eleventh amendment, had appended to it a
proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a state from being sued by its own
citizens in cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, can we
imagine that it would have been adopted by the states? The supposition that it would is
almost an absurdity on its face.
Id. at 15. Critics of Hans have argued that Hans was wrong because this anomaly did not exist; the
Eleventh Amendment did not prevent a citizen of one state from suing another state in federal court
on a cause of action arising under federal law. See, e.g., Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation,
supra note 5, at 1039 & n. 18, 1130; Gibbons, supra note 15, at 1893-94; Jackson, State Sovereign
Immunity, supra note 15, at 9 (describing Hans as based on this anomaly); id. at 32-39 (arguing that
Eleventh Amendment did not bar federal-question claims); see also Monaghan, supra note 23, at
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lesser-known, but equally important, anomaly that the Court wanted to avoid
in Hans was that a state "may be thus sued in the federal courts, although not
allowing itself to be sued in its own courts."27 This second anomaly-between
a state's suability in its own courts and in federal court-was central to the
Court's decision, given its belief that the Constitution did not give federal
courts "cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law" when the
Constitution was adopted.27'
Hans produced later Court decisions expanding the states' federal-
court immunity beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment in other ways.
Hans was at the center of the Court's decisions: in Smith v. Reeves,272 which
held that the states were immune from suits by federally created
105-06 (describing Hans as based on avoidance of this anomaly).
270 Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
271 Id. at 15. The second anomaly described by the Court in Hans was one between the
suability of states in federal court (under the interpretation advanced by the plaintiff) and their
suability in their own courts at the time the suit in Hans was brought. Thus, the anomaly does
not correspond exactly to the basis for the Court's holding, which rested on the nonsuability of
states in their own courts at the time the Constitution was adopted. The Court in Hans,
however, did not sharply differentiate among the suability of the states in their own courts at
these two points in time, perhaps because it did not perceive much difference in the state of the
law at those points. The Court's failure to differentiate between the states' suability when the
Constitution was adopted and their suability at the time of its decision is evident in its
discussion of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Court held the suit before it was not within the
circuit court's jurisdiction under that Act, which was then still in effect. The Court observed
the Act gave circuit courts only jurisdiction "'concurrent with the courts of the several states."'
Hans, 134 U.S. at 18 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73). Based on that language, the
Court determined that Congress, in 1789, "did not intend to invest its courts with any new and
strange jurisdictions." Id. The Court determined construing the Act to authorize circuit
jurisdiction over the case before it would conflict with that intention because "[t]he state courts
have no power to entertain suits by individuals against a state without its consent." Id. (emphasis
added). This use of the present tense shows the Court did not distinguish between the suability
of states in their own courts in 1789 and their suability 100 years later. See also id. at 21 (using
the present tense in this statement: "It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination
of the reason or expediency of the rule which exempts a sovereign state from prosecution in a
court ofjustice at the suit of individuals.") (emphasis added). In any event, in light of Hans's
reliance on the nonsuability of states in their own courts at the time the Hans case arose, I
respectfully disagree with one commentator's suggestion that the Hans Court "may have
assumed that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy available in state court." Cloherty, supra
note 15, at 1313.
272 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
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corporations;273 in In re New York,274 which held that states were immune from
suits in admiralty, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment's reference only
to suits "in law or equity";275 and in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,276
which held that the states were immune from suits by foreign countries, even
though foreign countries are not mentioned in the Eleventh Amendment.277
More generally, "[f]or over a century [the Court] ha[s] reaffirmed [Hans'
determination] that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States
'was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial
power of the United States.' ' 278 That determination lies at the core of the
Court's expansive notion of the states' constitutional immunity in federal
court.
2 79 That determination rests in large part on the Court's view of the
scope of the states' traditional immunity in their own courts.
The scope of this traditional immunity has also been the source of one
of the few restrictions on the states' federal-court immunity that is not evident
on the face of the Eleventh Amendment. "[T]he Court has consistently
refused to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to afford protection to political
subdivisions such as counties and municipalities... .280 In what appears to
be the-first and most-often cited case addressing the issue, the Court relied
primarily on a state statute authorizing state-court suits against the state's
273 See id. at 446 (finding that the immunity of states from federal-court suits by federal
corporations "is controlled by the principles announced in Hans").
274 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
275 See id. at 498 ("In Hans v. Louisiana, ... the court demonstrated the impropriety of
construing the [Eleventh] [A]mendment so as to leave it open for citizens to sue their own State
in the federal courts; and it seems to us equally clear that it cannot with propriety be construed
to leave open a suit against a State in the admiralty jurisdiction .... ").
276 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
277 See id. at 322, 325-27 (quoting Hans extensively and also citing In re New York and
Reeves).
278 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,54 (1996) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 15).
279 Most commentators and several Members of the Court have argued that Hans was wrong.
See Vdzquez, supra note 13, at 1694, 1698; see also id. at 1694 n.42 (citing commentary critical
of Hans). But cf David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
547, 547 (1997) (author identifying himself as "that rara avis, a law professor who thinks Hans
v. Louisiana was correctly decided") (citation omitted). This Article does not enter the fray over
the correctness of Hans, given the objective of this Article and the Court's steadfast adherence
to Hans. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 & n.7 (observing the Court has adhered to
Hans "[flor over a century"); see also id. at 64 (criticizing dissent's challenge to Hans).
280 -Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'i Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979).
See also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,47 (1994) ("[C]ities and counties
do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.") (citation omitted).
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counties.281 The significance of the Court's reliance on state law in this
context should not be overstated. The Court typically consults state law to
determine whether a subdivision of the state shares the state's federal-court
immunity." 2 Nonetheless, the Court's reliance on state law governing the
suability of counties in state court suggests the same instinct that is evident in
Hans: to make state-court and federal-court immunity congruent. 83
B. Decisions that Determine State-Court Immunity by Reference to
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Court has not only looked to the states' immunity in their own
courts to determine the scope of their immunity in federal court. The Court
has also looked to the states' immunity in federal court to determine the scope
of their immunity in their own courts. The Court followed the latter approach
in five cases decided in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth.284 These cases are hard to understand in light of the
many recent cases in which the Court has said, without mentioning these
earlier cases, that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to state-court
suits."8 5 It is possible that these early cases signify the Court's belief that the
immunity principle underlying the Eleventh Amendment protects the states
when sued in state court, as Professor Vizquez argues.2" 6 If so, the Court's
later statements that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state court
must be read to concern only the text of the Eleventh Amendment.2"7 A
second possibility is that the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in
these five cases on the assumption that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
281 See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890); see also Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1101-02 (discussing Luning).
282 See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)
(stating issue whether defendant was an "arm of the State partaking of the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity" depended on "the nature of the entity created by state law").
283 As in Hans, the Court in Lincoln County looked to the suability of the defendant entity
at the time of the lawsuit. See supra note 271. Also as in Hans, the suability of the defendant
entity at the time of the lawsuit did not differ from its suability at the time of the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment or of the original Constitution. See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation,
supra note 5, at 1100 ("The common understanding in the 1790's was that the sovereign
immunity of the states was not shared by their subdivisions.").
28 See Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911); General Oil Co. v. Crain,
209 U.S. 211 (1908); Louisiana ex rel. New York Guar. & Indem. Co. v. Steele, 134 U.S. 230
(1890); Chaffin v. Taylor, 114 U.S. 309 (1885); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885).
281 See supra note 256 (citing cases).
286 See supra note 256; see also Vizquez, supra note 13, at 1735-36 (discussing Poindexter).
287 See supra note 256 (citing cases).
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Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction over cases coming from the state
courts.2 That possibility is unlikely, however, because such an assumption
would have conflicted with the Court's holding in Cohens v. Virginia'8 9 that
the Eleventh Amendment did not restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 9°
In this author's view, the early cases do not signify the Court's belief that the
Eleventh Amendment was the source of the states' state-court immunity or
restricted the Court's appellate jurisdiction; instead, they reflect the Court's
view that the states' constitutional immunity in state court should be generally
coextensive with their constitutional immunity in federal court. In other
words, this is the same belief that underlay the Court's reliance on the scope
of state-court immunity in cases, such as Hans, that involved federal-court
immunity.
We have already seen two decisions that used Eleventh Amendment
principles to address a claim of state-court immunity: General Oil Co. v.
Crain and Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College. The prior discussion of
Crain reconciled it with Musgrove, a post-Testa decision strongly suggesting
the Constitution does not require state courts to entertain private claims that
would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.29' Hopkins was discussed as a
pre-Testa case supporting the same conclusion.2 9 Whereas the earlier
discussion of these cases emphasized the way in which they support the
existence of state-court immunity, now we will focus on the way they connect
that immunity to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Court in Crain asserted jurisdiction to review a state supreme
court decision dismissing on sovereign immunity grounds an officer suit
challenging the constitutionality of a state tax law.2 93 The Court asserted
jurisdiction only after determining that the state-court suit was not a suit
against the state. In support of that determination, the Court emphasized that,
whether an officer suit was brought in state court or federal court, "a
distinction must be made between valid and invalid state laws."'2 94 The Court
said state officers could be enjoined from enforcing state statutes violative of
federal law, regardless of the sovereign's immunity "in the state tribunals..
288 See Vazquez, supra note 13, at 1736 (offering this explanation for Poindexter).
289 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
290 See id. at 405-12.
29' See supra notes 102-31 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
293 See General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 221-28 (1908).
294 Id. at 226.
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. [and] national tribunals." '295 The Court explained that a contrary conclusion
would undermine the Constitution:
If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national courts by the
[Eleventh] Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a state
to its courts, as it is contended in the case at bar that it may be, without power
of review by this court, it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent
the enforcement of many provisions ofthe Constitution; and the [Fourteenth]
Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much
of its operation.296
The Court directed the reader interested in a fuller explanation to see Exparte
Young, an Eleventh Amendment case decided the same day as Crain.297 Thus,
the Court in Crain at once recognized that an immunity existed in both state
and federal court and, at the same time, found it necessarily limited, in each
forum, by the need to ensure state compliance with federal law.29
The Court's reliance on Eleventh Amendment principles in Crain
cannot be explained on the grounds that the Court overlooked the state-court
origin of the case or believed that the Eleventh Amendment restricted its
appellate jurisdiction. The first ground is not tenable because, as the discussion
above makes clear, the Court differentiated between the state's immunity in the
"state" and the "national" tribunals.2 9  Moreover, Justice Harlan, in
concurrence, complained that the majority's discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment was "entirely irrelevant" because "[t]hat amendment relates wholly
to the judicial power of the United States, and has absolutely nothing to do with
the inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the inferior state court."3" The second
explanation for Crain's reliance on Eleventh Amendment principles is untenable
in light of Justice Harlan's further observation that the Eleventh Amendment
was also irrelevant to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction; as he said, "it
was long ago settled that a writ of error to review the final judgment of a state
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 See id. at 227; see also id. at 211 (indicating decision date of March 23, 1908); Exparte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (same).
298 See Woolhandler, supra note 15, at 151 ("Interestingly, the Court's decisions [in
Poindexter and Crain] appeared to treat sovereign immunity as equally inapplicable in state and
federal court actions against individual officers to remedy trespassory harms.").
299 Crain, 209 U.S. at 226; see also id. at 224-25 ("[N]or were all of the cases cited by
plaintiff in error to sustain the jurisdiction of this court cases in the Federal Courts. Poindexter
v. Greenhow and Chaffin v. Taylor were brought in the state courts of Virginia .... ) (citations
omitted).
300 Id. at 233 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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court, even when a state is a formal party and is successful in the inferior court,
is not a suit within the meaning of the [Eleventh] Amendment." ''
As it did in Crain, the Court in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College rejected a claim of state-court immunity from money damages only after
determining, based on Eleventh Amendment case law, that the suit was not one
against the state."02 The Hopkins Court upheld a claim of state-court immunity
from the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff, however, because the
injunction would have entailed an action against the state.3"3 Thus, Hopkins
supports not only the existence of state-court immunity from constitutional
claims but also its general congruence with federal-court immunity.
In two of the remaining three cases, Poindexter v. Greenhow3 and a
companion case, Chaffin v. Taylor, 5 the Court used Eleventh Amendment case
law to reject state claims of immunity in actions brought in state court asserting
constitutional claims."° These two cases support the existence and federal-court
correspondence of state-court immunity in the same way Crain does: Although
the Court rejected state-court immunity claims, it did so on the basis of an
Eleventh Amendment analysis that was unnecessary unless the Court believed
the states had an immunity in their own courts that corresponded to their federal-
court immunity.
The remaining case is Louisiana ex rel. New York Guaranty &
Indemnity Co. v. Steele. °7 As in the other cases discussed in this section, the
Court in Steele relied on Eleventh Amendment case law to analyze a state's
claim of immunity from an action that was brought in state court against a state
officer alleging a violation of the Constitution.3 8 Unlike the other cases in this
301 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)).
Cohens was a state-court proceeding brought by the State. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at
378. In contrast, Crain was a state-court proceeding brought against the State. See Crain, 209
U.S. at 220. Nonetheless, the reasoning of Cohens supported the conclusion the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar the Court's appellate jurisdiction in either situation, and the Court's
"consistent practice since Cohens confirm[ed] this broader understanding." McKesson Corp.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 27 (1990); see also infra notes
357-62 and accompanying text.
302 See Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College, 221 U.S. 636, 642-45 (1911).
303 See id. at 648-49; see supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text for further discussion.
304 114 U.S. 270 (1885).
303 114 U.S. 309 (1885).
" See id. at 310 (relying on analysis in Poindexter); Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 285-301.
307 134 U.S. 230 (1890).
308 See id. at 230-31.
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section, the Court in Steele wholly sustained the claim of immunity.3" Steele is
useful in confirming the congruence of the states' state-court immunity and their
federal-court immunity. This is weak precedent, though, because its continuing
vitality is doubtful in light of the modem doctrine of Exparte Young.31°
In determining whether the Court would accord states immunity from
private, federal claims in their own courts, one must account for these decisions
in which the Court used Eleventh Amendment principles to evaluate claims of
immunity in cases brought in state court. They cannot be dismissed as the result
of an oversight by the Court. There are too many of them, and some, like Crain,
indicate the Court understood that the Eleventh Amendment applied only in
federal court. It is also unlikely that the decisions reflect a belief by the Court
that the Eleventh Amendment restricted its appellate jurisdiction of state-court
cases, given its early expression of the contrary view. The most likely
explanation is that the Court believed that state-court immunity existed and was
generally coextensive with federal-court immunity.
C. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police and Later Decisions
Reflecting the Court's View on the Congruence of the States 'Liability in
State and Federal Court
The cases discussed in Sections A and B evince the Court's view that
states have an immunity in their own courts that corresponds to their federal-
court immunity. But those decisions are old. The most recent decision was
Musgrove, a per curiam decision from 1949. 3" In later cases, the Court has said
the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits brought in state court, without
'09 See id. at 232.
30 The plaintiff in Steele sought injunctive relief against a state officer for unconstitutional
conduct, see id. at 230-31, relief that is now understood generally to be permitted under the Ex
parte Young doctrine and, if sought in federal court, not to be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996). The Young doctrine
has not always been understood so broadly; at least one scholar apparently understood Young
to authorize only "negative" injunctive relief, prohibiting certain conduct by a state official,
rather than affirmative injunctive relief that would require the official to take certain actions.
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State andFederal Law, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 489,
516 (1954), discussed in Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1120 n.324.
Under this narrower view, Steele differed from Young because the plaintiff in Steele sought
affirmative injunctive relief: an order requiring the state auditor to collect taxes to pay the
overdue interest on bonds held by the plaintiff. See Steele, 134 U.S. at 230. Cf Exparte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) (emphasizing that injunction "which restrains the state officer from
taking any steps towards the enforcement of an unconstitutional enactment" entails no
affirmative relief).
31 See supra notes 102-31 and accompanying text.
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suggesting that a cognate state-court immunity exists.' 2 It is therefore important
to take into account three recent cases in which the Court has endorsed a similar
form of congruence between the states' liability to private suits in state court and
federal court. These three cases furnish modem, though indirect, support for the
existence of a state-court immunity that is coextensive with federal-court
immunity.
The lead case is Will v. Michigan Department of State Police.3"3 To
understand Will, however, one must know what preceded it. Before Will, the
Court had held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from private suits in federal court." 4 In so holding, the
Court determined Congress had not made its intention to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment in § 1983 sufficiently clear.315 That holding left open the question
whether states could be sued under § 1983 in their own courts.31 6 That question
was one of statutory interpretation: whether, in authorizing actions against any
"person" acting under color of law who violated the plaintiff's federal rights,
Congress intended the term "person" in § 1983 to include states.3"7
In Will, the Court held that "neither a State nor its officials sued in their
official capacities are 'persons"' within the meaning of42 U.S.C. § 1983.a"' The
Court accordingly affirmed the dismissal of a private, state-court suit under §
1983 brought in state court against state officials and agencies alleging a
violation of the Constitution.31 9 In construing § 1983 not to apply to the states,
the Court held that, when Congress intends to make states liable in private
32 See supra note 256 (citing cases).
313 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
314 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp.
1996)).
311 See id. at 341-45.
316 See Will, 491 U.S. at 63-64.
3Sv Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
3"8 Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
319 See id. at 60-61, 71. Will claimed that he was denied a promotion in the state police
department because his brother was a "student activist." See id. at 60.
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actions under a federal statute, it must express that intention clearly.32° The
Court derived this clear statement rule primarily from the cases in which it had
required a "clear statement" by Congress to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment. 321' The Court recognized that the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment and of § 1983 were "certainly" separate issues.322 The Court,
nonetheless, believed that, "in deciphering congressional intent as to the scope
of § 1983, the scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration. 323 The
Court based that belief partly on the anomalous result of construing § 1983 to
apply to states but not to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.324 The Court
explained that, given Congress's evident purpose in § 1983 to "provide a federal
forum for civil rights claims,"'32 it would be odd for Congress not to authorize
§ 1983 actions against states in federal courts, but to do so in state courts.326
In two cases after Will, the Court has similarly recognized it would be
anomalous to permit federal claims against a state in its own courts that could
not be asserted in a federal court. In Howlett v. Rose,327 the Court remarked that
Will prevented the "anomaly" that "a State might be forced to entertain in its
own courts suits from which it was immune in federal court. ' 32' The Court also
said, however, this anomaly did not justify extending state-court immunity "not
only to the State and its arms but also to municipalities, counties, and school
districts that might otherwise be subject to suit under § 1983 in federal court. 329
Accordingly, the Court held that the state courts were obligated-under Testa,
among other decisions-to hear a § 1983 claim against a county school board that
was not shown to have immunity from such a suit in federal court.33°
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission,M the Court
found "much to commend" in the "symmetry" of Will's clear statement rule,
which "mak[es] a State's liability or immunity, as the case may be, the same in
320 See id. at 64-65.
32 See id. at 65 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).
322 See id. at 66-67.
323 id.
324 See id.
323 Id. at 66.
326 See id.
327 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
328 Id. at 365.
329 Id. at 366.
330 See id. at 373-74, 381 n.24.
"3 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
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both federal and state courts., 33 2 The Hilton Court added that Will's clear
statement rule "avoids the federalism-related concerns that arise when the
National Government uses the state courts as the exclusive forum to permit
recovery under a federal statute." '33 The Court in Hilton, nonetheless, construed
the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) to create a private cause of action
enforceable against a state in state court, even though, in a prior case, the Court
had construed a statute that incorporated FELA's remedial scheme not to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. 34 The
Hilton Court found the concerns of symmetry and federalism to be outweighed
by stare decisis. The latter doctrine was triggered by a decision that predated
Will's clear statement rule and had construed the FELA to cover states.3 5
The Court's reliance on an "anomaly" in Will and its recognition of that
anomaly in Howlett and Hilton do not directly establish that states have an
immunity in their own courts that is similar in scope to their Eleventh
Amendment immunity in federal court. Just because it would be "anomalous"
for Congress to make states liable in state court for claims that would be barred
from federal court by the Eleventh Amendment, that does not mean Congress
lacks the power under Article I to do so. It bears emphasis that the Court in Will
relied on the anomaly only to impose a clear statement requirement on Congress,
not to deny it power.3 6
Will and decisions referring to the anomaly identified in Will do,
however, furnish indirect support for a state-court immunity that is generally
coextensive with federal-court immunity. Will's use of Eleventh Amendment
principles suggests the liability of states in their own courts raises constitutional
332 Id. at 206.
333 Id.
334 See id at 199-200 (discussing Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483
U.S. 468 (1987), which held Eleventh Amendment was not abrogated by the Jones Act, which
incorporated FELA's remedial scheme, and which overruled the holding in Parden v. Terminal
Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), that states had waived their Eleventh
Amendment immunity from liability under FELA).
315 See id. at 201 ("Our analysis and ultimate determination in this case are controlled and
informed by the central importance of stare decisis in this Court's jurisprudence."); see also id.
at 201-02 (discussing Parden, which reflected "a 28-year-old interpretation" of the FELA as
applying to states); supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (explaining that Hilton did not
address state-court immunity issue).
336 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,66-67 (1989) (scope of Eleventh




concerns. 337 Hilton determined that "federalism-related concerns" supported
Will's clear statement rule.338 The constitutional flavor of Will's clear statement
rule could be significant, in light of what happened in Seminole Tribe to the
clear statement rule that the Court had used in earlier decisions to determine
whether federal statutes, including statutes based on Article I, abrogated the
Eleventh Amendment.339 Seminole Tribe held that, whether or not they contain
a clear statement, Article I statutes cannot abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.3"
It is, therefore, by no means inconceivable that Will's clear statement rule will
meet the same fate, giving way to a holding that Congress lacks power under
Article I to override the states' immunity from private Article I lawsuits in their
own courts.
D. Implications of the Link Between the States' State-Court and Federal-
Court Immunity for the Scope of Their State-Court Immunity
The link between the states' immunity in their own courts and their
immunity in federal court reflects a link between the Tenth Amendment and the
Eleventh Amendment, from which those immunities respectively spring. The
Court has construed each Amendment to mean more than it says. For example,
the Court has held that, although the Tenth Amendment is worded as "but a
truism," it forbids federal commandeering of state government,34" ' and that,
although the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not go so far, the principle
of which it is "but an exemplification"342 bars all private, federal-court actions
against unconsenting states.343 Each Amendment, the Court has said, reflects
... See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 209 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Will's clear statement rule
"derives from the Constitution itself.").
131 See id. at 206 ("[fjederalism-related concerns... arise when the National Government
uses the state courts as the exclusive forum to permit recovery under a congressional statute.").
... See Welch, 483 U.S. at 475-76 (plurality opinion) (applying clear statement rule to
determine whether federal statute enacted under Article I abrogated Eleventh Amendment, while
reserving issue whether Congress can use Article I to abrogate).
340 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,65-66 (1996) (citing prior decisions applying
clear statement rule to Article I statutes as "merely assum[ing] for the sake of argument" that
Congress had power to abrogate under Article I).
34' See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) ("The Tenth Amendment
... restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth
Amendment itself," which is "but a truism" and "essentially a tautology.").
342 In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
143 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 ("Although the text of the [Eleventh] Amendment
would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts," the




"postulates" implicit in the system of dual sovereignty established by the
Constitution.'" Because of the link between the constitutional provisions
underlying the two immunities, those immunities have some common features.34 5
Because the origins of the two immunities are nonetheless discrete, the
immunities are not identical. This Section explores the common features and the
differences.
1. State-Court Claims Against Cities and Counties
Part III of this Article argued that the Supremacy Clause, of its own
force, does not expand the jurisdiction of state courts except by invalidating
discriminatory restrictions on their jurisdiction. Part III also argued that
Congress. cannot, under Article I, compel a state court to hear a private action
that the Supremacy Clause would not require it to hear-i.e., an action that the
state court lacks power to hear under neutral state law.
Those principles fully apply to state-court actions against cities and
counties (as well as other non-state defendants). Thus, the Supremacy Clause
would not invalidate a state law that gave cities and counties immunity from all
private actions in state court. Nor would the Clause invalidate a state law that
allowed only some claims to be brought against cities and counties, as long as
the law did not discriminate against federal claims in the manner already
discussed.3" Moreover, Congress could not use Article I to compel state courts
to hear actions against cities and counties that the courts could not hear under
state laws that comported with the Supremacy Clause.
34 See, e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934):
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of section 2 of
Article 3, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the
restrictions upon suits against unconsenting States. Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.... There is... the
postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be
immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been a 'surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention.'
Id. at 322-23 (citations omitted). United States v. Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997)
(including among "essential postulate[s]" to which Monaco referred the principle of "dual
sovereignty," which was "rendered express" by the Tenth Amendment).
34 See supra notes 257-310 and accompanying text; see also Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 n.14 (1987) (Because Constitution does not
expressly abrogate states' sovereign immunity, "the principle that States cannot be sued without
their consent is broadly consistent with the Tenth Amendment," which reserved to states powers
not delegated to federal government.).
34 See supra notes 68-181 and accompanying text.
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In effect, then, cities and counties can have immunity in state court
from private actions based on Article I statutes, even though they do not have
such immunity in federal court. The same is true of other governmental entities
that would not be considered "arms of the State" for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment.347 This result accords with Supreme Court precedent recognizing
that cities and counties are protected by the Tenth Amendment,348 but not by the
Eleventh Amendment.349
The Tenth Amendment does not, however, protect cities and counties
from private actions in state court to enforce federal statutes enacted under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has held cities and counties
may be sued in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if they have immunity
under state law. 50 In so holding, the Court explained, "By including
municipalities within the class of 'persons' subject to liability for violations of
the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress... abolished whatever vestige of
the State's sovereign immunity the municipality possessed., 35' Because § 1983
falls within Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, that holding does
not foreclose state-court immunity from claims based on Article I statutes.352
147 See, e.g., Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977) (Eleventh Amendment bars actions against entities that function as "arms" of the state).
348 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 n.20 (1976) (stating Tenth
Amendment principle announced by majority applied to political subdivisions of states),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
141 See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Auth., 440 U.S. 391,401
(1979) ("[T]he Court has consistently refused to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to afford
protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities. .. ."); see also supra
notes 280-83 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court precedent on status of cities
and counties under Eleventh Amendment).
350 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
... Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1980). See also Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 367-83 (1990) (holding that state court was obligated to entertain § 1983 action
against local public school district, despite state law barring § 1983 actions against such
entities).
352 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972) (Section 1983 "was enacted for the
express purpose of enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment") (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Act of Apr. 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (entitling statutory
predecessor of § 1983 "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes"). In Howlett, the Court held the
Supremacy Clause required a state court to hear a § 1983 action against a local public school
district. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367-83. The state courts had refused to hear the action
because of a state statute that the state courts had construed to "confer[] a blanket immunity on
governmental entities from federal civil rights actions under § 1983." Id. at 364. From the
opinion in Howlett, it appears that, aside from that discriminatory construction, the state courts
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2. State Waivers of Immunity
A state can waive immunity from suits in its own courts, just as it can
do so with respect to suits in federal court.353 In each forum, there is an
important and identical limitation on the state's waiver "power." There is also
one important, though obvious, difference.
As discussed above, a state cannot limit the scope of its consent to a suit
in a way that would require the court hearing the suit to violate the Supremacy
Clause. 54 When a state submits a claim to a federal court, it exposes itself to
defenses and counterclaims in the nature of recoupment. Similarly, when a state
consents to suit in its own court, it exposes itself to both defenses and claims,
including federal claims, arising from the same facts as the suit to which it has
consented. Thus, the Supremacy Clause imposes an identical limit on the state's
ability to restrict the scope of its consent to suit in federal court and its ability to
do so in its own courts.
In one sense, though, a state's power to waive its immunity in its own
courts exceeds its power to do so in federal court. Obviously, a state can waive
immunity in its own courts from suits based solely on state law.355 By contrast,
a state cannot consent to be sued on a state-law claim in federal court, unless the
claim falls within the federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction. A state, like
other parties, cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts by
consent. 56 This really reflects a limit on the federal courts, rather than a limit
had power to hear a claim arising from the same facts as did the § 1983 claim in Howlett. See
id. at 362-64 & nn. 4, 10 & 11; id. at 378-79. If so, the holding in Howlett can be justified
solely on the basis of the Supremacy Clause, without regard to the fact that the federal claim
was based on a statute enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supremacy
Clause, of its own force, invalidated the state law (i.e., the judicial interpretation of the state
statute) because it discriminated against federal claims. In addition, the Supremacy Clause
required the state courts to hear the claim, because they had power to do so under the state laws
that remained intact when the discriminatory state law was disregarded.
353 See, e.g., DeSaussure v. Gaillard, 127 U.S. 216, 232-34 (1888) (holding that state can
waive immunity in its own courts); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (holding that
Eleventh Amendment waiver was effected "by the voluntary appearance of the State in
intervening as a claimant of the fund in [federal] court"). Cf Massey, supra note 15, at 143-44
(arguing that state lacks immunity in either its own courts or federal court unless it is granted
by state constitution).
"'5 See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
355 See, e.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857) (remarking that a state
"may, if it thinks proper, waive this privilege [i.e., against suit], and permit itself to be made
a defendant in a suit").
356 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908) (federal
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on the states' power to waive their immunity.
3. Appellate Review by the United States Supreme Court
A state cannot prevent the United States Supreme Court from reviewing
a final decision of the highest court of that state, even in a case brought against
the state without its consent. In Cohens v. Virginia,357 the Court held the
Eleventh Amendment did not bar the Court's appellate review of a case that had
been brought by the state in state court and that raised a federal question.35 In
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,"' the Court
held that its appellatejurisdiction also extends to actions that are brought against
a state in state court and that raise a federal question. 3' Although the Court in
both Cohens and McKesson suggested various reasons why its power of
appellate review overcomes the Eleventh Amendment, the Court seemed
ultimately to rely on the need to ensure "state-court compliance with, and
national uniformity of, federal law."36' Thus, the dual foundations for the
Court's appellate jurisdiction are the Supremacy Clause and the Court's role in
enforcing that Clause by reviewing state-court decisions.36 These foundations
court has independent obligation to determine existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, even if
parties do not question it).
317 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
358 See id. at 405-12.
359 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
360 See id. at 26-31.
361 Id. at 29; see also Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 381, 391-92 (rejecting argument that
Article III did not authorize federal courts to review state court decisions in cases brought by
state against its own citizens in which federal defense was raised; citing Supremacy Clause and
Constitution's general objective of "preservation of the constitution and laws of the United
States, so far as they can be preserved by judicial authority") (emphasis added); id. at 415-16
(citing need for uniformity in rejecting argument that Court could not review decisions of state
courts even in cases to which state was not party).
362 See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 28 (Court's appellate review of state-court decisions is
"consistent with this Court's role in our federal system"). Professor Vfzquez focuses on the
following statement in McKesson: "when a state court takes cognizance of a case, the State
assents to appellate review by this Court of the federal issues raised in the case." See Vdzquez,
supra note 13, at 1710-11 (quoting McKesson, 496 U.S. at 30). He regards this and a similar
statement in Seminole Tribe as evidence that the Eleventh Amendment gives states an immunity
from liability, rather than merely an immunity from private actions in federal court. See id. at
1702-03, 1710-11 (quoting statement in Seminole Tribe that Supreme Court can exercise
appellate jurisdiction "where a State has consented to suit," Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 71 n.14 (1996), and arguing that these statements support "immunity from liability"
interpretation of Eleventh Amendment). In his view, the United States Supreme Court cannot
review a state court decision in a suit against a state that has not waived immunity from the suit.
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support appellate review by the Supreme Court despite the immunity that this
Article contends the states enjoy in their own courts.363
4. Abrogation of Immunity Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress can abrogate the states' immunity in their own courts using
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress can do so for the same
reason that it can use Section 5 to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
See Vizquez, supra note 13, at 1692. With respect, I do not share this view. The statement in
Seminole Tribe is dicta in a footnote that purports only to describe Cohens v. Virginia.
Moreover, I believe the language of"consent," similar to the language of"constructive waiver,"
is merely shorthand for the notion that Eleventh Amendment immunity is overcome by the
Supremacy Clause and the Court's role in enforcing that Clause. For the same reason, I do not
attach significance to the reference to the state's "assent[]" in McKesson. Furthermore, the
Court's reference to the consent theory in McKesson reflects the state's actual consent, by
statute, to the state-court action before the Court for review. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 24-25
& n.4 (describing Florida's "Repayment of Funds" statute). It was, therefore, appropriate for
the McKesson Court to use "consent" terminology. The Court's use of it does not, in my view,
preclude the existence of the Supremacy Clause rationale that would support the Court's
appellate jurisdiction over a claim brought against the state in a state-court case to which it had
not consented.
363 These same considerations arguably support the Court's holding in FERC v. Mississippi
that Testa's duty of nondiscrimination extends to state executive officers who perform judicial
functions. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760-61,768-69 (1982); see also supra note
188. The Court said in Printz, "It is within the power of the States ... to transfer some
adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies, with opportunity for subsequent judicial
review." United States v. Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2381 n.14 (1997) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The italicized statement implies that, when a state delegates adjudicatory
power to a state agency, the state must provide for judicial review of at least the federal issues
that arise in the agency's adjudications. Suchjudicial review could be impaired if state agencies
had no obligation to address federal claims. If a state agency could refuse to address federal
claims, the federal claims might not be capable of effective resolution by a state court on review
of the agency's decision. Cf Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146-50 (1988) (holding that state
law was preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in part, because it operated like an administrative
exhaustion requirement). If so, the agency's disregard of the federal claim would prevent the
state court from treating the federal claim and state claims evenhandedly, as Testa requires. It
could, in turn, also hamper effective appellate review by the Supreme Court of the state court's
decision on the federal claim. Thus, it may be true, as Professor Caminker argues, that the
extension of Testa in FERC is not justified by the "Judges Clause" portion of the Supremacy
Clause. See Caminker, Subordinacy, supra note 54, at 1040 (asserting "[tihe [FERC] Court's
unreflective extension of the Testa principle to 'adjudication' conducted by a state official other
than a 'judge' rests somewhat uneasily with New York's notion that the duty to enforce federal
law stems directly from the literal text of the Judges Clause"). The extension does seem




immunity in federal court: "the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the
adoption of the [Tenth] Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution,
operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power
achieved by Article III and the [Tenth] Amendment.""s Applied to state-court
immunity, that rationale accords with precedent in which the Court has rejected
Tenth Amendment challenges to federal legislation enacted to enforce the Civil
War Amendments.365 Because of the importance and complexity of Congress's
use of Section 5 to abrogate the states' state-court immunity, that issue is the
subject of the next Part of this Article. Part V concludes that the Fourteenth
Amendment, of its own force, sometimes requires state courts to entertain
actions against state officers. It further concludes that Congress can use Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize suits in state court directly against
unconsenting states under the same circumstances as it could authorize such
suits in federal court.
V. LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ON THE STATES'
IMMUNITY IN THEIR OWN COURTS
A. The Due Process Clause Obligations of States
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states
to provide adequate procedures when they deprive someone of life, liberty, or
property.3" Supreme Court precedent leaves unclear when, if ever, the
3" Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 454 (1976)).
365 See, e.g., Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) ("[P]rinciples of federalism
that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation."'); see also Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,463,469 (1991) (states' freedom under Tenth Amendment to specify
qualifications of their governmental officials is subject to constitutional limitations, "most
notably" those of Fourteenth Amendment, but "the Fourteenth Amendment does not override
all principles of federalism."); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 & n.18 (1983)
(reaffirming that federalism restraints on Congress's Commerce Clause powers are attenuated
when Congress acts under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456
(upholding Title VII's authorization of suits against the states as valid exercise of Congress's
power under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment and stating "the Eleventh Amendment, and
the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment") (citation omitted); Exparte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments "were intended to be, and
really are, limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress.").
366 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."). In addition to ensuring adequate procedures, the
Due Process Clause limits government intrusion on fundamental rights that are either explicitly
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procedures must include a state-court suit directly against a state that has not
waived immunity from the suit. The precedent suggests, however, that when a
state has retained its state-court immunity, its courts merely must entertain
private actions against the state official who causes the deprivation. The timing
and nature of this action depends on the nature of the deprivation. For random
and unauthorized deprivations, state courts must hear post-deprivation actions
for damages against the offending official personally. For most predictable and
state-authorized deprivations, as distinguished from those that are random and
unauthorized, the state courts must entertain pre-deprivation Ex parte Young-
type actions-i.e., actions against the offending official for prospective relief.
When due process requires an individualized, judicial-style
proceeding,367 the required timing of that proceeding depends on whether the
deprivation is "random and unauthorized [by state law]," or is instead
predictable and state-authorized. 3" Examples of the first sort of deprivation
include cases brought by: a company claiming that state officials destroyed food
in the company's care, which the officials mistakenly believed was
contaminated;369 a public school student whom a teacher hit with a wooden
paddle for misconduct;37 and a prisoner whose hobby kit was lost by prison
officials.371 For random and unauthorized deprivations of property or liberty
protected by the Constitution and incorporated in the Clause's protection of "liberty," or
implicitly protected by the Constitution, according to the doctrine of substantive due process.
See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). The author's own limitations prevent
an exploration in this Article of the extent to which the doctrine of substantive due process
requires state courts to entertain actions against their own state or state officials.
367 The Due Process Clause requires states to provide individualized, judicial-style
procedures only for state action that affects people in an individualized, rather than an across-
the-board, way. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW §§ 5.6-5.8, at 232-
41 (3d ed. 1991). For example, a state need not give every property owner the right to a hearing
before it enacts a law raising the property tax rate. On the other hand, the state does have to give
a property owner an opportunity for an individual hearing in connection with its valuation of his
or her property for tax purposes. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
36 See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128-30 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533
(1984)).
369 See North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
370 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
"' See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986); see also Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 33-34 (1918) (dismissing, for lack of
federal question, writ of error from state-court decision dismissing, on sovereign immunity
grounds, action against state by landowners claiming that state's flooding of their land violated
Just Compensation Clause, and that state court's denial of relief "somehow deprives them of
property without due process of law").
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such as these, the Court has held that states only need to afford post-deprivation
remedies for wrongful deprivations.3" A Supreme Court case illustrating the
second type of deprivation-a predictable and state-authorized one-was
brought by a man who claimed that state officials allowed him to commit
himself to a mental institution without his understanding what he was doing.373
The Court held that, for this sort of deprivation, the Due Process Clause
ordinarily requires a pre-deprivation means of avoiding a wrongful
deprivation.374
For random and unauthorized deprivations, the Court has held that a
sufficient post-deprivation remedy consists of a state-court action against the
offending official personally for money damages.375 Notice two features of this
remedy. First, it would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment if sought in
a federal court, because actions seeking to hold state officers personally liable
for damages are not considered suits against the state.376 If sought in a state
court, the remedy, therefore, would not infringe on a state-court immunity that
corresponded to federal-court immunity. Second, the remedy may be illusory
in many cases. It might be barred by the doctrine of official immunity, under
which most officials can avoid liability for most wrongs if they show their
conduct did not violate "clearly established" law.3" The Court has not decided
whether the doctrine protects officials in suits mandated by the Due Process
Clause.37 In any event, some officials will be judgment proof. The Court has
372 See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533-36; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44;
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682; North Am. Cold Storage Co., 211 U.S. at 306; see also Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982).
313 See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 114-15.
314 See id. at 132-39. The main exceptions to this requirement of a pre-deprivation
proceeding for predictable, state-authorized deprivations are the state's collection of taxes and
its taking of private property for public use. See infra notes 397, 402 and accompanying text.
311 See Hudson, 460 U.S. at 535-36 (holding that due process was satisfied by existence of
state tort remedy against individual officer); see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44 (rejecting
plaintiff's claim that state-law remedy in state court was inadequate because it authorized suit
against state, rather than against officer).
376 See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 & n. I1 (1986) (noting that Eleventh
Amendment does not apply "[w]hen a state official is sued [in federal court] and held liable in
his individual capacity" for damages).
177 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
311 See Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism
andState Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277,294-97 (1988) (describing as unsettled the
question whether state officials can raise official-immunity defense when sued for violations of
Due Process Clause); Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for
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never suggested that the Due Process Clause requires states to satisfy judgments
against such officers when those judgments are entered by a federal court.37 9 If
no such requirement exists for federal-courtjudgments, there should be no such
requirement for state-court judgments against judgment-proof officials.
Otherwise, federal courts would be rendering judgments that were inadequate
to satisfy due process. It seems, then, that the Due Process Clause requires state
courts to hear private actions for personal damages against a state official who
deprives someone of life, liberty, or property in a random and unauthorized way
if no state-court remedy is available directly against the state.
For deprivations that are predictable and state-authorized, the Due
Process Clause might be satisfied as long as state courts entertain pre-
deprivation, Ex parte Young-type actions against the responsible state
officials."8 Recall that General Oil Co. v. Crain38' implies that the Constitution
does indeed require state courts to entertain Exparte Young-type actions, even
if state law bars private, state-court actions directly against the state." 2 The
Crain Court left unclear whether that requirement rests on the Supremacy
Clause alone or on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned:
"If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national courts by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a state to
its courts, . . . it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent the
enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution; and the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of
its operation." '383
In support of that reasoning, the Court cited Exparte Young,3"' a decision that
the Court has linked to the Supremacy Clause.38 5
Parratt, Hudson, and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. REv. 813, 832-43 (1987) (same).
7 Cf DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 687-90 (1 th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 601 (1997) (holding that Eleventh Amendment and principles of federalism
barred claims by local school district for reimbursement from state for costs of complying with
desegregation order); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252-53 (1985)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment barred county's cross-claim against state for indemnity and
that indemnity claim raised only issue of state law).
380 See supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text (discussing Ex parte Young).
381 209 U.S. 211 (1908); see supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text (discussing Crain).
382 See Crain, 209 U.S. at 220-28.
311 Id. at 226.
384 See id. at 227 (citing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
385 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("the availability of prospective
relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause"); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984) (Exparte Young doctrine rests
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Under the analysis of the Supremacy Clause proposed in this Article,
however, the holding in Crain should rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, rather
than the Supremacy Clause. This Article has argued the Supremacy Clause does
not, of its own force, expand the jurisdiction of state courts except by
invalidating discriminatory state-law restrictions on their jurisdiction. In the
absence of such a restriction, the Supremacy Clause does not compel a state
court to hear any action that falls outside its jurisdiction, even an action against
a state officer alleging a constitutional violation. As discussed above, however,
the Due Process Clause generally requires a state to provide a meaningful pre-
deprivation remedy for predictable and state-authorized deprivations. An Ex
parte Young-type suit in state court seems to provide the remedy required by due
process in this situation."
The interpretation of Crain proposed here-which would base its result
on the Due Process Clause rather than the Supremacy Clause alone-has two
main implications. First, it would mean a state would not have to allow its
courts to entertain Exparte Young-type actions, as long as the state provided an
adequate alternative remedy." 7 That is because of the remedial flexibility
allowed to states under due process precedent.388 Second, even in the absence
of an alternative remedy, state courts would not have to hear Ex parte Young-
type actions that did not allege a wrongful deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process. As a result, state courts would not have to hear
some Ex parte Young-type actions that could be brought in federal court.
Specifically, the state courts would not have to hear actions that alleged a
violation of federal law that did not entail a deprivation of life, liberty, or
on the need to "vindicate the supreme authority of federal law"); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 277 (1986) (explaining that Exparte Young actions will not lie in federal courts for
violations of state law, because in such actions "federal supremacy is not implicated"). Cf
David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv.
L. REv. 61, 83-84 (1984) (expressing qualified praise for Pennhurst's "emphasis on the
subordination of immunity doctrine to federal interests").
386 Accord Vfzquez, supra note 13, at 1710.
387 In any event, all 50 states appear to allow Exparte Young-type actions to be brought in
their own courts. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2058 n. 15 (1997) (citing
cases). But cf id. at 2035-36 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that
Ex parte Young actions have been justified primarily when no relief was available in state
court).
388 See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,
51 (1990) (observing that state had discretion in crafting remedies for illegal taxation); see also
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986) (rejecting argument that state did not satisfy due process because it authorized a suit
against itself for official's destruction of property but did not allow a suit against official).
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property, even though federal courts can hear such actions under the Ex parte
Young doctrine.389 By the same token, state courts would have to hear actions
alleging a violation of state law that entailed a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, 3' even though federal courts cannot hear such actions under the Ex
parte Young doctrine.39
The foregoing analysis indicates that due process is satisfied as long as
state courts hear private actions against the state- officials responsible for due
process violations. This analysis may conflict, however, with a line of cases that
could be read to mean that the Due Process Clause is not always satisfied by the
availability of a state-court remedy against the responsible official.3"
The best known case in that line is McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco. There, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause required a state to provide a "clear and certain remedy for any erroneous
or unlawful tax collection" and that this remedy would sometimes have to
consist of a refund by the state.3 The scope of the McKesson holding is
unclear. In that case and later cases citing its "clear and certain remedy"
holding, the state let taxpayers sue it for refunds in its own courts.3" It is
389 The Court has always assumed that Ex parte Young actions will lie in federal court not
only for violations of the Constitution but also for violations of rights conferred by federal statutes.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) ("[W]e often have found federal
jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive
relief in order to end a continuing violation of federal law.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
'90 Cf Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 83-84, 133 (arguing that early Supreme Court case
law indicates that "remedies for some state law violations may be constitutionally required").
391 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984) (holding that
Eleventh Amendment bars federal-court action against state official for violations of state law).
392 See, e.g., McKesson, 496 U.S. at 18.
393 Id. at 39 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also National Private Truck
Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 587 (1995) (observing that McKesson
principle may entail state refund); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 755 (1995)
(discussing when McKesson requires state to refund taxes under unconstitutional state law).
"' See McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 24-25 & n.4; see also Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Dep't
of Revenue, 118 S. Ct. 904, 904 (1998) (per curiam); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325,
329, 346 (1996) (citing McKesson in case brought in state court under state tax refund statute);
Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1994); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86, 90-91 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 533 (1991). Cf
National Private Truck Council, Inc., 515 U.S. at 585-86 (state permitted state-court suits for
refund of unconstitutional state taxes); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.
334, 339, 348-49 (1992) (citing McKesson to indicate remedial obligations of state in case
brought against state official in its own courts apparently without immunity objection by state);
Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 199-200, 205 (1991) (state court
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possible the McKesson principle is limited to situations in which the state has
consented to suits directly against it.395 If McKesson is so limited, then it would
not prevent a state from meeting its due process obligations by allowing its
courts to entertain actions against its officers rather than against itself. On the
other hand, McKesson could be read to require state courts to hear tax refund
suits directly against the state even if state law forbids state-court suits against
the state.3" So read, McKesson would establish that, at least with respect to
illegal taxation, the Due Process Clause compels a state court to entertain an
action directly against the state.397
held that federal statute did not create cause of action against state in state court, and Court
reviewed this "pure question of statutory interpretation," without addressing immunity issue);
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1991) (state court heard action against state officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 apparently without immunity objection by state). But cf Ward v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920) (holding, in action brought in state court under
state refund statute, that county had to refund taxes collected in violation of federal law; and
stating in dicta that "no statutory authority was essential to enable or require the county to
refund the money"); HART & WECHSLER 4th ed., supra note 15, at 850 (suggesting that Ward
may have "merely ensur[ed] that the state courts were applying state remedial rules on a non-
discriminatory basis to a claim based on federal law"). In two ofthe cases following McKesson,
the state court unexpectedly interpreted a state refund statute so as to deny relief under that
statute to a taxpayer who sought a post-deprivation remedy in state court, on the ground that the
taxpayer should have sought pre-deprivation relief. See Newsweek, 118 S. Ct. at 904; Reich,
513 U.S. at 111. The Court properly rejected this "bait and switch" gambit, for the gambit itself
violated the Due Process Clause. See Newsweek, 118 S. Ct. at 905; Reich, 513 U.S. at 111; see
also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 679-82 (1930) (holding due
process violated by state court interpretation denying relief because of exhaustion requirement
that did not exist under prior state court precedent).
395 In Reich, the Court described McKesson broadly, to "stand for the proposition that 'a
denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of
the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment,' the
sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding." Reich, 513
U.S. at 109-10 (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369 (1930)) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This statement is dictum, because the state in Reich had
enacted a tax refund scheme that had been construed, until the decision before the Court in
Reich, to authorize post-deprivation refund suits against the state to recover state taxes collected
in violation of federal law. See id. at 11; see also supra note 394 (discussing "bait and
switch" decisions).
396 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER 4th ed., supra note 15, at 379 (reading Reich this way);
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 247, at 1824-28 (apparently reading McKesson this way);
Monaghan, supra note 23, at 125 (reading Reich this way); Vdzquez, supra note 13, at 1689
(same); Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REv. 188, 192-98 (1990)
(apparently reading McKesson this way).
311 Some commentators have argued that, in addition to the Due Process Clause, the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment (which applies to the states under the Fourteenth
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Amendment) overrides any immunity that states enjoy in their own courts. See Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment incorporates Just
Compensation Clause). They base this argument on First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). See Fallon, supra note 5, at 1211 n.318
(describing First English as holding that the Just Compensation Clause obligates state courts
to provide damages for temporary or permanent takings); Scott P. Glauberman, Citizen Suits
Against States: The Exclusive Jurisdiction Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 63, 96
n. 194 (1997) (citing First English for the proposition that "the state cannot exert sovereign
immunity in state court against a takings claim"); see also Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and
Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37, 57
(1995) (stating that, "after First English, no state court is free to reject a compensation award
where a taking is found"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309,370 (1993) (citing First English
as "requir[ing] state courts to give remedies for Takings Clause... violations"). Cf Beermann,
supra note 378, at 283 & n.22 (1988) (citing First English to argue that "state sovereign and
official immunities, insofar as they bar recovery when private parties would be liable for similar
conduct, are unconstitutional under the takings clause"). First English, however, did not hold
that the Just Compensation Clause overrides a state's immunity in its own courts by requiring
state courts to hear Just Compensation claims against their own state. See First English, 482
U.S. at 318. Instead, the Court in First English held that the Just Compensation Clause requires
the government to compensate a landowner for "temporary" regulatory takings-i.e. "for the
period of time during which regulations deny a landowner all use of his land." Id. See also id.
at 321 ("We merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked a taking
of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."). The First English
Court further held that the government's duty to pay compensation under the Just Compensation
Clause is self-executing. See id. at 315. This means the Clause itself creates a cause of action
against the government. The state court in First English had therefore erred by dismissing a
claim for compensation on the ground that state law did not supply a cause of action to support
the claim. See id. (observing that "'[s]tatutory recognition [of right to compensation for
governmental taking] was not necessary') (quoting Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16
(1933)). The question whether a plaintiff has a cause of action in a state court, however, is
distinct from the question whether the defendant has immunity from that cause of action. See,
e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 112 (1984) (criticizing dissent's
position for confusing issue of sovereign immunity with issue of existence of cause of action);
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 692-93 (1949) (criticizing
plaintiff's theory for "confus[ing] the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that
a plaintiff state a cause of action"); see also Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 565 (1988)
(distinguishing issue whether Title VII authorized recovery of interest from issue whether
Congress had waived federal government's sovereign immunity from interest award); supra
notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing Hilton). First English held only that the Just
Compensation Clause created a cause of action for a temporary taking. The Court did not
address whether the Clause also overrides state sovereign immunity. See First English, 482
U.S. at 304.
While the Just Compensation Clause may not override a state's immunity in its own
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Under the latter reading, taxpayers would be treated better than some
other due process claimants.39 The Court has established that the victims of
"random and unauthorized" deprivations of liberty and property are entitled only
to sue the offending state officer in state court.3" As discussed above, that
remedy may be illusory.' A broad reading of McKesson would give the
victims of wrongful taxation, in contrast, a "clear and certain remedy" in state
court directly against the state. This difference seems unfair, considering that
the victims of random and unauthorized deprivation may include victims of
police misconduct and other state action that violates liberty interests, as
distinguished from property interests.4°1
courts, the Due Process Clause may do so. The Due Process Clause does not require pre-
deprivation procedures when the government takes property for public use, just as that Clause
does not require pre-deprivation procedures for the government's collection of taxes. See, e.g.,
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment
does not require that just compensation be paid in advance of or even contemporaneously with
the taking." (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 194 (1985)); United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17,21 (1958) (stating that federal government
can exercise eminent domain by entering into physical possession of property without a court
order, in which case property owner's remedy lies in post-deprivation suit under Tucker Act);
Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932). The Due Process Clause does, however, require
"the existence of a 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation' at
the time of the taking."' Preseault, 494 U.S. at 11 (citing The Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974)). The question remains whether a state's obligation under the Due
Process Clause to provide "'an adequate process for obtaining compensation,"' id. (quoting
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 194-95), can be met only by allowing itself to be sued in its own
courts. McKesson suggests an affirmative answer to that question, as discussed in the text. See
also United States v. Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2381 n.14 (1997) ("It is within the power of the
States... to transfer some adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies, with opportunity
for subsequent judicial review.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In any event, if state
courts have an obligation to hear claims against their own state for Just Compensation claims
(as well as claims for wrongfully collected taxes), notwithstanding the state's retention of
immunity in its own courts, that obligation stems from the Due Process Clause, rather than the
Just Compensation Clause. In hereafter discussing the possible existence of such an obligation,
references in the text to claims by taxpayers should be understood also to include claims by
victims of governmental takings.
... See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 247, at 1827.
39 See supra note 375 and accompanying text (discussing state-court remedy required by
Due Process Clause for "random and unauthorized" deprivations of liberty or property).
0 See supra notes 377-79 and accompanying text.
401 Justice O'Connor cited this disparity as a reason to allow states to assert a type of
qualified immunity defense against retroactive liability for the collection of taxes later found to
be unconstitutional. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 135-36 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I do not see why the Due Process Clause would require a full,
backwards-looking compensatory remedy whenever a governmental official reasonably taxes
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A plausible reason to treat tax cases differently from others may exist.
A "clear and certain," post-deprivation, state-court remedy directly against the
state might be justified in tax cases as a trade-off for the state's freedom from
having to provide the pre-deprivation remedy that the Due Process Clause
requires for other predictable, state-authorized deprivations.' If the state were
required to provide pre-deprivation means by which a taxpayer could avoid
wrongful taxation-by, say, getting a state-court injunction against the collector
of taxes-taxpayers would have a "clear and certain" remedy. The state's strong
interest in collecting taxes withoutjudicial interferencejustifies dispensing with
the pre-deprivation timing of a remedy, but does not justify dispensing with its
"clear and certain" quality.f3 This trade-off does not occur with respect to other
predictable, state-authorized deprivations, for which the state generally cannot
dispense with pre-deprivation procedures.4 And the trade-off is not possible
for random and unauthorized deprivations, because, by their nature, they cannot
be prevented before they occur.' This trade-off theory is plausible because it
imposes a special burden on states to counterbalance their special latitude in tax
cases to dispense with pre-deprivation procedures. The theory is no better than
plausijle, though, because it does not come to grips with the inequitable
treatment of taxpayers, on the one hand, and certain victims of liberty
deprivations, on the other.
This difference in treatment would disappear if McKesson were read
narrowly, as establishing a remedial principle applicable only, but whenever,
the state allowed itself to be sued in its own courts. So read, McKesson would
require a state itself to provide a "clear and certain remedy" for other types of
deprivations, besides the collection of taxes, to the extent that the state
a citizen under what later turns out to be an unconstitutional statute but not where the officer
deprives a citizen of her bodily integrity or her life.").
402 See National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 586-
87 (1995) (discussing "the longstanding federal reluctance to interfere with state taxation").
403 See id. at 587 ("As long as state law provides a 'clear and certain remedy,' the states may
determine whether to provide predeprivation process (e.g., an injunction) or instead to afford
post-deprivation relief (e.g., a refund).") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted);
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 247, at 1826.
41 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) ("[T]he Court usually has held
that the Constitution requires some kind of hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty
or property."); see also id. at 125-26 ("'Procedural due process rules are meant to protect
persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life,
liberty, or property."') (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978)).
405 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
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consented to suit on claims for non-tax-related deprivations.4"6 If, for example,
a state permitted state-court suits against it for the torts of its employees, it
would be obligated to provide a clear and certain remedy-including an award
out of the state treasury-when those torts constituted violations of the Due
Process Clause. On the other hand, if the state preserved its immunity from
lawsuits in its own courts, victims of wrongful taxation, as well as victims of
random and unauthorized deprivations, could only sue the responsible officers
in post-deprivation, state-court suits.4°7
A narrow reading of McKesson is supported by two other
considerations. First, it construes the Due Process Clause to be congruent with
the historical remedy for wrongful tax collections, which was a suit against the
tax official for personal damages.48 Second, it makes the remedy available for
wrongful state taxation in state court more congruent with the remedy available
for wrongful state taxation in federal court. A taxpayer cannot obtain a refund
from the state treasury in a federal-court action because of the Eleventh
4o See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text (discussing state waiver of state-court
immunity); cf The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 396, at 197
("McKesson's requirement of redress for unconstitutional taxes... may not be generalizable.").
40 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 247, at 1825 (explaining that, broadly read, McKesson
"poses something of a puzzle" considering that, "[ijn the vast majority of cases, sovereign
immunity and related doctrines bar unconsented suits for payment of funds directly out of state
and federal treasuries").
408 See Barney v. Rickard, 157 U.S. 352, 355 (1895) ("Actions against collectors for money
had and received depended originally on common-law principles."); Elliott v. Swartwout, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 156-57 (1836) (discussing English case law allowing suits against collectors
of government revenue); see also, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223
U.S. 280, 285-86 (1912) (holding that taxpayer who paid unconstitutional state tax under duress
was entitled to "clear and certain" remedy, which consisted in that case of suit against state
taxing official); Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 249 (1965)
(including "[t]he suit against an officer for improper collection of taxes" among the "traditional"
cases in which judicial remedy was available for governmental wrongdoing). See generally
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND
MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE, WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND FOREIGN
LAW § 307, at 380-81 (Charles P. Greenough ed., 9th ed. 1882) (recounting that public officers
could be held personally liable for illegally, but under color of office, taking money or other
property from third parties), id. § 320, at 398 (discussing tort liability of public officers in
general) (5th ed. 1857); cf Pfander, History, supra note 23, at 1303 (when Constitution was
drafted, "suits against federal officers were expected to provide a method of securing ajudicial
determination of the legality of much executive action."). Under the Court's precedent, a
remedy's long history supports the conclusion that it satisfies the Due Process Clause. See
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 672-76 (1977); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884).
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Amendment.' Instead, the taxpayer may only sue the taxing official personally,
in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (and then only if no adequate state remedy
is available).10 Under a narrow reading of McKesson, such a personal action
likewise would be the only remedy that due process would require in state court.
In sum, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
appear to require a state court to hear private actions against its own state for
violations of the Clause. If the state immunizes itself from such actions,
however, the Clause compels state courts to entertain actions against the
responsible officials. When the violation consists of a random and unauthorized
deprivation of life, liberty, or property, the victim can, after the deprivation
occurs, sue the responsible state official in state court for money damages out
of the official's own pocket. When the violation consists of a predictable and
state-authorized deprivation, the victim can, before the deprivation occurs, sue
the responsible state official in state court for prospective relief.
4,'
4 See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110 (1994).
410 See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981)
(construing § 1983, in light of principles of comity, to bar action under that provision
challenging state tax system on federal grounds); see also National Private Truck Council, Inc.
v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 589 (1995) (holding that § 1983 does not require
state courts to award declaratory or injunctive relief against state taxation that violates federal
law as long as adequate state remedy exists).
4 Professor Vfzquez believes that the McKesson line of cases should be reinterpreted so
as to rest on the Supremacy Clause instead of the Due Process Clause. See Vdzquez, supra note
13, at 1744-90. As he reads McKesson, it "appears to require a damage remedy from the state
for every violation of mandatory obligations imposed on the state by federal statute for the
benefit of individuals, even if Congress has chosen not to provide a damage remedy." Id. at
1764. He argues that, so read, McKesson has two doctrinal defects. See id. at 1766. First, it
conflicts with "the many decisions affirming Congress's power to impose mandatory obligations
on states without subjecting them or their officials to damage liability." Id. Second, it enables
Congress easily to avoid the holding in Seminole Tribe that Congress cannot use Article I to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 1746. It does so by allowing Congress to use its
Article I powers to create "property" protected by the Due Process Clause and then to use its
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize private actions directly
against the states for deprivations of that "property." See id. at 1691 (describing this potential
for circumvention, and calling it the "abrogation reductio"); id. at 1744-90 (proposing
reinterpretation of McKesson as Supremacy Clause decision in order to avoid the "reductio" and
to make McKesson consistent with Congress's remedial discretion for state violations of federal
statutory rights). He contends that these defects would disappear if the Supremacy Clause
replaced the Due Process Clause as the basis for the McKesson line of cases. See id. at 1782.
First, the Supremacy Clause would leave Congress with the flexibility to prescribe the remedies
for state violations of federal statutory rights. See id. at 1782-83. Second, Supremacy Clause
precedent would require state courts to provide a damages remedy only against state officers,
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rather than the state itself; the Supremacy-Clause reinterpretation, thus, would prevent Congress
from using its Article I powers to override the immunity that states enjoy under the Eleventh
Amendment from private lawsuits directly against them in federal and, as Professor Vdzquez
interprets the Eleventh Amendment, see supra note 256 and accompanying text, in their own
courts. See id. at 1770-77.
The doctrinal problems identified by Professor Vizquez are real, but I do not think it is
necessary to reinterpret McKesson as a Supremacy Clause case to avoid them. As I understand
his reading of McKesson, it rests on the premises that: (1) whenever Congress imposes on states
a mandatory obligation that confers individual benefits, Congress has created a "property"
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; (2) the Due Process
Clause requires the courts of a state that has wrongfully deprived someone of the property so
created to award damages for that deprivation, even if Congress did not intend damages to be
available; and (3) McKesson holds that the damages remedy must be available directly against
the state. I dispute each premise. First, the Court has indicated that there are limits on
Congress's power to create property. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84
(1980) ("Nor as a general proposition is the United States, as opposed to the several States,
possessed of residual authority that enables it to define 'property' in the first instance."); see
also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2166 (1997) (Section 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment does not empower Congress "to legislate generally upon life, liberty, and
property") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Just because Congress can-under
the Commerce Clause, for example-impose substantive obligations on states and, thereby, create
private benefits, that does not mean every such obligation creates "property" for due process
purposes. Second, even if Congress acts under a constitutional power that encompasses the
power to create "property" for due process purposes-the Patent Clause, as a possible
example-that does not automatically give Congress the power under Section 5 to authorize suits
against the states for deprivations of that property, for the reason recognized by Professor
Vizquez and discussed in Section B: Congress can protect property from state deprivations
under Section 5 only if it reasonably concludes that the states are not themselves providing the
remedies required by due process for such deprivations. Cf Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
125-26 (1990) (violation of procedural due process "is not complete when the deprivation
occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process"). See infra
notes 420-23, 441 and accompanying text. Nor does Congress's creation of "property" in an
Article I statute necessarily deprive Congress of the discretion to limit the remedies available
for the states' violations of that statute. Professor Vizquez believes that this discretion is
defeated by the Court's rejection of the "bitter with the sweet" rationale articulated by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by two other Justices, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974). See VAzquez, supra note 13, at 1768. The bitter-with-the-sweet rationale held that,
when the government creates a private benefit and limits its own discretion to terminate that
benefit, thereby creating a "property" interest protected by due process, the government can
prescribe whatever procedures it wishes to terminate the benefit; those procedures provide all
the process that is constitutionally due. See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153-55 (plurality opinion). In
ClevelandBoard of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the Court rejected the bitter-
with-the-sweet rationale, holding that the procedures prescribed in a statute that created a
property right were subject to judicial review to determine whether they provided the process
that was "due" under the Constitution. See id. at 541. The bitter-with-the-sweet rationale
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B. Congress's Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause
Even if the Due Process Clause, of its own force, never compels a state
court to entertain a private action directly against its own state, the question
remains whether Congress can exert such compulsion to enforce the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That is an especially difficult
question after the recent decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores."' The Court there
announced for the first time that, when Congress legislates under Section 5,
"[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the [constitutional]
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."' 3 The
Court did not explain precisely how this new standard restricts Congress's
power under Section 5. The Court did offer some guidance, however, that
illuminates Congress's power under Section 5 to force state courts to hear claims
against their own state.
The Court in Boerne confirmed Congress's power under Section 5 to
concerned a context quite different from that under discussion. It concerned whether the
government had discretion to determine the procedures for its own deprivation of the benefit
that it had created. In rejecting the rationale, the Court did not address its validity for a situation
in which one sovereign (the federal government) creates property and prescribes the remedies
for deprivation of that property by other sovereigns (the states). That situation does not present
the danger that the government is trying to reserve its own latitude to take away the property
arbitrarily or invidiously, a danger that may well have underlain the Court's rejection of the
"bitter with the sweet" rationale. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239
(1957) (hearing required by due process necessary to ensure against "invidiously
discriminatory" action); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889) (concept of due
process came from England, where it was "designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary
action of the crown"). For that reason, I do not believe that the Court's rejection of the bitter-
with-the-sweet rationale prevents Congress from deciding what remedies are appropriate for a
state's violation of property rights created by a federal statute. At the very least, in light of the
difference between this context and the one in which the "bitter with the sweet" rationale was
rejected, the "many decisions" cited by Professor Vdzquez, see Vdzquez, supra note 13 at 1766,
would support a strong presumption that the procedures prescribed by Congress for remedying
the states' infringement of a federal statutory right were all that were constitutionally "due."
Finally, as to Professor Vdzquez's third apparent premise, the McKesson line of cases need not
be read to hold that the Due Process Clause requires a state-court monetary remedy directly
against the state, for the reason discussed above in the text accompanying note 394: In each of
the McKesson cases, the state authorized suits directly against it in its own courts and thereby
waived immunity.
412 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
4,3 Id. at 2164.
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enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." 4 The Court
emphasized, however, that Section 5 does not encompass "[t]he power to
'legislate generally upon' life, liberty, and property.""41 Instead, the Court
described Congress's power under Section 5 as "remedial and preventive."'"
6
The Court meant that, when the states are violating the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress can pass a law to remedy past violations and prevent future ones.
Congress can also use Section 5 to regulate or prohibit some state conduct that
does not violate the Constitution." 7 For example, the Court held that Congress
could, under its "parallel power" to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, suspend
all literacy tests for voting-even though the only ones that violated the Fifteenth
Amendment were ones that were adopted or maintained intentionally to
discriminate against blacks -because Congress reasonably concluded many of
the tests were adopted or maintained because of intentional discrimination.4""
But Congress cannot use a cannon to kill a flea; the means prescribed by the law
to remedy or prevent constitutional violations must be proportional to those
violations.419
These principles place two major conditions on Congress's power under
Section 5 to enforce the Due Process Clause. First, Congress must be able
reasonably to conclude that the states are violating the Clause. Boerne suggests
that the perceived violations would have to be widespread and numerous for
Congress to pass a law that applied nationwide and indefinitely.42 In striking
down a federal law enacted under Section 5, the Court in Boerne stressed the
lack of evidence of recent constitutional violations of the sort that the law was
designed to prevent.42 By comparison, the Boerne Court remarked that, in prior
decisions upholding federal laws enacted to enforce the Civil War Amendments,
it had found a legislative record of "subsisting and pervasive" constitutional
violations.4" The Court left unclear whether Congress must have evidence of
414 See id. at 2163 ("The 'provisions of this article,' to which § 5 refers, include the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
415 Id. at 2166 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 15 (1883)).
416 Id.
417 See id. at 2170.
411 See id at 2163 (discussing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308 (1966), and
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)).
419 See id. at 2164 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
[constitutional] injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end").
420 See id. at 2167.
421 See id. at 2169.
422 Id. at 2167.
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a "widespread pattern" of such violations before acting.423 The Court
nonetheless implied that some evidence of current and prevalent violations must
exist.
Second, Congress must enact a law that targets the perceived due
process violations. In Boerne, the Court said Congress can prohibit "certain
types" of state laws "when there is reason to believe that many of the laws
affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional. 424 The Court struck down the statute in Boerne as overly
broad because it subjected to strict judicial scrutiny any state or local law a
person could show substantially burdened his or her exercise of religion. 41 It
thus "intru[ded] at every level of government, displacing laws ... of almost
every description and regardless of subject matter. ' 26 The Court also noted the
statute "ha[d] no termination date or termination mechanism." 27 That
distinguished it from the federal statute the Court had upheld in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach,42 which was limited in both duration and geographic scope.429
Thus, Boerne suggests Congress must aim with some precision at the state
practices that cause the constitutional violations Congress seeks to remedy or
prevent.
One can envision facts that would empower Congress to enforce the
Due Process Clause against the states. Suppose Congress found widespread
evidence of excessive brutality by state and local police. Such conduct violates
fundamental rights-specifically, the freedom from unreasonable
seizures-protected by the Due Process Clause.43° Suppose Congress also found
that, in many areas of the country: high-level state and local officials condoned
the brutality; state law required victims of the brutality to exhaust lengthy and
often futile administrative procedures before they could present a claim in state
423 Id. at 2169 (finding no evidence before Congress of "widespread pattern of religious
discrimination").
424 Id. at 2170.
42 See id. at 2162 (describing Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)).
426 Id. at 2170.
427 id.
428 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
429 See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 (noting that federal statutory provisions upheld in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), "were confined to those regions of the country
where voting discrimination had been most flagrant, and affected a discrete class of state laws,"
and had termination provisions triggered by covered state's showing an absence of substantial
discrimination for past five years).
430 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
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court; state law imposed other unreasonable requirements for this sort of state-
court claim, such as too-short statutes of limitation; and victims of police
brutality who obtained money judgments against the offending police officers
in state court could seldom collect on those judgments because so many police
officers werejudgment-proof. It seems plain these circumstances would justify
legislation under Section 5.
Even in this setting, Boerne would place some legislation out of bounds.
Congress probably could not forbid the state and local governments from having
police departments and create, in their stead, a nationwide, permanent, federal
police force.431 That would be "a considerable congressional intrusion into the
States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health
and welfare of its citizens." '432 It would be much less intrusive-and almost
certainly permissible-for Congress to create a federal cause of action for
unconstitutional police brutality that was enforceable in state court by an
injunction or an award of money damages against the state. Congress could
probably go even further, by making states liable for specific police practices,
such as chokeholds, which, it found, may not always violate the Constitution but
do so in many instances.433
Although the hypothetical statute involves deprivations of liberty
interests, Congress could respond in a similar way to egregious and widespread
deprivations of property. Legislation proposed in the last Congress provides a
possible example. The legislation was premised on Congress's belief that many
states and localities are violating the landowners' due process rights by failing
to provide adequate remedies for land use regulation that, in some instances,
takes property without just compensation.4 34 The legislation responded to this
perceived problem by cutting back judicially-developed restrictions on takings
claims brought in federal court against state officials under § 1983.43
'3" Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) ("The Constitution... withhold[s]
from Congress a plenary police power").
432 Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
431 Cf Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,115 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing
use of chokehold in case holding that plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunction against
continued use of chokeholds).
414 See Citizens Access to Justice Act of 1998, H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. § 2(1) (1998)
(finding that "property rights have been abrogated" by state and local regulations "that adversely
affect the value and the ability to make reasonable use of private property"); H.R. REP. No. 105-
323 (finding that local land use process "can take years for property owners who are left in
regulatory limbo due to the local entities' failure to make a final decision as to what land use
is permitted").
411 See H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. § 6(c) (restricting federal courts' use of abstention and
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A difficult question remains about Congress's power under Section 5
to enforce the Due Process Clause: To what extent can Congress use its Article
I powers to create "property" protected by the Due Process Clause and then use
its Section 5 powers to authorize private suits against states for "depriv[ations]"
of that property?. 6 For example, could Congress use its Commerce Clause
powers to create a "property" interest in the receipt of a minimum wage and use
its Section 5 powers to authorize private, federal-court actions against states that
"deprived" their employees of that right by paying them lower wages? If so,
Congress seemingly could circumvent Seminole Tribe, which prevents Congress
from using Article I powers to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment directly. The
question has arisen, so far, only in the context of federal laws that abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment by authorizing private suits against the states in federal
court." 7 Nonetheless, the same question would be posed by Article I laws
authorizing such suits in state court, if Congress lacks power under Article I to
compel state courts to hear such suits. In each setting, the limit on Congress's
use of Article I to authorize private actions against states would be no limit at all
if Congress could routinely overcome it by relying on Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.43
A complete exploration of this question would require the author to
begin a new article even as this one draws to a close. It is worth noting,
however, there are two important restrictions on Congress's ability to
circumvent Seminole Tribe in the way just described. First, Congress does not
ripeness doctrines).
436 See, e.g., Vdzquez, supra note 13, at 1691-92, 1744-66.
431 Compare Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 287-91 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that federal provision authorizing suits against states for copyright violations was not valid
exercise of Section 5, partly because recognition of broad power under Section 5 to enforce
Article I property rights would negate Seminole Tribe); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 357-62 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S.
Ct. 790 (1999) (No. 98-149) (holding that Lanham Act was unconstitutional as applied in
private suit against state for false advertising), and Schlossberg v. Maryland Comptroller of
Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (4th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998) (using same rationale to hold that federal
provision allowing bankruptcy claims against states exceeded Section 5), with College Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 770 (1990) (No. 98-531) (holding that federal provision
authorizing suits against states for patent infringement was a valid exercise of Section 5).
411 See Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146-47 (finding Seminole Tribe "inconsistent
with any reading that would extend Congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to reincorporate express Article I powers").
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have unlimited power to create "property" under Article ." In particular, it is
not clear that Congress's authority to "regulate" interstate commerce empowers
it to create a "property" right, say, to be free from state laws that burden such
commerce.' ° Second, Congress's creation of a property interest under Article
I does not automatically trigger its power under Section 5. If the states
themselves provide constitutionally adequate procedures for preventing or
remedying their wrongful deprivations of congressionally-created property
interests-by, for example, authorizing post-deprivation tort suits against state
officers for "random and unauthorized" deprivations and pre-deprivation, Ex
parte Young-type suits for predictable, state-authorized derivations-Congress
would lack the factual predicate that Boerne seems to require for a Section 5
response."
Nonetheless, Congress can sometimes enforce the Due Process Clause
by authorizing suits directly against a state in its own courts, even if the state has
retained its immunity from such suits and even if the Due Process Clause,
standing alone, would never require the state to permit such a suit. It is hard
under current precedent to identify all of the circumstances in which Congress
can do so. The precedent does strongly suggest, though, that the power is not
4" See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) ("Nor as a general
proposition is the United States, as opposed to the several States, possessed of residual authority
that enables it to define 'property' in the first instance."); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117
S. Ct. 2157, 2166 (1997) (Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment does not empower Congress "to
legislate generally upon life, liberty, and property") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 360-61 (holding that tort of unfair competition created
by Lanham Act did not constitute "property" for purposes of Due Process Clause). Cf College
Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1352 (holding that patent constituted "property" for purposes of Due
Process Clause).
440 Cf. College Say. Bank 131 F.3d at 361 ("If a state's conduct impacting on a business
always implicated the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would have almost unrestricted power
to subject states to suit through the exercise of its abrogation power.... This result would be
unacceptable and would conflict directly with the strict limits on Congress's powers to abrogate
a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity."). But cf Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443-51
(1991) (holding that suits for violation of Commerce Clause may be brought under § 1983,
because Clause creates a "right" protected by § 1983).
"' See Vdzquez, supra note 13, at 1753-63. Cf Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26
(1990) (violation of procedural due process "is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is
not complete unless and until the State falls to provide due process"); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (1Ith Cir. 1998) (holding that provision of Americans with
Disabilities Act authorizing private, federal-court actions against states fell within Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment; relying in part on congressional finding that disabled people
suffered from "a history of purposeful unequal treatment,") (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)





This Article attempts to answer an important question posed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida in a way that is faithful
to the Court's precedent. Under Seminole Tribe, Congress cannot use its Article
I powers to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private
actions in federal court. Yet, Congress can still use Article I to impose generally
applicable, substantive obligations on the states, such as an obligation to pay its
employees a minimum wage. This Article has addressed the question whether
Congress can, in the exercise of its Article I powers, compel state courts to hear
private actions to enforce these obligations against their own state. The Article
concludes Congress cannot do so, because of the Tenth Amendment.
The states' Tenth Amendment immunity in their own courts is limited,
however, by the Supremacy Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that
permit or require state courts to discriminate against federal claims, including
claims against the state. In addition, the Clause requires state courts to hear
those federal claims if they have power to do so under the neutral state law that
remains when discriminatory laws are disregarded. The Due Process Clause
requires states to provide adequate procedures in connection with deprivations
of life, liberty, or property. Those procedures include an obligation on the part
of state courts to entertain actions against state officials responsible for wrongful
deprivations. Moreover, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress can, under some circumstances, compel state courts to entertain
actions directly against their own state.
Recognition that the Tenth Amendment protects states from private
suits in their own courts would represent a major doctrinal development, but it
would not radically change things, as a practical matter. Congress has never
forced state courts to hear claims against their own state over the state's
objection."2 The question whether Congress can do so arises only because
Seminole Tribe gives Congress an incentive to try. Moreover, while this Article
argues Congress cannot use Article I to force state courts to hear suits against
states that have preserved their immunity in state court, nothing prevents the
442 Cf Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 191 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The simple
fact is that from 1789 to this day no act of Congress has attempted to force upon state courts the
duty of enforcing any right created by federal law on terms other than those on which like
litigation involving rights other than federal rights is required to be conducted in a state court.").
1998-99]
BRANDEIS LA WJOURNAL
states from waiving immunity. Indeed, many states have wholly or partly
waived their state-court immunity in recent years," 3 and, under Testa v. Katt,
such a state-court waiver exposes a state to suits on claims arising from the same
facts as do the claims permitted under the waiver. It is doubtful that states will
reverse the trend of waiving their immunity as long as Congress does not begin
indiscriminately enacting laws exposing them to private lawsuits in their own
courts.
44' See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 n.28 (1980) (stating all but a
handful of states waive their immunity from tort suits for governmental functions); John Evans
Taylor, Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 GA. L. REv. 513, 527-32
(1983) (surveying state laws waiving sovereign immunity).
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